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In July 2011, Minster of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism, Jason Kenney, 
announced the beginning of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown, an initiative to revoke, on mass 
scale, citizenship and Permanent Resident status obtained through fraudulent means. The 
initiative strived to purge Canada of past, present, and future citizenship fraud on a scale never 
seen before. The Crackdown cited 11,000 cases of fraud under investigation. Despite its rhetoric 
of eliminating fraud, the Crackdown failed to uncover wide scale deception in the citizenship 
program. I evaluate the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown through public discourse analysis, a 
review of internal Citizenship and Immigration Canada documents, and through interviews with 
individuals implicated in the investigations. The case study highlights racial and neoliberal 
underpinnings present in Canadian citizenship, and interesting tensions within citizenship 
reforms. The first tension is the push to require greater physical presence in Canada, at a time 
when globalization promotes neoliberal subjects living transnational lives. A second tension is 
fracturing of citizenship rights along the lines of dual citizens and single-citizens, even though 
both types of citizens are offered the same protections under the law. I argue the Citizenship 
Fraud Crackdown represents a form of nation-building that is fueled by racism and facilitated by 
the neoliberal crime-and-security agenda. I also argue that neoliberalism does not just operate 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION: STRENGTHENING THE VALUE 
OF CANADIAN CITIZENSHIP  
 
The stories that we tell are powerful. They spark our emotions, help us learn, and, most 
importantly, help us make sense of the world around us. A story can be a factual or fictional 
account. This does not, in fact, matter; what makes a story powerful is its reiteration. Through 
reiteration stories escalate to ideologies. Bonilla-Silva (2010) eloquently explains: 
What makes story lines “ideological” is that story tellers and their audiences 
share a representational world that makes these stories seem factual. Hence, by 
telling and retelling these story lines, members of a social group strengthen their 
collective understanding about how and why the world is the way it is. (p.76) 
 
When stories become ideologies they perpetuate certain ways of thinking and knowing, which in 
turn upholds social systems and institutions. Bonilla-Silva (2010) argues, for example, that racist 
structures are upheld through racist ideologies. He traces how the emergence of race in human 
history formed social structures (a racialized social system) that awarded systemic privileges to 
Europeans (the people who became white) over non-Europeans (the people who became non-
white). In perpetuating ways of knowing and being, stories “legitimate control, or otherwise 
‘naturalize’ the social order…especially relations of inequality” (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 256), such 
as racism, sexism, and other hegemonic discourses. Given the power of stories to create material 
effects on our lives, it is important to understand what kind of stories frame our understanding of 
the world.  
This research paper is, in essence, an account of the power of stories. I examine the 
power of stories in facilitating historical changes to immigration and citizenship in Canada. 
Canada has recently experienced monumental reforms to its immigration system. The changes 
started in 2007, when the Conservative Party under the leadership of Stephen Harper began 
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making fast-paced and widespread changes that included every category of immigration and, 
some argue, were unprecedented in the last 30 years (Alboim & Cohl, 2012).  
The face of the changes was then Minister of Immigration, Citizenship and 
Multiculturalism, Jason Kenney. During his time as Minister, Kenney zealously conveyed the 
Conservative’s commitment to making Canada’s immigration system more efficient and secure. 
In a speech to the Surrey Board of Trade, he summarized the goals of the Conservative Party’s 
reforms: 
What we've ended up with is a system where we were losing in the competition 
for many of the world's best and brightest. Why would they wait seven years to 
come to Canada if they wanted to go to a developed country when they could get 
to Australia or New Zealand in six months or less? Now finally, we'll be in the 
game. And, I believe – if we can offer those opportunities quickly – that we will 
attract many of the world's best and brightest […] These are dramatic changes 
that we're making at the same time that we are reinforcing the integrity of our 
system. For too long, Canada developed a reputation around the world – 
particularly amongst the industry of unscrupulous immigration agents overseas – 
as a soft target for queue jumping, for immigration fraud. And this created the 
perception that our system wasn't really fair. What we're trying to do is to 
reinforce the integrity of our system so that there is confidence in Canada.  
(Citizenship and Immigration Canada [CIC], 2012e) 
 
According to the Minister’s speech, the overarching purpose of the widespread changes to 
Canada’s immigration system was to increase Canada’s competitiveness for attracting the “best 
and brightest” immigrants. The Conservative party strived to achieve this goal by coupling faster 
processing times with higher security measures in its reforms.  
Citizenship was one area that was impacted by the reforms. Prior to the Conservative’s 
gaining power in 2006, the Citizenship Act had undergone only one major reform since its 
inception in 1947 - in 1977 it was modified by the Liberal Party (CIC, 2012d). The Liberals tried 
again to amend the Act, from 1993 to 2006, in order to change the revocation process (Anderson, 
2008). All of their attempts were unsuccessful. The Conservatives, soon after they came into 
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power in 2006, began to focus on citizenship too. The culmination of their efforts is the 
revamping of the Citizenship Act. In February 2014, the Conservatives tabled Bill C-24 (2014) 
Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act, which proposed sweeping changes. The bill received 
Royal Assent on June 19, 2014, four months after it was introduced, and thus marks the second 
major reform to citizenship since 1947. The bill created monumental changes, which, among 
other things, expanded grounds for revocation of citizenship and Permanent Resident (PR) status 
(see Appendix A for an overview). The Conservatives thus continued the revocation plans that 
the Liberals had started, but with their own vision. However, before being able to make such 
monumental changes, the Conservatives needed to prime the Canadian public for what was to 
come.  
The focus of this thesis is an event that led up to the introduction and passing of the 
historic citizenship reforms introduced by Bill C-24: the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown. The 
Citizenship Fraud Crackdown was launched in July 2011, when Minster Jason Kenney 
announced that Canada was beginning the process to revoke, on mass scale, status from 
individuals who had obtained their citizenship or PR through fraudulent means (CBC News, 
2011a). A few months after the launch Kenney announced that the number of individuals under 
investigation was 11,000 (CBC News, 2012), and described the revocation as “the largest 
enforcement action ever taken in the history of Canadian citizenship” (Mackrael, 2011). 
Newspaper articles echoed the rhetoric that fraud was widespread, and employed words such as 
“rampant,” “tip of the iceberg,” “sweep,” and “crackdown” in their headlines to describe the 
extra citizenship scrutiny that the government was undertaking.  Kenney made it clear: the 
initiative strived to purge Canada of past, present, and future citizenship fraud on a scale never 
seen before. The Crackdown never came to a conclusive end; rather, it was taken up and 
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enshrined in law by Bill C-24 (2014). The Crackdown, thus, is an important initiative in the 
recent reforms to Canada’s immigration system. 
Before delving deeper into the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown, I wish to make an 
important note for the reader. I use the term “Citizenship Fraud Crackdown” as a proper noun to 
underscore that it is the formal name for the Conservative’s initiative to increase citizenship 
scrutiny. The term “Citizenship Fraud Crackdown” deceivingly alludes to the presence of 
widespread fraud in the citizenship program, which statistics from this research show not to be 
the case. Therefore, I use this term to preserve the intimidating and misleading tone that 
surrounds the initiative, while at the same time highlighting that such rhetoric is hallow. The 
reader needs to keep in mind the hollowness of the term throughout the chapters, and not to 
internalize the misleading rhetoric. 
I compare two narratives that surround the initiative: the narrative of the Citizenship 
Fraud Crackdown presented in the public discourse and the narratives of the individuals who are 
entangled in the initiative. The way the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown is presented in the public 
discourse largely reflects the nation-state’s view on citizenship, while the individual narratives 
reflect citizenship from the perspective of those who have none. In analyzing the Citizenship 
Fraud Crackdown I uncover how racial and economic logics are embedded within it and how 
these logics are conjoined in the conceptions of citizenship. Additionally, I examine how this 
combination of logics is experienced, and responded to, by the individuals who are targeted by 
the Crackdown. In comparing the two narratives (of the nation-state and of the lived experience 
of the Crackdown’s targets) I uncover how neoliberal and racial logics are embedded within 
citizenship, and the consequences of this merging. I also highlight the power the public narrative 
in facilitating historical changes to immigration and citizenship in Canada. 
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My examination of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown is particularly insightful for 
highlighting the convergence of neoliberal and racist ideologies in the citizenship. When 
evaluating the connection between neoliberalism and race, many scholars suggest that 
neoliberalism is a separate process from racism, but the two are layered and work in conjunction 
with each other (Goldberg, 2002; Davis, 2007; Theodore, 2007). Scholars such as Roberts and 
Mahtani (2007) argue, however, that a more critical analysis of neoliberalism is needed, one that 
attempts to examine whether neoliberalism is racist. The Citizenship Fraud Crackdown is riddled 
with racial and economic logics and helps build on the literature that attempts to clarify the 
relationship between race and neoliberalism. Additionally, while the link between neoliberalism 
and citizenship has been explored by scholars such as Aihwa Ong (1999, 2006), few scholars 
focus on the intertwining of race with neoliberalism in citizenship discourse. Thus, the 
investigation of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown contributes to this important body of literature. 
 Apart from highlighting racial and neoliberal underpinnings of citizenship, my 
investigation also highlights the lived experience of those implicated in the Citizenship Fraud 
Crackdown. Scholars emphasize that in order to understand how hegemonic regimes operate, it 
is important to focus on the perspective of people who are marginalized by such regimes 
(Alexander & Mohanty, 1997; Calliste & Sefa Dei, 2000; Shohat, 2002; Mohanty, 2003). 
Citizenship is embedded with colonialism, capitalism, imperialism, racism and other systems of 
oppression. Despite these traits, scholars often present citizenship from a privileged perspective: 
by those who have citizenship. This thesis will attempt to build on the scarce literature (such as 
Lee, 2012) that investigates citizenship from the perspective of those who have none. By 




Another reason why studying the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown is important is that it 
helps understand the current reforms to citizenship.  Many components of the Crackdown (such 
as the focus on revocation, fraud prevention, and upholding residence in Canada) were 
incorporated in Bill C-24 (2014), and consequently enshrined in law. Thus, by critically 
analyzing the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown, it is possible to get better insight into the effects of 
the new Citizenship Act as well. This research comes in a timely manner when the Conservatives 
are redefining citizenship in Canada. It is important to note that many of the immigration reforms 
implemented by the Harper government were done with minimal public consultation and debate 
(Alboim & Cohl, 2012; Uechi, 2014). Therefore, it is important to offer an analysis on these 
reforms and contribute to the building of public discourse about the changes. 
The purpose of this research project, as mentioned above, is to provide an in-depth 
analysis of how the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown is embedded with racial meaning and 
economic imperative - an entwining of racism and neoliberalism. The research question that 
guides my analysis is: How are race and neoliberalism conjoined in the conception of Canadian 
citizenship?  
The primary research objectives of this project are: 
 To provide a critical reflection on the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown. 
 To provide an in-depth analysis of how race and neoliberalism converge in present 
conceptions of citizenship in Canada, through the critical analysis of the Crackdown. 
 To understand the experience of those who are implicated in the investigations. 
My analysis reveals interesting tensions in the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown. The first tension is 
the push to require greater physical presence in Canada, at a time when globalization promotes 
neoliberal subjects living transnational lives. A second tension is the fracturing of citizenship 
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rights along the lines of dual citizens and single-citizens, even though both types of citizens were 
once offered similar protections under the law. These tensions contribute to solidifying the 
relationship between race, nation, and immigration. I conclude that the Crackdown is an exercise 
in nation-building that is fueled by racism and facilitated by the neoliberal crime-and-security 
agenda. I also argue that neoliberalism does not just operate parallel to racism; it is a racist 
ideology in and of itself. 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 is an overview of methodology 
and methods; Chapter 3 is a review of literature in the areas of critical race theory, citizenship, 
neoliberalism, race, nation, and immigration. Chapter 4 provides a detailed description of the 
Citizenship Fraud Crackdown. Chapters 5 and 6 present contrasting stories to the Citizenship 
Fraud Crackdown. Whereas Chapter 5 analyzes how the Crackdown is presented in the public 
discourse, a narrative that is largely shaped by the nation-state, Chapter 6 exhibits the stories of 
those entangled in the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown. Chapter 7 concludes with a summary of 





CHAPTER 2 – METHODOLOGY  
 
My investigation of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown is a case study. A case study 
approach is best suited for research that takes place in a specific time and place, and consists of 
using multiple sources of information to analyze a phenomenon in detail (Creswell, 2007). The 
purpose of case studies is not so much to create generalizations, or overarching theories, as it is 
to describe a phenomenon in detail and point out the lessons learned (Creswell, 2007).  This type 
of approach is ideal for exploratory and in-depth research. In attempting to analyze the 
Citizenship Fraud Crackdown, I use three primary sources: discourse analysis, internal 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) documents obtained through Access to Information 
and Privacy Act (ATIP) requests, and interviews with individuals affected by the Crackdown. 
The sections below will cover each of these sources in detail, and conclude with a discussion of 




In attempting to understand the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown, I analyze the discourses 
surrounding the initiative. Discourse is defined as “a particular way of representing the world” 
(Fairclough, 2003, p. 17). Public discourse analysis is relevant to this case study for a number of 
reasons. First and foremost, much information about the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown is only 
available in the public discourse (such as CIC media statements, ministerial speeches, and 
newspaper articles). Apart from these public texts, not much information can be obtained about 
the Crackdown. CIC justifies the lack of available information by wanting to protect the security 
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of its investigations. It is important to note that the public discourse on the Crackdown is heavily 
controlled by the Minister of Immigration, Citizenship and Multiculturalism and the government, 
because they have the power to choose which information to reveal to the public, and which 
information not to reveal.  The public discourse provides a rich source of information about the 
Crackdown, and is one of the few sources of information for the public. 
Second, an analysis of the public discourse enables a study of the ideological 
perpetuations surrounding the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown (Fairclough, 2003; van Dijk, 1993, 
1998). Bonilla-Silva (2010) argues that racist structures are upheld through racist ideologies. By 
trying to uncover the ideology/ies that justify the revocation of citizenship, it is possible to 
understand how racial structures are (re)produced in Canada’s immigration and citizenship 
systems (Bonilla-Silva, 2010). In addition to understanding how racism is perpetuated and 
upheld in the institution of citizenship, the analysis of the public discourse also allows for 
uncovering how economic logics (ideologies) are also embedded in citizenship and used as 
another layer to justify the exclusion of certain groups of people. In perpetuating certain ways of 
thinking, public discourses can “legitim[ize] control, or otherwise ‘naturalize’ the social 
order…especially relations of inequality” (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 256). Van Dijk (1993) suggests 
that the reproduction of dominance occurs through: i) controlling discourses (text and talk), and 
ii) influencing the thinking of others through these discourses. The effects of public discourses 
are important given the wide audiences they reach, and the close relationship between public 
discourse and policy making. 
This brings me to my third reason for choosing to conduct a discourse analysis: many 
scholars note that policy making is connected with public discourses (Bauder, 2008; Ibrahim, 
2005; Mountz, 2004). I define policy making as “a set of actions by public authorities intended to 
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act on events that are defined as being problematic” (Morrison et al., 2014). One example that 
highlights the power of discourse to shape policy is an event from 1999, when an unannounced 
boat of Chinese refugees arrived to the coast of British Columbia seeking refuge. The surprised 
arrival of the boat sparked public outrage. The CIC was forced to respond quickly and harshly in 
order to restore its faith in the public eye. Mountz (2004) describes the concern of CIC with 
responding to the media in its day-to-day functioning, and the extra measures the government 
took to respond to public controversy. The government invests much time and money to uphold a 
respectable image of itself in the media (Mountz, 2004), which is understandable given that the 
federal government’s legitimacy is driven by public opinion.  
In addition to being influenced by public discourses, the government also uses discourses 
to garner support for its policies (Bauder, 2008, Hier & Greenberg, 2002). For example, Ibrahim 
(2005) notes how the Canadian government portrayed Japanese Canadians as a social threat in 
World War II, and was able to use such discourse to implement the revocation of their 
citizenship. Additionally, policy making is a democratic practice which requires public discourse 
to function. In this light, policy making can be described as “an attempt to manage a field or 
discursivity” when making decisions (Gottweis, 1998 as cited in Ibrahim, 2005, p. 178). Thus, 
public discourses have real effects; they can perpetuate ideologies, influence policies, and be 
controlled by government to garner support for its policies, programs, and actions. It is hard to 
analyze Citizenship Fraud Crackdown without looking at how it was transmitted, taken up, and 
transformed in the public discourse.  
One limitation of public discourse analysis is that it might not reveal the government’s 
true intentions. As Bonilla-Silva (2010) notes, racism is not only about intentions, it is about 
unequal institutional structures. The same can be argued for economic logics: it is important not 
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only to look at their intent, but also their effects. Thus, even though the government’s intention 
may not be to create a racialized citizenship, it may still well be the consequence of its 
revocation policy.   
SCOPE 
In order to capture the public discourse surrounding the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown, I 
collected texts from numerous sources, ranging from newspaper articles to Minister Jason 
Kenney’s speeches (Table 1). Other sources included CIC media releases and backgrounder 
reports, all of which can be found on the CIC website. The time period under investigation 
included the year the Crackdown was announced until the end of August (January 1, 2011 to 
August 31, 2013).  
I did not analyze articles in all newspapers, but rather was selective from where I 
obtained my articles. In deciding which newspapers to use, I considered their national 
distribution and readership. The greater distribution and the greater readership of texts, the more 
impact they have (Fairclough, 2003). The Globe & Mail and the National Post were included 
because they are national newspapers and have wide readership. The Toronto Star, the Gazette 
[Montreal], and the Vancouver Sun were included because these three cities are the major 
immigrant receiving areas in Canada. Lastly, the Ottawa Citizen was included given that it is 
located in the Nation’s capital where the Parliament is situated. Combined together, these 
newspapers provide a picture of the discourses on a national and local scale, and reach a broad 
readership. I analyzed all articles in the newspapers, including editorials, opinion pieces, guest 
columns, and letters-to-the-editor to grasp a full picture of what a typical reader might encounter. 
Keywords that were used to extract the articles included: “revocation,” “fraud,” and 
“citizenship.” Most of the articles were associated with the search term “fraud” (a total of 500 
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results appeared under “fraud”, while only 50 appeared under “revocation”). Of the articles that 
appeared, only 53 were in regards to the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown. 






Once the relative texts were collected, I read through all the articles and noted 
preliminary themes that seemed to be present in the documents (Creswell, 2007). After noting 
preliminary themes, I constructed a description of the case and context, confirmed the themes 
initially noted, interpreted the information, and finally constructed an in-depth understanding of 
the case (Creswell, 2007). However, even with a completed discourse analysis, questions 
remained about the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown, which I supplemented through Access to 
Information and Privacy Act requests, and interviews. 
 
ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND PRIVACY ACT (ATIP) REQUESTS 
 
Although the public discourse is useful for understanding the purpose, racial and 
economic operation of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown, it cannot address all questions.  As I 
mentioned above, not much information is publically available about the Citizenship Fraud 
Type of source Number of items included in analysis 
Newspaper articles 53 
CIC News releases 9 
CIC Backgrounder reports 5 
Minister Kenney’s speeches 2 
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Crackdown. Things that remained hidden from the public discourse included: the process CIC 
uses to uncover citizenship fraud, how the process to strip persons of status is carried out, and 
what type of individuals are being implicated in the investigations. To gain more in-depth 
understanding of these aspects of the Fraud Crackdown, I relied on documents released through 
the Access to Information and Privacy Act (ATIP). 
SCOPE 
 In gaining ATIP information I decided to request previously released ATIPs, submitted 
my own request, and reviewed ATIPs available on the Association of Future Canadians’ (AFC) 
website. I requested six previous ATIPs that related to citizenship fraud or the Residence 
Questionnaire (Appendix B) that were listed on the CIC website. On January 1, 2014, I 
submitted my own ATIP, in which I requested internal statistics, reports, policies, procedures 
and other documentation pertaining to CIC’s attempts to reduce citizenship fraud and residence 
fraud. The request was assigned the reference code A-2013-23291. Additionally, the Association 
of Future Canadians had 11 ATIP files posted on their website, which I reviewed. The three 
sources of ATIP provided extensive documents relating to the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown. 
I expected the submitted ATIP to be processed in the standard time frame of 30 days. In 
May 2014, I received a letter from CIC indicating that an extension of 90 days was needed to 
process the request. The reason for the extension was that the request pulled on third party 
information (including “trade secrets” and/or “financial, commercial, scientific or technical 
information”). The head of CIC, the Minister, believes the ATIP contains information that would 
result in “material financial loss or gain” of the third party; “prejudice the position” of a third 
party; or “interfere with the contractual or other negotiations of a third party.” At the time of 
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writing this report it has been nine months since I made the original request; CIC has not yet 
processed the ATIP.  
METHODS 
 Despite not being able to gain access to my own ATIP request, the six previous ATIPs I 
acquired, and the 11 posted on the AFC website, contained valuable information. Together, the 
six ATIPs comprised a total of 729 pages of internal CIC material, and the 11 AFC documents 
comprised of 361 pages.  The information could not be themed; rather I used it to piece 
information about the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown that was missing from the public discourse.  
Chapter 3, which provides a detailed overview of the revocation process, is largely based on 
ATIP information. One of the most valuable findings from the documents is a profile of the 
individuals implicated in the fraud investigations (including country of birth and the immigration 
category through which they entered Canada). This information provided valuable insight into 




 In addition to collecting ATIPs, I conducted interviews with individuals affected by the 
Citizenship Fraud Crackdown. While the public discourse and ATIP analysis provided 
information about the purpose and process of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown, the interviews 
supplement this information with lived experiences of those implicated in the initiative. It is 
important to contrast the public discourse/ATIPs with personal narratives of immigration for 
many reasons. First, the interviews provide an understanding of how the policy has impacted, 
and could be expected to impact, immigrants living in Canada. Second, according to the 
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transnational feminist framework, which provides the framework for analyzing the interviews, it 
is only possible to understand the impacts of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown by looking at 
those who it is targeted at (Alexander & Mohanty, 1997; Grewal & Kaplan, 1994; Pratt, 2004). 
Comparing migrant stories with the public discourse provides interesting contrasts and insights 
into the image of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown that is made available to the public. 
SCOPE 
From December 2014 to June 2014, I conducted semi-structured interviews with seven 
individuals who had received a Residence Questionnaire. The interviews ranged from thirty 
minutes to two hours, depending on how much time participants wished to give. The Residence 
Questionnaire is one of the ways the CIC is attempting to “crack down” on citizenship fraud. Its 
purpose is to evaluate whether individuals have met the residence requirement for citizenship. 
Although these individuals were not having their status revoked, they were still entangled in the 
crackdown, as CIC investigated whether they had met the qualifications for citizenship.  
I was not successful in acquiring interviews from individuals who are having their 
citizenship or PR status revoked. I think this is due to two reasons; the first being that there are 
very small numbers of revocations taking place, an estimated 250. However, despite the small 
numbers, I knew people who were connected with individuals threatened with revocation. I think 
the greatest reason for not being able to find willing interviewees is that a great sense of fear is 
present in many individuals. The immigrants I spoke with who had received the RQ all had 
heightened sense of fear, and I can only speculate what levels of fear exist among those whose 
face the threat of revocation. Other reasons I heard for not wishing to participate include fear of 
jeopardizing judicial review of their revocation cases. The lack of willing participants sheds light 
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on the extreme vulnerability immigrants entangled in the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown are 
experiencing.   
I connected with a variety of organizations and individuals in an attempt to find 
individuals willing to share their stories. I disseminated invitations to the mailing lists of 
organizations in Montreal (e.g., Immigrant Worker’s Centre, Solidarity Across Borders, No One 
Is Illegal, Women of Diverse Origins, Canadian Council of Refugees, Just Solutions) and 
Toronto (No One Is Illegal, Refugee Lawyers Association of Ontario). I also connected with 
journalists who were conducting research on immigration policies. Finally, I attempted to contact 
individuals who had conducted interviews with the press about their experience with the 
citizenship application process.  
Due to the sensitive nature of the interview topic, and limited sample size of participants, 
I relied on non-random convenience sampling, using the snow-balling technique, to recruit 
participants. Evidence suggests snowball sampling is an efficient strategy increasingly used with 
difficult to reach, ethnically diverse populations (Atkinson & Flint, 2001). Once I had found 
participants, the snowball sampling approach proved effective in helping spread word about the 
interviews, and build trust with other participants. 
A breakthrough in the interview process occurred when I made contact with the organizer 
of the Association of Future Canadians, which I heard about through the radio. This 
organization, based on the Internet, is a group of citizenship applicants and their allies that wish 
to advocate for a fair and timely process to citizenship (Residence Questionnaire Wordpress, 
n.d.[b]). It has a membership from across Canada. There were many members of this group who 




After I completed each interview, I transcribed the conversation.  I analyzed the 
interviews in a similar manner to the public discourse. I read through the transcripts and noted 
preliminary themes that seemed to be emerging, confirmed the themes initially noted and 
interpreted the information (Creswell, 2007) using the transnational feminism framework 
(further explained in the Chapter 3). This framework helped me to better understand the 
Citizenship Fraud Crackdown.  
 The combination of discourse analysis, ATIP requests, and personal interviews 
contributes to a rich understanding of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown. Each source of 
information provides a unique perspective, or story, if you will, about the Crackdown: the ATIPs 
reveal internal workings of the CIC, the public discourse is the public image of the Citizenship 
Fraud Crackdown created by CIC and transmitted by actors, and the interviews highlight the 
experiences of those implicated in the investigations. The power of comparing these stories 
becomes evident throughout the chapters. However, before presenting the findings from each of 
these three realms, it is important to first set the context for the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown. I 
am not the first researcher to attempt to study the connection between race, neoliberalism, and 
citizenship. In the next chapter I turn my attention to the work of previous scholars, in order to 





CHAPTER 3 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of how scholars have attempted to 
understand and answer the question: 
How are race and neoliberalism conjoined in the conception of Canadian citizenship? 
In order to answer this question, I engage with literature from critical race theory, literature on 
race, nation, and immigration, and literature that examines the intersection of neoliberalism and 
immigration.  Figure 1 provides an overview of the various connections that I explore in this 
chapter.  
The primary focus of this research is contemporary immigration to Canada. However, it 
is difficult to study immigration without taking into consideration its connection to race and 
nation. Race influences how Canada perceives itself, and also how it perceives other nations; it 
determines who belongs in its nation and who does not (Goldberg, 2002; Thobani, 2007). 
Scholars agree that the state fashions and constructs race for purposes of nation-building 
(Goldberg, 2002), and that Canada is no exception (Austin, 2010; Razack, 2002; Thobani, 2007). 
For example, Canada’s national identity is that of White European settlers who are ostensibly 
multicultural and accepting of others (Austin, 2010; Thobani, 2007).  Immigration laws are one 
of the most important state tools for managing the racial composition of the nation (Thobani, 
2007) and are deeply shaped by assumed connections between nation and race. Thus, it is 
important when studying the phenomenon of immigration to take into account nation and race.  
This section will provide a brief overview of: 1) how the conception of race has changed 
over time, 2) how conceptions of race have been central to the way nations are understood and 
defined, and 3) the role of the immigration in creating and reifying the nation-state. 
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Figure 1: Literature Map 
 
MORPHOLOGY OF RACISM  
 
Race is a changing concept that has yet to be uprooted from society. The concept of race 
emerged in the 1500s from Western Europe, and coincided with the first stages of colonialism 
(Goldberg, 1993; Reynolds & Lieberman, 1993). As Western European empires began to expand 
and voyage to new areas of the globe, they used the term race to describe and differentiate the 
new peoples they encountered (Goldberg, 1993). Over the centuries, rather than being abolished, 
racism has taken new forms (Balibar, 1991; Melamed, 2011). After World War II, a pronounced 
shift in the conception of racism occurred. The shift is described as the move from biological 
racism (whereby races were believed to differ based on genetic make-up) to cultural racism 
(whereby races are believed to differ due to their social practices or norms) (Goldberg, 1993; 
Melamed, 2011). Cultural racism persists today in some form or another, and makes distinctions 
based on language, religion, norms or customs (Goldberg, 1993). Hall (1996) refers to race as the 
“floating signifier,” recognizing that it is subject to redefinition and appropriation.  What has 
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remained unchanged in racist logic throughout the centuries is the conviction that certain groups 
of people (however they are defined, biologically or culturally or otherwise) are superior to 
others. Superiority cannot be uprooted from racist logic, no matter what form it embodies. It is 
this concept that makes racism so dangerous because it creates relations of domination and 
subordination (Razack, 1998). The changing forms of racism reveal that it is a social 
construction created through material and social processes (Castagna & Dei, 2000; Hall, 1996; 
Kobayashi & Peak, 1994).  
Even though race is artificially constructed, it very much has real effects on individuals 
being racialized (Bonilla-Silva, 2010; Castagna & Dei, 2000).  Racial ideologies are frameworks 
used by actors to explain and justify the dominance of one “race” over others (Bonilla-Silva, 
2010; Razack, 1998). In Canada, given its colonial history, the dominant race is white. The 
effects of these racial frameworks are made concrete through “the totality of social relations and 
practices that reinforce white privilege” (Bonilla-Silva, 2010, p. 9). The focus of this study is to 
portray how the effects of race are made real through conceptualizations of the nation, which 
delineates racial belonging. Immigration and citizenship laws, which are built on the values of 
the nation, are consequently embedded with similar practices that enforce white superiority. 
Although a social construction, racism creates material effects through creating and upholding 
unequal power relations in society.  
Critical race theorists attempt to expose and disrupt how race operates. They work under 
the shared understanding that race is ingrained in all aspects of life (Milner, 2007). As Goldberg 
(1997) most eloquently explains:  
Racist expressions are normal to our culture, [they] manifest not only in extreme 
epithets but in insinuations and suggestions, in reasoning and representations, in 
short, in the microexpressions of daily life. (p. 21) 
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Racism permeates all facets of society, often without our realization (Kobayashi & Peake, 2000) 
due to discourses that camouflage and conceal its existence (Melamed, 2011; Thobani, 2007).  
Due to its pervasiveness, racism is normalized in society. In addition to acknowledging the 
pervasiveness of racism, critical race scholars attempt to understand how race functions through 
narratives and counter-narratives with people of colour (Milner, 2007). As a result, a “theme of 
‘naming one’s own reality’ or ‘voice’ is entrenched in the work of critical race theorists” 
(Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995 as cited in Milner, 2007).  In the sections that follow, I 
summarize how critical race scholars understand the relationship between race, nation, 
immigration, and citizenship in Canada. 
 
RACE AND NATION 
 
Although race is constructed in many ways, I focus on how the conception of nation 
depends on constructs of race. Nations are defined as “imagined communities” (Anderson, 
1991). Scholars note that the concept of “nation” is always understood in relation to its outsider – 
the “other” –that does not belong and that simultaneously constitutes a threat (Goldberg, 2002). 
This external other is often defined in racial terms (Goldberg, 2002; Thobani, 2007).  Nations 
were not always conceived in this way; rather, it was during the time of Western European 
colonization that race and nation became fused together (Goldberg, 2002). Western European 
nations gave themselves “white” racial identities, while conferring black, brown, and yellow 
racial identities upon colonized nations (Austin, 2010).  In contemporary times, the existence of 
the racial “other” continues to perpetuate the existence of the nation (Austin, 2002; Goldberg, 
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2002; Razack, 2002; Thobani, 2007). Thus, nation as an inherently racial construct was created 
by colonizing countries.  
Colonial conceptions of nationhood are not only racial, but also homogenous (Goldberg, 
2002). What this means is that often national identities are conceived of as a single racial 
identity, rather than multiplicity of racial identities. During the process of establishing new 
countries, or settler colonies, the European populations excluded and oppressed indigenous 
groups in order to create single national identity that was racially homogenous (Goldberg, 2002; 
Thobani, 2007).  Canada is no exception. European settlers arriving to the “New World” worked 
hard to erase the centuries’ presence of First Nations, in order to establish a white national 
identity, while simultaneously erasing the contribution of people of colour in establishing the 
new nation (Thobani, 2007). To give but one example of the perpetual erasure of people of 
colour from the national body, I highlight the case of Mathieu Da Costa. It is little known that 
Samuel de Champlain hired Mathieu Da Costa, a black man skilled in the Mi'kmaq dialect, to 
work as a translator and interpreter for him on his excursions to Canada (Johnston, 2001).  
Mathieu Da Costa played a crucial role in bridging communication between Aboriginals and 
French explorers, and thus enabling the expansion of European trade and settlement in Atlantic 
Canada (Johnston, 2001). It is important to note that Da Costa was hired by Champlain, rather 
than worked as a slave. Despite Da Costa’s important contribution to settler Canada, he is 
expunged from its national identity. The deliberate erasure of people of colour from Canadian 
history over centuries reiterates and naturalizes a white Canadian nation. In this construct of the 
nation, the presence and contribution of other racial groups is atypical and rare, rather than a 
common occurrence. The conceptualization of nations as homogenous identities stems from the 
era of colonization. 
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The colonial-racist conceptions of a pure white nation remained unchanged for a long 
time; it was only after World War II that certain national definitions began to be reworked and 
ceased to be explicitly centered upon a single race. Nation-states began to adopt multicultural 
policies that promoted the inclusion of different races. Because racial distinctions continued to be 
assumed and asserted, however, the opening of national definitions to multiple races did not 
imply equal membership in the nation (Thobani, 2007). Scholars identify how different waves of 
cultural racism were embedded in multiculturalism. During the first wave of cultural racism, 
called racial liberalism, multicultural frameworks expected individuals to assimilate to certain 
American cultural norms; those who did not assimilate did not belong in the national identity 
(Melamed, 2011). During the next wave of cultural racism, called liberal multiculturalism, 
multicultural discourses promoted tolerance and equal opportunity; in doing so they denied the 
existence of racism and continued to uphold cultural superiority. In the present time of cultural 
racism, called neoliberal multiculturalism, views individuals with low human capital as not being 
valuable citizens of the nation (Melamed, 2011). Hage (2000) explains the reason why 
multiculturalism fails to provide equal membership in the nation is because it is based on the 
power of the white population to choose whom it will and will not accept in its national 
membership. The embedded power within multiculturalism enables nations to continue to 
inscribe ideas of racial superiority. Although nations are conceived in multi-racial or 
multicultural terms, they still remain unequal and camouflage different forms of cultural racism.  
The perseverance of racial superiority and homogeneity in the conceptualization of 
nationhood is observed in many contemporary colonial countries. Canada is inherently perceived 
as a “white” nation despite the adoption of multiculturalism. Canada’s national identity is that of 
a country whose citizens embrace democracy, multiculturalism, and the promotion of peace. 
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Austin (2010) and Razack (2002) argue this mythology is still based on a white subject and 
continues to disenfranchise First Nations and people of colour from Canadian history. Thobani 
(2007) notes that Canada’s mythology has created “exalted subjects” of European decedents, 
whose values and institutions are preserved at all cost within the nation-state. The amalgamation 
of race and nation perseveres in Canada in the present day. The reason for this is because nation 
is an inherently racial concept. 
 
RACE AND NATION-STATE 
 
Central to the establishment and reiteration of the connection between nation and race, of 
course, is the nation-state. The term nation-state describes a geographic area where the creation 
of a “common identity” (nation) coincides with the territorial administration of the state 
(Anderson, 1991).  The inextricable relationship between nation and state is embodied in the 
hyphenation of term “nation-state.” The term underscores that each upholds the other; in order 
for the nation to exist, the state must institutionalize the national identity in its judicial systems, 
policies and practices; in order for the state to function, it must unite citizens in a common 
national identity, so that citizens will endow it with power to act on their behalf and protect their 
interest (Thobani, 2007).  In this section, I explore both facets of this relationship between nation 
and state, and how they uphold race.   
One purpose of the state is to unite citizens in a common national identity, so that citizens 
endow power to the nation-state to act on its behalf. This requires the constant reiteration of 
national boundaries (Honig, 2001; Nyers, 2006). Given the nation is inherently a racial construct, 
Goldberg (2002) observes that the “apparatuses and technologies employed by the modern 
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state…fashion, modify and make concrete the terms of racial expression, as well as racist 
exclusions and subjugation” (p. 10) that is required to uphold the national identity. As outlined 
above, the Canadian nation-state is no exception for constructing and perpetuating racialized 
others (Austin, 2010; Dhamoon & Abu-Laban, 2009; Razack, 2002; Thobani, 2007). The state, 
in deploying its apparatuses to uphold national identity, upholds the connection between nation 
and race. 
An example of an apparatus that the nation-state uses to establish and uphold its national 
boundary is immigration laws. By enacting and enforcing immigration laws and borders, the 
nation-state has the power to render unwanted populations “illegal” (Dauvergne, 2008; Saad, 
2013; Weber & Pickering, 2011). The category “illegal” often demarcates individuals that do and 
do not belong in the nation-state. In doing so, the nation-state portrays them as transgressors and 
a potential danger to state security, which unites citizens against a common threat. Scholars 
observe that the illegal discourse replaces discourses of racial others so the non-white other 
becomes the seemingly raceless criminalized other (Dauvergne, 2008; Sharma, 2006; Pratt 2012; 
Wright, 2013). Through its control on migration law, the state is instrumental in producing and 
upholding illegality (Bauder, 2013; Dauvergne, 2008; Goldring & Landolt, 2013; Nevins, 2002; 
Wright, 2013), which upholds the boundaries of the nation, and unites citizens in a homogeneous 
identity.  
Another purpose of the state is “institutionalizing the national identity” in its operation. 
Immigration laws offer an example of how national identity is institutionalized. National values 
determine immigration laws. From European settlers colonizing Canada up until the end of 
World War II, the primary goal of Canada’s immigration laws was to build a strong nation by 
increasing the European population (Green & Green, 2004; Walsh, 2008). During this period, 
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Canada facilitated the migration of whites, which it believed best upheld the values of the nation, 
and barred entry of people of colour (Walsh, 2008). Current immigration laws continue to be 
shaped by national values and interests, which are now focused largely on economic prosperity. 
As national values change with time so, too, do migration policies.  Given that this nation, 
Canada, is inherently white, it follows that the migration laws are shaped by white interests. 
Migration laws do not just uphold the boundaries of the national identity, they enshrine national 
(read: racial) values and interests into law. 
Mongia (1999) asserts that nationality “is the outcome of how the state rationalizes race 
and implements a racist agenda [of exclusion]” (546). Critical race scholars agree that the 
purpose of the nation-state is to uphold the existence of its racial identity that gives it power to 
act on behalf of its citizens (Goldberg, 2002; Thobani, 2007). The nation-state is a central actor 
in upholding race and nation (Mongia, 1999). 
 
RACE, NATION-STATE, AND IMMIGRATION 
 
Immigration policies, as I suggested, are one of the most important state tools for 
managing the racial composition of the nation, and are deeply shaped by assumed connections 
between nation and race (Hayter, 2004).  Immigration policies in Canada, given its history, are 
white-centric (Calliste 1993; Peake & Ray, 2001; Simmons, 1998). This is witnessed by the fact 
that only relatively recently (in the late 1960s) were non-European migrants permitted to arrive 
in Canada in large numbers (Kobayashi, Li & Teixeira, 2012). Immigration controls are 
established by the nation-state to control its racial composition.  
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When speaking of immigration, it is important to acknowledge that only a very specific 
type of immigration leads to the consolidation of nation and state - namely, the immigration of 
people of colour (Thobani, 2007).  Looking at Canada’s past and present, only large migrations 
of people of colour have lead to public outcry. There is no public outcry about white Europeans 
flooding the country and threatening Canada’s way of life. It is important to understand that the 
immigration that worries the nation-state and its citizenry is racial in nature, and that the 
immigrant is a substitute category for race (Balibar, 1993). It is precisely immigration of 
different races that threaten to destabilize white national identities that are inscribed in the state.  
In her archival research Mongia (1999) uncovers that Canadian government officials 
created the concept of the nation-state to respond to uncontrolled migration into Canada, 
specifically from India.  Prior to the introduction of the Canadian Citizenship Act in 1947, there 
was legally no such thing as Canadian citizenship (CIC, 2012a). Rather, members of 
commonwealth countries were British subjects (CIC, 2012a), who enjoyed free movement 
throughout the Empire on the basis of their shared Imperial citizenship (Mongia, 1999).  Based 
on this free movement, in 1907, a ship carrying 2,000 men from India arrived in Vancouver, 
British Columbia, wanting to settle in Canada. In an attempt to prevent further immigration of 
Indians into Canada, the Canadian government asked the British government for permission to 
implement a passport system which would allow Canada to control migration into its borders. 
For years Canadian officials petitioned the British Empire to implement the passport system as a 
means of immigration control. In 1915, Canadian officials persuaded the Empire that each 
commonwealth country, based on national interests, had the right to control who could mix with 
its population and who could not. In effect, they argued that based on national identity, each 
country had the right to control who entered its geographic space. This logic linked national 
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identity to territory, and in doing so, created the concept of a nation-state. The conception of the 
nation-state successfully earned Canada the right to gain autonomy in controlling immigration 
into its borders. As a new state formation, the nation-state emerged as “the first kind of state 
formation to have a monopoly over migration” (Mongia, 1999, p. 544), and enabled countries 
such as Canada to prevent unwanted populations from entering its borders.  
What can be learned about this piece of history are two things. First, the establishment of 
the nation-state was created as a response to immigration, and the need to protect national 
identity. Second, immigration controls are inherently racial in nature.  Mongia (1999) further 
argues: 
The passport emerges here as a state document that purports to assign a national 
identity rather than a racial identity—a mechanism that would conceal race and 
the racist motivations for controlling mobility in the guise of a reciprocal 
arrangement between states described as national. (p 553) 
 
When the passport system was established, it embodied and concealed the racist motives of 
immigration controls. Consequently, it engrained different mobility rights for different racial 
groups.  
Through tracing the establishment of the Canadian passport, Mongia (1999) shows that 
the nation-state is a concept that was created in response to immigration, and its continued 
existence depends on its power to control who can enter its territory and who cannot. Also 
interesting to the emergence of the nation-state is that government officials argued that 
immigration is fundamental to state sovereignty, and thus supported early notions of state 
security. State security and immigration continue to be highly linked in the present day, as will 





RACE, NATION-STATE, AND CITIZENSHIP 
 
As the section above illustrates, immigration laws are meant to regulate people of colour 
entering the nation-state. Where does this leave citizenship with respect to the nation-state and 
race? Dauvergne (2007) argues that, whereas migration law serves to filter who can be a member 
of the nation-state, and consequently who has formal access to citizenship, the role of citizenship 
law is to cultivate loyalty and national values in those who are accepted as members of the 
nation-state. While immigration law is concerned with selection and exclusion, citizenship is 
used as a nation-building tool.  Dauvergne (2007) writes:  
The messy policing of the national boundary by inquiring into debt and disease, 
criminality and qualifications, is left to migration law. Most prosperous 
contemporary states would not tolerate a citizenship regime that excluded 
individuals from naturalizing because of having a child with an intellectual 
disability, being poor, or dropping out of high school. Migration law specializes 
in precisely this type of distinction. (p. 495) 
 
Compared to immigration law, the exclusionary aspects of citizenship are minimized in public 
perceptions and discourses. Citizenship law thus works together with migration law to solidify 
the border of the nation by promoting the established national identity and a sense of belonging 
within it.  
However, it is important to also understand citizenship not just as an institution of the 
nation-state, but also as a social practice. Even in cases where citizenship is possessed, people 
may not be able to exercise their rights equally due to the racialized nature of citizenship. 
Dhamoon and Abu-Laban (2009) use the term “internal foreigners” to describe individuals who, 
even though they are legal citizens, are not considered legitimate members of the nation-state 
due to their racial identity. The individuals are often described as foreigners living in the nation-
state, and sometimes even a threat to its security. Harder and Zhyznomirska (2012) argue that 
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Canada’s citizenship is embedded with ideas that certain racial and ethnic qualities are more 
authentic than others.  It can thus serve to iterate racial division, cement inequalities, and uphold 
racial homogeneity within Canada (Thobani, 2007). Even though citizenship provides legal 
membership to the nation-state, it does not necessarily offer equal membership to everyone. 
Scholars such as Ahmand & Husband (1993) assert that citizenship is not just a means for 
defining national identity, but a vehicle for nationalism.  
It is in this context that I wish to bring to light the “citizens of convenience debate” from 
2006. This debate highlights the racial inequalities present in citizenship. Furthermore, it served 
as an important predecessor and influencer in the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown. In 2006, the 
Canadian government evacuated Lebanese-Canadian citizens from Lebanon when the country 
was attacked by Israel. Soon after their evacuation, public outcry ensued about the use of 
taxpayer money to evacuate the dual citizens. The debate revolved around the legitimacy of the 
Lebanese Canadians’ claims to citizenship. Discourses portrayed Lebanon as the “real home” of 
the dual nationals; assumed that all the citizens were recent immigrants to Canada; and 
insinuated that they were taking advantage of their Canadian citizenship. The dual nationals were 
thus dubbed “citizens of convenience.” All of these accusations were not based on facts, but 
rather assumptions. The assumptions represent a racist logic that is suspicious of immigrants and 
assumes migrants from Lebanon cannot truly be Canadian. 
On the other hand, in the same year, there was a case of “Lost Canadians” who had 
unknowingly lost their Canadian citizenship status after previous changes to the Citizenship Act. 
In contrast to the dual citizens, who had Canadian citizenship, the Lost Canadians had none. 
However, they were able to invoke their European ancestry to reclaim their Canadian status and 
effectively exercise their rights to membership in the nation-state. Because they had European 
31 
 
ancestors, their citizenship rights were taken for granted. The Lebanese Canadians had a harder 
time exercising their rights to citizenship because they weren’t viewed as “Canadian enough.” 
The public discourse portrayed the “Lost Canadians” as persons who were unjustly denied their 
roots, while vehemently disputing the fact that individuals of Lebanese decent could have 
authentic Canadian roots. An important finding from my analysis of the Citizenship Fraud 
Crackdown is that even though individuals may have citizenship, racialized and ethnic 
hierarchies continue to influence how they can exercise their rights (Harder & Zhyznomirska, 
2006). Thus, citizenship, like the other apparatuses of the state, is racialized (Dhamoon & Abu-
Laban, 2009; Harder & Zhyznomirska, 2012; Razack, 2002; Thobani, 2007).  
The sections above summarized how scholars explain the relationship between nation-
state, immigration and citizenship. What does the relationship look like in contemporary times 
that are marked with neoliberalism? This is an area of exploration in the section below. 
 
THE ERA OF NEOLIBERALISM: CONTEMPORARY RACE, NATION, AND IMMIGRATION 
 
The first half of the literature review explored the connection between race, nation and 
immigration. In this section, I wish to explore how this triad is affected by a contemporary 
occurrence: neoliberalism. I conceive neoliberalism as an ideology that facilitates the global 
spread of capitalism, an ideology that has permeated all facets of contemporary life.  
Neoliberalism helps internalize and engrain the values of competition, free markets, and 
survival-of-the-fittest in the conscious of individuals. It became a hegemonic discourse in the 
1970s and continues to have profound effects on the organization of our society, including how 
nation-states control migration and citizenship laws. 
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Neoliberalism can be studied from three different perspectives: as a new form of 
capitalism, as an ideology, or as governmentality (Hilgers, 2010). The different perspectives are 
related in that they acknowledge the primary purpose of neoliberalism is to facilitate the 
operation and spread of capitalism. In studying the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown, it is useful to 
evaluate neoliberalism as an ideology and governmentality. Scholars note that, as an ideology, 
neoliberalism serves to protect and uphold the interests of the dominant group and the economic 
processes which uphold the dominance of this group (Bourdieu, 1998; Harvey, 2005). As 
governmentality, neoliberalism is concerned with new forms of control of populations that 
benefit capitalist arrangements (Foucault, 2004; Ong, 2006). No matter from what perspective 
scholars choose to study neoliberalism, they all agree that it is a source of inequalities in 
contemporary societies (Hilgers, 2010).  
There are a number of defining characteristics of neoliberal ideology. At its core, 
neoliberal ideology is about upholding and protecting the economic processes of capitalism. The 
underlying rational for neoliberalism is that public resources are best allocated through 
individuals striving to maximize self-interest in unconstrained markets (Ong, 2006). This 
rationale results in the withdrawal of government intervention in allocating resources, as markets 
are deemed to be more efficient mechanisms of distribution (Harvey, 2005). The way economic 
processes are framed permeates and redefines other aspects of life. For example, neoliberalism 
instills values of individualism, competitiveness, and self-management in populations (Gough, 
2002; Ong, 2006; Peck 2004). In this spirit, individuals are no longer viewed as citizens, but are 
rather considered entrepreneurs and consumers (Peck, 2004). Scholars argue that neoliberalism is 
eroding a sense of collectivity (e.g., Ong, 2006). Neoliberal ideology vilifies welfare recipients 
(Bauder, 2008; Dobrowolsky, 2008) because every individual has the freedom to succeed 
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economically, and if they are not succeeding, it is because of their failure to self-manage 
(Aguiar, 2006; Ong, 2006, Abu-Laban, 1998). Neoliberalism considers social inequalities a 
result of individual failure rather than symptoms of systemic oppression or marginalization from 
capitalistic modes of operation (Herod & Aguiar, 2006). In addition to emphasizing individual 
competition, neoliberalism is fraught with discourses of global competition, as regions and 
countries try to compete with one another in an increasingly globalized world (Ong, 2006; 
Harvey 2001).   
Two big shifts occurred in Canada’s immigration system during the rise of neoliberalism. 
One of the biggest changes to occur in Canadian immigration policy is the introduction of the 
points system in the 1970s. The adoption of the points system eliminated overtly-racist criteria 
for immigration selection, and represented the shift in the purpose of immigration from nation-
building to economic growth. Also corresponding with the rise of neoliberalism is the adoption 
of the multiculturalism in Canada, which promoted inclusivity. The rise of neoliberalism is thus 
associated with the adoption of race-neutral policies in Canada. I would now like to turn my 
attention to exploring neoliberalism’s relationship to immigration and race-neutrality, 
respectively. 
 
NEOLIBERALISM AND IMMIGRATION 
 
Neoliberalism has had pronounced effects on Canada’s immigration policies. It promotes 
individualism, competitiveness, and self-management in populations (Gough, 2002; Ong, 2006; 
Peck 2004). In this light, states begin to view individuals less as citizens, but more as 
entrepreneurs and consumers (Peck, 2004). Additionally, immigrants are viewed as an important 
source of creativity, entrepreneurship, and investment (Florida, 2002).  States are very selective 
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in deciding which populations to allow into their borders so that they can remain globally 
competitive. It is in such an environment that the discourses of attracting the “best and brightest” 
immigrants emerge.  Neoliberal ideology also results in the state viewing citizens responsible for 
their own success. The result is that there is an increasing dualism in immigration policies: they 
privilege the economic class, while criminalizing or marginalizing lower classes which are 
viewed as undesirable and undeserving (Ong, 2006; Sparke, 2006; Walsh, 2008). Neoliberalism, 
therefore, downloads the responsibility for successful immigration onto individuals, and instills 
values of competition among immigrants and nation-states. 
The point-system embodies a number of neoliberal ideals. Its main purpose is to facilitate 
the immigration of individuals with high capital who are predicted to succeed economically 
(Arat-Koc, 1999).  Other changes it embodies include user-pay policies that put the burden of 
administration costs on individual applicants, and giving priority entry to highly-skilled and 
affluent applicants (Walsh, 2008).  In 2002, the point system was revised to increase the 
requirements in areas such as language, education, and work experience (Kobayashi, Li & 
Teixeria, 2012). Additionally, more immigrant classes were established that conferred different 
status upon arrival, based on economic categories (i.e., family class, economic class, skilled 
workers, business immigrants, provincial nominees, live-in-caregivers, seasonal agricultural 
workers, refugees) (Kobayashi, Li & Teixeria, 2012). The creation of these immigration streams 
essentially allows for categorization based on perceived economic contribution to Canada. All of 
these changes represent the shift in the purpose of immigration from nation-building to economic 
growth, and the instillation of neoliberal ideology in immigration policies. 
In addition to an emphasis on attracting the best and brightest, the rise of the neoliberal 
era has resulted in crime-and-security focus in many fields of immigration policy in Canada. I 
35 
 
would like to focus on this nexus in evaluating the effects of neoliberalism on immigration. The 
link between immigration and criminality is now well documented in the literature (Dhamoon & 
Abu-Laban, 2009; Dolbrowsky, 2008; Gilbert, 2007; Nyers, 2009), with scholars terming the 
phenomenon “crimmigration” (Stumpf, 2006). Pratt (2012) traces the origins of the conflation of 
criminal justice and immigration with the transition from welfare states to neoliberal states in the 
1970s. In 1980s and 1990s legislative reforms in Canada began increasingly linking security and 
immigration (Ibrahim, 2005; Russo, 2008). In the 1990s a discursive shift occurred from 
portraying immigrants as deserving migrants to suspected criminals (Pratt & Valverde, 2002). 
These shifts (toward criminalization and security) coincide with the rise of neoliberalism. 
Although links between security and immigration have long existed in Canada (Brodie, 2009; 
Mongia, 1999), there is no doubt that the links between the two are becoming stronger and 
cemented in the neoliberal era (Aharonson & Ramsy, 2010; Pratt, 2012; Valverde, 2010).  
Scholars attribute to the link with the criminalization of migration as a hallmark of the neoliberal 
state (Nevins 2002, 2007), and thus a governmentality of neoliberalism. 
What does the merging of criminal law and immigration law look like? Stumpf (2006) 
outlines three main emergences. First, migration law increasingly has the substance of criminal 
law. For example, immigration violations are now criminal when they once used to be civil 
violations; criminal violations are resulting in deportation (representing the use of the 
immigration realm as punishment in the criminal realm); and there is increased focus on 
detaining and/or deporting immigrants who are likely to commit crimes that pose a threat to 
national security (representing the use of immigration law to meet the goals of criminal law). 
Second, immigration law enforcement is increasingly made to resemble criminal law 
prosecution.  It is for this reason that we note the rise of immigration detention complexes, which 
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resemble criminal incarceration, but which have less judicial review and indeterminate detention 
times. Third, immigrant enforcement resembles criminal enforcement. It is for this reason that 
we see the rise of border patrol agencies, such as the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA), 
that serve as pseudo-police agencies. These agencies have gained the power to police 
immigrants, and thus blur the lines between controlling immigrant populations and policing. In 
the current time, immigration and criminal law have become so merged that it is increasingly 
difficult to differentiate the two.   
It is important to note that criminal and immigration law are concerned with two very 
different realms. Crime has a very specific meaning and connotation; it is meant to address 
violent actions against a person (such as murder, sexual assault, kidnapping, or threats), or 
violent actions against a person’s property (such as theft, breaking and entering, or fraud) 
(JusticeBC, n.d.). As such, criminal law is meant to “prevent and address harm to individuals and 
society from violence or fraud or evil motive” (Stumpf, 2006). Immigration law, on the other 
hand, is concerned about regulating who may and may not enter the nation-state, the terms of 
their stay, and when they must leave (Stumpf, 2006).  In other words, it regulates the borders of 
the nation-state, and serves as a gatekeeper for citizenship. Stumpf (2006) observes that the 
commonality between criminal law and migration law is their ability to delineate belonging in 
nation-states. Given criminal law’s focus on prosecuting violent actions, the merging of criminal 
law with migration law serves to portray immigrants as perpetrators of violence against the 
nation-state. This perception, in turn, justifies violent state actions against immigrants. 
The rise of crimmigration coincides with the rise of neoliberalism for a number of 
reasons.  The first explanation is neoliberalism uses criminalization as a form of social order. 
The reasons for this include: to regulate marginalized populations that are disadvantaged by 
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neoliberal regimes (Aharonson & Ramsy, 2010; Parenti, 2000; Zedner, 2010); to create cheap 
and vulnerable workforce that neoliberalism favours (Bauder, 2003; Champlin & Hake, 2006; 
Sharma, 2006; Smolash & Tucker-Abramson, 2011; Walia, 2010); and to keep wealth 
concentrated in the hands of the wealthy, and to further cement the inequalities between rich and 
poor (Nevins, 2002; Walia, 2010). The law-and-order agenda thus provides heavy regulation of 
social order and in doing so upholds the established economic processes that rely on this social 
order. 
Another explanation scholars have for the rise of crimmigration is that neoliberalism can 
contribute to anti-immigrant sentiments that result from the restructuring of labour markets, 
dismantling of welfare states, and erosion of social security (Aliverti, 2012). In such a context, 
the illegal/criminal immigrant becomes the scapegoat for the havoc wreaked upon society by 
capitalism (Nevins, 2002). As the effects of neoliberalism increase anti-immigrant sentiment, in 
response, states increasingly try to enforce immigration through criminal law. Criminalization of 
migrants is used by the state to ease public opinion (Aliverti, 2012; Nevins, 2002) and to show 
that the state is still in control in times of increased movement in the era of globalization 
(Aharonson & Ramsy, 2010). Thus, neoliberalism employs the criminal “other” to deflect 
attention from the harsh effects of capitalism. It feeds the argument that the cure for social ails is 
to increase security from immigrants, rather than tame capitalism. 
 A third explanation for the rise of criminal law and immigration is that, together, they 
serve as an effective tool for nation-building at a time when the state sovereignty is under threat 
by globalization (Nevins, 2002). Neoliberalism promotes the free movement of goods and capital 
across borders, which threatens the sovereignty of nation-states. The increased opportunities for 
movement that result from globalization create threats to national-identity. The rise of 
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crimmigration thus represents nation-states asserting their sovereignty and national identity. 
Scholars have observed that one of the few areas of government regulation that has increased 
during globalization is immigration policies that control the movement of people (Anderson, 
Sharma & Wright, 2009; Sassen, 1996; Walsh, 2008; Walia, 2010). Thus, while capitalism 
facilitates the uncontrolled flow of goods, the nation-state is increasingly using new tools, such 
as criminalization, to heavily control the movement of people. This is because, in time of 
globalization and loss of sovereignty, immigrant illegality reifies the existence of the nation-
state. Without illegality, the identity of the nation-state would be annihilated. 
 
NEOLIBERALISM AND RACE 
 
Neoliberalism, with its focus on upholding capitalism does not take into account systems 
of oppression individuals may encounter that prevent their economic advancement, such as 
racism. Even though neoliberalism does not acknowledge the existence of racism, as the sections 
above showed, race is embedded in the existence and operation of the nation-state, and is 
manifest in the conceptualization of citizenship (Harder & Zhyznomirska, 2012; Sharma, 2006; 
Thobani, 2007). How is the relationship between state, nation, and immigration nuanced when 
neoliberalism is added into the equation? 
It is important to note that racism continues to operate in the era marked by 
neoliberalism. The current immigration system is characterized by the discourse of 
neoliberalism, where certain individuals are more valued for their capital contributions and other 
individuals are devalued because of their lack of capital contribution. The framework makes no 
allusions to overt racist criteria for immigrants entering Canada. However, there are many signs 
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that racism continues to operate and influence immigration, despite the adoption of race-neutral 
frameworks such as neoliberalism and multiculturalism. 
Shortly after the initial introduction of the points system, Canada’s immigration policies 
became increasingly restrictive in the 1990s (Walsh, 2008). This change was, in part, a result of 
discontent arising in the Canadian public about large number of immigrants arriving to Canada 
(Arat-Koc, 1999; Walsh, 2008). Ironically, the rising discontent was also in part fueled by the 
Reform Party, of which Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Minister Jason Kenney, were a part. 
At the time the Party spread news of high number of crime perpetrated by immigrants (Arat-Koc, 
1999), an issue that Mr. Harper and Mr. Kenney put front and center upon their rise to power in 
2006. To calm the apprehensions of the public, the government of the day responded by 
increasing the criteria for immigration to Canada (Walsh, 2008). The phenomenon indicates that 
xenophobia and racism continue to persist in the neoliberal era (Ibrahim, 2005). Despite being 
race-neutral, neoliberal immigration policies continue to be influenced by race. 
Other evidence that demonstrates that race remains important in contemporary 
immigration issues is that new Canadians are often portrayed as a threat to national safety in 
public discourses (Chan, 2004; Bauder, 2008; Dhamoon and Abu-Laban, 2009; Ibrahim, 2005; 
Thobani, 2007).  For example, Ibrahim (2005) evaluated newspaper coverage of a boat of 
refugees that arrived from China on the coast of British Columbia in 1999. The newspaper 
coverage brought into doubt Canada’s immigration system by failing to portray the safety of the 
country (Ibrahim, 2005). Authors note that the discourse of immigration-as-threat is used to 
support immigration policy changes (Dhamoon & Abu-Laben, 2009; Chan, 2004; Mountz, 
2004).  Thus, neoliberal immigration policies continue to be influenced by racial discourse, such 
as immigrants are threats. 
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Goldberg (2002) suggests that neoliberalism attempts to ignore racial histories and their 
accompanying inequalities.  This type of analysis suggests that neoliberalism is a separate 
process from racism, but the two are layered and work in conjunction with one another. When 
evaluating the connection between neoliberalism and race, many scholars take this position (see 
Davis 2007; Theodore, 2007). This type of analysis examines how the racialized groups are 
disproportionately affected by neoliberal policies. For example, scholars note that while capital 
and goods are promoted to travel freely in the era of neoliberalism, human movement is heavily 
controlled (Anderson et al., 2009; Arat-Koc, 1999; Walia, 2010). The result is that racialized 
groups have a harder time travelling across borders. Scholars also observe that racialized groups 
are also disproportionately affected the creation of the illegal/criminal other – which is a 
production of neoliberal modes of governing. They note that illegality/criminality has replaced 
discourse of the racial other in immigration (Dauvergne, 2008; Pratt 2012; Sharma, 2006; 
Wright, 2013). In other words, scholars suggest that while subsuming the racial other into its 
realm, neoliberalism subsumes the systems of repression embedded within in it, while failing to 
acknowledge their existence.   
Roberts and Mahtani (2007) argue, however, that a more critical analysis of neoliberalism 
is needed, one in which attempts to examine whether neoliberalism is racist. This analysis seems 
to suggest that neoliberalism does not just operated parallel to racism, but rather that racial 
conceptions are embedded within it. Hage (2000) refers to the growing immigration detention 
complexes in nation-states as “ethnic caging,” and argues that the complexes are a material 
expression of racialized othering (Mountz, 2004). His analysis suggests that although 
neoliberalism does not acknowledge the presence of race, it still attempts to manage and control 
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it, similar to past ideologies, but using new tools (i.e., criminality and illegality). The study of 
how neoliberalism may be raced is relatively underexplored by scholars. 
 
NEOLIBERALISM AND CITIZENSHIP: CANADIAN CITIZENSHIP IN THE CONTEMPORARY 
ERA 
 
Although scholars are attempting to understand the intersection of neoliberalism and 
immigration, an area that is relatively underexplored is how neoliberalism intersects with race in 
the context of citizenship. Citizenship is primarily a white institution that has only recently (in 
the 1960s) begun to be extended openly to people of colour. In this section I explain how 
scholars are attempting to understand the infusion of neoliberal ideology and modes of governing 
in citizenship; what new forms of citizenship this gives rise to; and what the consequences are 
for individuals.   
One effect neoliberalism has on citizenship is creating a dualism between citizenship and 
criminality. Increasingly, the nation-state characterizes non-citizens as illegal persons or 
criminals (Dauvergne, 2008). The illegal/criminal other is now a new racial category in 
immigration (Dauvergne, 2008; Sharma, 2006; Pratt 2012; Wright, 2013).  
Another effect of neoliberalism on citizenship is that citizenship is increasingly becoming 
out of reach for immigrants not viewed as economically productive (Ong, 2006; Sparke, 2006; 
Walsh, 2008). Seasonal agricultural workers, refugees, and live-in-caregiver programs face 
lengthier and more difficult paths to citizenship than immigrants in economic classes. Some 
routes, such as the seasonal agricultural workers program, are altogether blocked off from 
permanent resident status. Coincidentally, lower-capital immigration streams that have more 
difficult paths to citizenship largely consist of racialized immigrants from the Global South. 
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Scholars argue that the capital-based selection criteria in immigration systems inherently prevent 
people from underprivileged nations from obtaining citizenship (Walsh, 2008). Ong (2006) 
refers to the phenomenon whereby different individuals are given different rights and 
entitlements based on their human capital as “differentiated citizenship.” Although people may 
occupy the same territory, they can have different rights based on their contribution to the 
economy (Ong, 2006).   
Furthermore, the rise of neoliberalism is associated with the rise of precarious status, 
whereby temporary forms of migration are outpacing the granting of long-term residence that 
leads to citizenship acquisition. In Canada, temporary foreign workers exceeded permanent 
residents for the first time in history in 2008 (Statistics Canada, 2010). Additionally, there has 
been a proliferation of undocumented migrants entering countries such as the United States as 
the requirements for legal migration are increasing. The proliferation of temporary foreign 
workers and undocumented immigrants is unprecedented.  
Not only is citizenship growing out of reach for larger populations under neoliberal 
regimes, citizenship itself is being fractured (Stumpf, 2006; Sparke 2006). Stumpf (2006) argues 
that merging of criminal and immigration law creates “lesser levels of citizenship.” One example 
is the differentiation between dual citizens and birthright citizens. Deportation and immigrant 
detention protocols only apply to dual citizens, and require much less thoroughness and evidence 
for conviction than criminal reviews. Birthright citizens are not only exempt from deportation, 
but are protected by more stringent judicial reviews when their actions are perceived as 
threatening. The result is that nation-states are able to expel and punish individuals based on their 
citizenship status and ethnicity, rather than rigorous criminal judicial review, which is a privilege 
birthright citizens enjoy. Sparke (2006) notes how the NEXUS pass in the United States has 
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Figure 2: Map of Visa Requirements to Enter Canada by Country  
 
White = Countries whose citizens do not need visa to enter Canada, Blue = Countries whose citizens 
need a visa to enter Canada (Stray, 2008) 
 
emerged to privilege business class citizenship that provides greater than ever ease in travelling 
the world. At the same time, US securitization of citizenship is happening to create an underclass 
of immigrants that cannot achieve citizenship. Regardless of how the differences to citizenship 
are perceived, scholars seem to agree that citizenship is increasingly being fractured along racial 
(Stumpf, 2006) and economic lines (Sparke, 2008; Ong, 2006). Although the changes 
neoliberalism brings to citizenship are still to be explored, what is clear is that inequalities 
remain embedded in citizenship today. 
Neoliberalism has not just created new inequalities in citizenship; it also operates over 
existing inequalities. Mongia (1999) observed that upon the establishment of the passport system 
in Canada, different “nationalities” were given differential mobility rights. The phenomenon 
largely continues today. A map of citizens who area able to enter Canada without visas reveals a 
striking visual (Figure 2); only first world citizens, mostly of European ancestry, have free 
movement into Canada. The majority of the world is excluded from this same privilege. To think 
that the entire world experiences the privilege of free movement is “colonial behavior” (Spivak, 
2008). Thus, neoliberalism does not just create new inequalities in citizenship; it operates on top 






One framework that is useful for understanding the changes to citizenship under 
neoliberal regimes is transnational feminism. Transnational feminism overlaps with critical race 
theory. Transnational feminism emerged in the 1970s during the rise of neoliberalism and is an 
anti-racist, anti-capitalist movement. Given its focus on neoliberalism and race, the framework 
offers many useful insights for this investigation, which attempts to evaluate how neoliberalism 
and race converge in Canadian citizenship. Its most important contributions include: the call for 
the identification and critique of capitalism and neoliberalism in all contexts (including 
citizenship); its focus on the lived experiences of people in the margins; its attempts to 
contextualize local inequalities within the global flows of power; and, its critical perspective of 
the nation-state in perpetuating and upholding race. I use this framework in order to understand 
the workings of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown.  
In recognizing the context of global hegemony of neoliberalism and capitalism, 
transnational feminism advocates for decolonization through anticapitalist movements (Mohanty, 
2003). Decolonization is defined as “active withdrawal of consent and resistance to structures of 
psychic and social domination” (Mohanty, 2003, p. 9). Transnational feminism sees capitalism as 
embedded with racist and other forms of social domination. Capitalism thus in turn creates and 
upholds current organizations of power in society (Mohanty, 2003). By taking an anticapitalist 
stance, transnational feminism advocates for the critique of the “operation, discourses and values 
of capitalism, and of their naturalization through neoliberal ideology” (Mohanty, 2003, p.9). 
Therefore, it views neoliberalism, capitalism, and colonialism as inseparable and in need of 
questioning in order to eliminate systems of domination. This same approach can be used to 
study the systems of domination present in citizenship. 
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It is impossible to understand the current form of citizenship, without understanding its 
global context. Transnational feminism attempts to understand how global flows of power, 
embodied in neoliberal and capital regimes, are exerted on the marginalized individual 
(Alexander & Mohanty, 1997; Grewal & Kaplan, 1994; Pratt, 2004; Pratt & Yeoh, 2003; 
Razack, 2000). It calls for “an analytic framework that is attentive to the micropolitics of 
everyday life as well as to the macropolitics of global economic and political processes” 
(Mohanty, 2003, p. 230). This is relevant to Canadian citizenship because the government is 
using it as an incentive to attract the world’s best and brightest, which is resulting in the 
marginalization of growing number of individuals deemed not to be economically desirable. 
Thus, it is impossible to understand local manifestations of power void of the context of global 
flows. Transnational feminism attempts to understand both local and global location of actors, 
and how these layers intersect on the level of the marginalized individual (Mohanty, 2003). 
Because of its emphasis on decolonization, transnational feminism places particular 
emphasis on understanding social justice from the perspective of people in the margins 
(Alexander & Mohanty, 1997; Calliste & Sefa Dei, 2000; Shohat, 2002; Mohanty, 2003). 
Scholars argue that it is really only possible to understand the functioning of power in general, 
and capitalism and colonialism specifically, by looking at their impacts on the marginalized 
(Alexander & Mohanty, 1997; Mohanty, 2003). As mentioned previously, a goal of this research 
project is to provide an analysis of citizenship from the perspective of those who have none. 
Conducting interviews with immigrants who are entangled in the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown 
allows stories of struggle to emerge that might not otherwise be heard. In the powerful public 
domain of the media, the voices of the marginalized are rarely represented. Transnational 
feminism is a framework that is useful for understanding, and contextualizing, these stories. By 
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focusing on the experiences of individuals in the margins, the framework emphasizes that 
individuals have agency to resist oppressive or unjust regimes, as opposed to being solely 
victims (Alexander & Mohanty, 1997; Calliste & Sefa Dei, 2000; Mohanty, 2003; Nagar & 
Swarr, 2010). 
Given that colonization, economic imperialism, and territorial sovereignty are central to 
its critique, transnational feminism also focuses on the nation-state (Alexander & Mohanty, 
1997). It argues that the nation-state upholds capitalism and colonialism through its form and 
operation. It upholds capitalism by facilitating the movement of capital, and it upholds 
colonialism by intervening, controlling, and disciplining populations within its borders, and those 
attempting to cross them. Citizenship is one way in which the state institutionalizes colonialism 
and capitalism. Transnational feminism argues that the nation-state uses citizenship consciously 
to manipulate the differences it creates.  It uses citizenship to exclude marginalized groups based 
on their deviance from the universal citizen (Alexander & Mohanty, 1997). The universal citizen 
is portrayed as loyal to the nation-state, and the subordinate class of noncitizens are portrayed as 
deviant, non-loyal, and therefore, suspect. In addition to creating and upholding exclusions, the 
nation-state has the means of organized violence to protect its national security from those who 
are non-citizens (Alexander & Mohanty, 1997). The “citizenship machinery” is not blind to 
difference; it purposefully manipulates it (Alexander & Mohanty, 1997). 
It also deconstructs cultural racism by arguing for a more comparative approach 
(Alexander & Mohanty, 1997; Mohnaty, 2003). It calls for comparing experiences of people and 
finding the “interconnectedness of their histories, experiences and struggles” (Mohanty, 2003, p. 
242). It rejects the idea that certain cultures are superior to others, but instead tries to study 
cultures in relation to one another (Alexander & Mohanty, 1997; Shohat, 2002). This approach 
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shifts the focus of analysis from cultural differences to looking at similar social and economic 
processes and histories, and how they affect groups of people differently (Mohanty, 2003). This 
approach calls for studying the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown across racial groups, and 
highlighting how the same action impacts certain groups differently. This type of comparative, or 
relational approach, allows scholars to study power and oppression, agency and resistance, 
across contexts (both national and cultural) (Alexander & Mohanty, 1997; Mohanty, 2003). In 
doing so, it recognizes that the same act of power, applied across different groups, has very 
different effects. Most importantly, it rejects cultural racism by acknowledging that the unequal 
effects are not due to cultural inferiority, but rather, to the social, political, and economic context 
in which they occur. 
It should be clear by now that the transnational feminist literature is relevant to this 
investigation in numerous ways. First, it calls for evaluating local and global contexts hand-in-
hand. Citizenship in Canada is now viewed as tool by the government to attract global capital, 
but the granting of citizenship has acute impacts on the individual level, on the people who are 
applying for it, and are denied it. Second, it centralizes the perspective of the marginalized, 
which this thesis will attempt to do by interviewing individuals who do not have Canadian 
citizenship. Third, it foregrounds and critiques the links between neoliberalism, race and 
citizenship, themes which are central focus in the analysis of the Fraud Crackdown. Lastly, it 
calls for a comparative approach across racial groups, and recognizing the similarities and 
differences in the struggles of different groups. As the chapters below unfold, all of these 




In summary, to understand the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown, I draw on literature from 
critical race theory, nation, immigration and neoliberalism. The literature provides an overview 
of: 1) how the conception of race has changed over time, 2) how conceptions of race have been 
central to the way nations are understood and defined, 3) the role of the immigration in creating 
and reifying the nation-state. Lastly, the literature examines how a new phenomenon, 
neoliberalism, is layered onto the historical relationships of race, nation, and immigration. I use 
the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown to build on the literature that examines how race intertwines 
with neoliberalism.  
In doing so, this investigation will contribute to two literature gaps. The first is that 
scholars need to do more work in understanding how neoliberalism and race work in conjunction 
with one another (Roberts & Mahtani, 2010). Citizenship studies are one area where this 
connection can be better explored. While the link between neoliberalism and citizenship has been 
explored by scholars such as Aihwa Ong (1999, 2006), few scholars focus on the added layer of 
race intertwining with neoliberalism in citizenship. By adding this additional layer of analysis, I 
contribute to understanding the relationship between neoliberalism and race, and examine 
whether they are separate processes, as many scholars suggest, or whether there is another way 
to characterize their relationship.  Second, citizenship is embedded with colonialism, capitalism, 
imperialism, racism and other hegemonic systems and discourses. Despite these traits, 
citizenship is often discussed from a privileged perspective: by those who have citizenship. This 
thesis will attempt to build on the scarce literature (such as Lee, 2012) that examines citizenship 
from the perspective of those who have none. By addressing areas under-explored by scholars, I 
hope to contribute to contemporary citizenship studies. 
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 Now, more than ever, is an important time to be studying citizenship in Canada. Under 
the leadership of the Conservative government, the nation-state has created major reforms to 
citizenship. The Fraud Crackdown, and the Citizenship Act that followed, are embedded with 
racial and neoliberal underpinnings that must be better examined in order to understand what is 




CHAPTER 4 – THE CITIZENSHIP FRAUD CRACKDOWN  
 
It is interesting to note that the first substantial controversy the Conservative government 
encountered after coming into power was related to citizenship. In July 2006, only a few months 
after winning the election, the Conservatives were criticized for evacuating Canadians from 
Lebanon (Harder & Zhyznomirska, 2012). The public discourse dubbed the individuals, who had 
dual Canadian and Lebanese citizenship, as “citizens of convenience.” The Conservative 
government was slammed for using tax-payer money to evacuate citizens perceived to be taking 
advantage of Canada. I outline the “citizens of convenience” controversy as the start of the 
Conservatives’ obsession to reform citizenship, and situate the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown 
within this context.  
In providing the context of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown, I begin the first section 
with an overview of the citizenship changes enacted by the Conservatives, from 2006 to 2014. I 
then provide a detailed overview of the operation of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown. The 
Crackdown is carried out in two ways: the first component of the Crackdown is the revocation of 
citizenship and Permanent Resident (PR) status, the most publicized portion of the initiative. The 
second component of the Crackdown is the revision of the Residence Questionnaire, which 
ensures that citizenship applicants meet the physical residence requirements in Canada. This 
component of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown, although less publicized, impacted a number of 
citizen applicants as well. The chapter, thus, explains how the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown is 
an extension of the Conservative’s attempts to reform citizenship after the “citizens of 




THE CONTEXT: OVERVIEW OF PROPOSED AND ENACTED CHANGES TO CITIZENSHIP 
UNDER THE STEPHEN HARPER CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT, 2006 - 2014 
 
Over the course of their time in power, the Conservatives have tabled a number of bills to 
reform the Citizenship Act (Table 2). Those of notable interest are Bill C-37 An Act to Amend the 
Citizenship Act (2007), Bill C-37 Strengthening the Value of Canadian Citizenship (2010), and 
Bill C-24 Strengthening the Canadian Citizenship Act (2014). This section will provide a brief 
overview of these bills and other changes to citizenship under the Conservatives. The changes, 
for the most part, aimed to prevent the presence of dual citizens who had no ties to Canada, and 
who only used citizenship for its benefits.  
Bill C-37 (2007) was created to address two controversies: the case of the “Lost 
Canadians” and the “citizens of convenience” controversy. “Lost Canadians” were individuals 
who unknowingly lost their citizenship due to previous revisions of the Citizenship Act. Many 
individuals were unaware they had lost status until the government of Canada required passports 
to enter the United States, and the individuals had to file for a certificate of Canadian citizenship 
or other documentation. The bill restored citizenship to these individuals, who successfully 
invoked their European ancestry to claim citizenship status. The second purpose of the bill was 
to calm public controversy concerning the “citizens of convenience” debate that had been 
sparked by the evacuation of Canadians from Lebanon. Bill C-37 aimed to curb these debates by 
introducing the first generation rule to citizenship, which bars citizenship to second- and 
consequent-generations born outside of Canada. In effect, the bill strived to prevent immigrants 
who lived outside of Canada from passing their citizenship onto subsequent generations. The bill 
is inherently racialized, as discussed above in Chapter 3, because it embodies a suspicion toward 
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dual citizens with non-European origins, while considering individuals with European ancestry 
as de-facto Canadian. 
In addition to introducing Bill C-37 (2007), following the “citizens of convenience 
scandal,” the Conservatives promised to review the practices surrounding the granting of dual 
citizenship. The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade was 
tasked with completing this review. In its report, the committee suggested that no changes be 
made to dual citizenship. Instead, the Committee used a quote from a Department of Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) official to outline its stance: “a Canadian is a Canadian; 
the rule is very clear. However […] the debate has been launched and the discussion will take 
place. The challenge before us concerns how to frame that debate” (Standing Senate Committee 
2007 cited in Nyers, 2010). The Committee, in its review, supported the idea that dual citizens 
and birth right citizens should not be differentiated in law. 
Despite the recommendations not to make changes to dual citizenship, the Conservatives 
continued on their quest to reform it. In June 2010, Minister Jason Kenney announced the 
introduction of the bill, Bill C-37 Strengthening the Value of Canadian Citizenship (2010), 
whose purpose was to further build upon the integrity of the citizenship program as Bill C-37 had 
started to do. The Conservatives used Bill C-37(2010) to continue to address the problems in 
citizenship that were perceived, although not confirmed, by the “citizens of convenience” debate  
(such as dual citizens not physically residing in Canada for long periods of time), and also added 
new components to the reforms for citizenship (such as cracking down on “crooked consultants”, 
increasing penalties for citizenship fraud, preventing criminals from becoming citizens, and 
streamlining the citizenship/PR revocation process).   The bill did not get past the second reading 
at the House of Commons.  The Conservatives were able to pass one component of the bill into 
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law, however, through a separate bill called Bill C-35: Cracking Down on Crooked Consultants 
Act (2010), which created a regulatory body for immigrant consultants.  The bill, had it passed, 
would have created vast changes to citizenship.  
Shortly after Bill C-37 died, in July 2011, the Conservatives announced the launch of the 
Citizenship Fraud Crackdown that is the focus of this study. The purpose of the Crackdown was 
well-aligned with the intent of Bill C-37, such as reducing citizenship fraud and enforcing 
physical residence requirements. It is here that I locate the importance of the Citizenship Fraud 
Crackdown: it was, in fact, used by the Harper government to raise public concern about the 
integrity of the citizenship program, in order to gain public support for citizenship reforms that 
had failed to pass. The Conservatives used the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown to address the 
challenge presented to them by the Standing Committee: how to frame the debate surrounding 
dual citizenship. The Conservatives decided to frame the dual citizenship discourse using the 
Citizenship Fraud Crackdown, which perpetuated an image of a citizenship program under threat 
from a large number of fraudulent immigrants.  
Three years after the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown was launched, the Conservatives 
introduced Bill C-24 Strengthening the Canadian Citizenship Act (2014). The bill was very 
similar to its predecessor, Bill C-37, and strived to protect citizenship from misuse and abuse. It 
also incorporated many components of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown (such as defining 
residence as solely physical, and updating the revocation process in order to allow for faster 
removal of fraud). Bill C-24 (2014) successfully passed into law in June of 2014, four months 
after it was introduced. With Bill C-24 (2014), the Conservatives were finally able to pass the 
changes to citizenship they had long dreamed of since the “citizens of convenience” spectacle, 
and failed to do through Bill C-37(2010). Bill C-24 (2014) represents the Conservatives’ efforts 
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coming full-circle, by preventing dual citizens from using their citizenship for its benefits, and 
thus preventing any further cases of “citizens of convenience.” 
In addition to creating new bills to change the citizenship laws, the Conservatives also 
made changes to the citizenship program through policies and programs (Griffith, 2013). These 
changes included (CIC, 2012f; Griffith, 2013): 
 Creating a new citizenship test guide called Discover Canada, written in a much higher 
level of English than the previous guide (increase from Level 4 English in the previous 
guide to Level 7-8 English) 
 Establishing a new knowledge test  (to address anecdotal evidence of cheating on the 
citizenship test) 
 Allowing military personnel to preside in the citizenship ceremonies 
 Banning face coverings in citizenship ceremonies 
 Changing the citizenship ceremony program folders (including removing the copy of the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, adding an explanation of the importance of the Oath of 
Citizenship and importance of the monarchy) 
 Establishing a citizenship fraud tip line 
In general, the changes the Conservatives proposed and enacted through bills and programs, 
reflected their strong ties to the British Crown, and a view that citizenship was too easy to attain 
(Griffith, 2013). Broadly speaking, Kenney’s reforms to citizenship represented a change in 
paradigm from previous Liberal views on citizenship (Griffith, 2013). Whereas the Liberals 
viewed citizenship as a stepping stone to integration, and thus wanted it to be relatively easy to 
acquire, Jason Kenney wanted to emphasize that effort and hard work were needed to attain 
citizenship (Giffith, 2013). And, whereas the Liberals viewed that integrity of citizenship in 
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terms of assisting with integration, the Conservatives viewed its integrity through the lens of 
higher standards and more exclusionary measures (Griffith, 2013).  
 
Table 2: Citizenship Reform Bills Made to the Senate by the Conservative Government, 
2006 - 2014 
Source: Parliament of Canada, 2010 
  
Date introduced Status Name of bill Purpose 
February 2014 Royal Assent 





Created many changes to Citizenship (for overview 
see Appendix A). The changes focused on the broad 
areas of focus include: reducing fraud, changing 
revocation process, increasing efficiency in citizenship 












Private member’s bill that revised C-232 (below). In 
addition to proposed fast-tracked citizenship for 
Canadian armed forces, it added the provision that an 
individual is deemed to have applied to renounce their 
citizenship if they engage in act of war against the 
Canadian armed forces. 
June 2010 Did not get 
past first 





Value of Canadian 
Citizenship  
Cracking down on “crooked consultants”, increasing 
penalties for citizenship fraud, requiring physical 
presence in Canada in order to meet residency 
requirements for PR and citizenship, preventing 
criminals from becoming citizens, streamlining the 
citizenship/PR revocation process. 
June  2010  
 
Royal Assent 
on  March 
2011 
Bill C-35: Cracking 
Down on Crooked 
Consultants Act 





March 2008  
(as S-231) 
Abandoned S-231: An Act to 
amend the 
Citizenship Act (oath 
of citizenship) 
Private member’s bill that proposed to eliminate the 
federal court and Charter of Rights and Freedoms as a 
means to make changes to the citizenship oath.  
December 2007 Royal Assent 
on  April 
2008 
Bill C-37: An Act to 
amend the 
Citizenship Act 
Restored citizenship to “Lost Canadians.” 
Implemented the first-generation rule for citizenship. 
April 2006  
 
(Reinstated 
December 2007)  
Abandoned  C-232: An Act to 
amend the 
Citizenship Act 
(service in the 
Canadian armed 
forces) 
Private member’s bill which proposed to fast-track 
citizenship for Permanent Residents who served in the 
Canadian armed forces 
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THE THRUST: (RE)DEFINING RESIDENCE IN CANADA 
 
During the introduction of the three bills outlined above, the Conservatives were fixated 
on clearly defining what “residence” in Canada means in order to qualify for citizenship status.  
Until Bill C-24 (2014) was passed, the Citizenship Act did not provide a clear definition of 
residence. 
In the antecedent Citizenship Act (1977 – 2013), there were three types of judicial 
interpretations of residency, due to the term “residence” not being clearly defined (Canada 
[Citizenship and Immigration] v. Takla, 2009). The first, and least commonly used, 
interpretation of the law was that the Citizenship Act was referring to physical presence in 
Canada. The other two interpretations considered residence in terms of established relations to 
the nation-state. For example, a second interpretation of the law viewed the intention to reside in 
Canada as sufficient to acquire Canadian citizenship, as long as a certain connection to Canada 
was maintained. The third, and most dominant interpretation, was that as long as a person’s 
existence was centralized in Canada, he/she was considered to be residing in the country, and 
meeting the requirements to apply for citizenship.  
Citizenship judges were free to interpret the residence requirement in any of these three 
ways (physical, intentional, or centralized) (Canada  v. Takla, 2009). The dominant 
interpretation of residence as centralized existence was often tested through the Koo Test (Table 
3), which attempted to examine the quality of connections to Canada. The ambiguity of the term 
“residence” in the legislation gave flexibility for citizenship judges to grant citizenship to 
applicants who do not meet the three year physical residency requirement, but nonetheless had 




Table 3: The Koo Test 
 
The most common interpretation of “residence” in Canada under the Citizenship Act of 1977-
2013 was centralized existence. The Koo Test was the most common way for citizenship judges 
to verify that applicants had met the residence requirements for Canadian citizenship. The test 
consists of the following questions: 
 
(1) Was the individual physically present in Canada for a long period prior to recent absences 
which occurred immediately before the application for citizenship;  
  
(2) Where are the applicant’s immediate family and dependents (and extended family) resident;  
 
(3) Does the pattern of physical presence in Canada indicate a returning home or merely visiting 
the country;  
  
(4) What is the extent of the physical absences - if an applicant  is only a few days short of the 
1095 day total it is easier to find  deemed residence than if those absences are extensive;  
  
(5) Is the physical absence caused by a clearly temporary  situation such as employment as a 
missionary abroad, following a  course of study abroad as a student, accepting temporary  
employment abroad, accompanying a spouse who has accepted  temporary employment abroad;  
  
(6) What is the quality of the connection with Canada: is it more substantial than that which 
exists with any other country 
 




During their reforms to citizenship, the Conservatives made numerous attempts to define 
residence in Canada as solely physical presence in the nation-state.  Their first attempt was the 
mass distribution of the Residence Questionnaire (further elaborated upon below) for citizenship 
applicants, as part of their Citizenship Fraud Crackdown. The Conservatives made other attempts 
through tabling Bills C-24 (2010) and C-37 (2014), discussed above, both of which proposed to 
amend the Act to define residence as exclusively physical. Bill C-24 succeeded in changing the 
definition of residence in the Act. The new change means that citizenship judges are no longer 
able to exercise discretion in cases where applicants do not meet the exact number of physical 
days of presence in Canada.  It also reiterates citizenship as a territorial relation to the nation-
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state, as opposed to the other definitions, which looked at the quality of the relationship to the 
nation-state.  
Given the context reforms outlined above, it appears that the Citizenship Fraud 
Crackdown was a result of the “citizens of convenience” controversy, which resulted in 
Conservatives attempting to make citizenship more exclusionary, in order to increase its value. 
The Crackdown also took place at the time when the Conservatives were preoccupied with 
reiterating citizenship as a territorial relation to the nation-state.  The section below provides an 
overview of the process and operation of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown. 
 
THE CITIZENSHIP FRAUD CRACKDOWN DESCRIBED 
 
The Citizenship Fraud Crackdown seems to have its origins in the CIC Fraud Action 
Plan. There are almost no public documents available about the Fraud Action Plan; however, I 
have come to understand its purpose and scope through snippets of information on the CIC 
website and through documents released through the Access to Information and Privacy Act 
(ATIP). It appears that the Citizenship Fraud Action Plan was developed by the Program 
Integrity Division (PID) of the Citizenship Program, which is responsible for the granting of 
citizenship (CIC, 2012d). The PID is concerned with risk management, quality insurance, and 
fraud prevention in the Citizenship Program (CIC, 2012d).  The Action Plan’s main aim is 
preventing individuals from obtaining citizenship through fraudulent means. Despite applicants 
being able to misrepresent any number of the eligibility requirements for citizenship
1
, the Action 
                                                             
1
 The eligibility criteria for citizenship at the time of the Crackdown required that individuals must: be 18 years or 
older, have valid Permanent Resident status, be fluent in one of the official languages, pass a knowledge test about 
Canada, have allowed enough time to pass from criminal convictions and prohibitions, and have spent the last 3 out 
of the 4 years in Canada (CIC, 2014b). 
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Plan seems to focus primarily on residence fraud. CIC uses the example of people who establish 
false addresses in Canada and live elsewhere before they apply for citizenship as an example of 
residence fraud. In January 2010, CIC announced the launch of the Fraud Action Plan “to 
respond to abuse, particularly organized residence fraud in the Citizenship Program” (CIC, 
2013c).  
Shortly after the plan was launched, in July 2011, Kenney announced the launch of 
Citizenship Fraud Crackdown. He explained that thousands of people were suspected of having 
obtained their citizenship by lying about their residence in Canada. In a July 27, 2011 press 
conference, Kenney announced CIC was “beginning the process to revoke the citizenship of up 
to 1,800 citizens who have obtained it fraudulently” (CIC, 2011b). On December 9, 2011, he 
announced that the number of revocations proceedings had risen to 2,100 and an additional 4,400 
individuals were being scrutinized, for a total of 11,000 cases (CIC, 2011d). The media was 
quick to transmit that cases of "widespread fraud" were present in the citizenship program. 
Kenney described CIC’s intent to revoke citizenship on a mass scale as  “the largest enforcement 
action ever taken in the history of Canadian citizenship” (Mackrael, 2011). The Conservatives 
thus continued the revocation discourse the Liberals had started from 1993 to 2006, but 
garnering much more public attention. From their rhetoric, they appeared to be doing an 
undertaking never done before: purging Canada of past, present, and future citizenship fraud. 
CIC’s focus on residence fraud was sparked by a number of events, including anecdotal 
information (Griffith, 2013), and the discovery of immigration consultants in Montreal, Halifax 
and Mississauga who were establishing false addresses for applicants (CIC, 2011a). Interesting 
to note is that it was also sparked by “citizens of convenience” controversy surrounding 
Lebanese-Canadians (Griffith, 2013). Together, these three sources were uncertain at best, and 
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failed to provide a clear picture of the extent of fraud present in the citizenship program. Despite 
the lack of rigour of their sources, the Conservatives acted swiftly to address residence fraud.  
From what can be gathered from newspaper articles and interviews, CIC had a two-
pronged approach to the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown. The first approach was to revoke 
citizenship that was obtained through void means (i.e., misrepresentations or lying about 
residence), while the second approach was to prevent the granting of citizenship in the first place 
to false applicants. The latter approach resulted in updating the Residence Questionnaire in May 
2012 and handing it out in large numbers to citizenship applicants. Below I discuss each of these 
two approaches separately. 
 
REVOCATION OF CITIZENSHIP & PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS 
 
The Citizenship Fraud Crackdown was launched prior to the revisions to the Citizenship 
Act. Thus, this section will explain how the Fraud Crackdown functioned under the Citizenship 
Act of 1977-2013, which was in force at the time. It seems that the Fraud Crackdown will 
continue into the future, and will be tailored to the new citizenship and PR requirements under 
the revised Citizenship Act of 2014. However, the form of the Fraud Crackdown under the new 
Act is out of the scope of this paper, given that all of its components are yet to come into force.  
Under the antecedent Citizenship Act (1977-2013), the only grounds for revoking 
citizenship are cases of “fraud, false representation or knowingly concealing material 
circumstances” (CIC, 2011c). The transgression can occur at any time in the citizenship/PR 
process, from obtaining status to maintaining it. Examples of transgressions include 
misrepresenting residency in Canada in the application for PR or citizenship, or concealing 
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information that would makes someone ineligible for PR or citizenship status. Since the fraud 
investigations are concerned with enforcing physical residency in Canada, it is important to note 
that residence obligations are different for citizenship and permanent residence (PR). To uphold 
PR status, individuals must reside in Canada for a minimum of two years out of five. In order to 
qualify for citizenship, individuals must reside in Canada for a minimum of three years out of 
five.  
Revocation is not a common phenomenon in Canada. Since 1977, 68 citizenships have 
been revoked in Canada (CIC, 2011a). In 2010, CIC established a permanent addition to CIC’s 
organizational structure, a new unit of 11 public servants to work full-time on potential 
revocation cases (CIC, 2011a). After the establishment of the new unit, called the “Integrity 
Team” (CIC, 2011a), Minister Jason Kenney announced that the number of revocations would 
increase drastically. Revocation can be applied retroactively (CIC, 2012i), and potentially 
includes backtracking citizenship applications to identify fraud.  
It is important to remember that revocation only affects individuals with dual citizenship, 
and those who are born outside of Canada. Under citizenship legislation, individuals who have 
birth-right citizenship cannot have it revoked, nor can individuals born outside of Canada, but 
that only possess Canadian citizenship. This is because the government cannot render a person 
stateless. In reality, revocation only affects individuals (immigrants) who do not have citizenship 
by birth, and who simultaneously hold citizenship from another country. 
A person may have either their citizenship or Permanent Resident status revoked, or both.  
For Permanent Resident revocations, CIC wants to ensure that individuals are meeting the 
residence requirement to uphold their PR status (i.e., living in Canada two years out of five 
years). In order to ensure individuals are meeting their PR requirements, they are questioned 
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about their residency (although CIC does not clarify how exactly). If they are found to not have 
upheld the requirements, individuals will most likely lose their PR status, and face removal from 
Canada and/or criminal charges. The decision to revoke PR status may occur while an individual 
is outside of Canada. If their status is being revoked, individuals have 60 days to file a notice of 
appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board. In addition to 
CIC revoking PR status, the CBSA or IRB may issue a removal order to individuals who did not 
meet the residency requirements of their PR status.
2
 If the person has been issued a removal 
order, he or she has 30 days to file an appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division of the 
Immigration and Refugee Board. An individual may apply again for Permanent Resident status if 
it is revoked; however, the likelihood of being approved is unclear.  
For citizenship revocations, the CIC wishes to ensure that individuals meet the residence 
requirement to apply for citizenship (i.e., lived in Canada for three out of five years) and did not 
misrepresent any information in their citizenship application. CIC issues a Notice of Intent to 
Revoke Citizenship to individuals it believes have obtained their status through 
misrepresentation, and for which it has acquired evidence (CIC, 2011c). Once individuals 
receive the Notice of Intent to revoke citizenship, they have 30 days to refer their case to the 
Federal Court and have a hearing in front of a judge (CIC, 2011c). If they do not respond to the 
Notice of Intent, then they automatically forfeit their citizenship and the revocation process 
begins (CIC, 2011c). If the Federal court finds the individual innocent, then their case is closed. 
                                                             
2
 There are three types of removal orders: departure order, exclusion order, and deportation order. The first two are 
temporary in nature and allow the possibility for return to Canada. The third permanently bars re-entry into Canada, 
unless the individual obtains written permission from the CBSA. Departure Orders require individuals to leave 
Canada within 30 days of being served the notice, and to verify their exit with an immigration officer. If individuals 
respect both directions (exit and verification of exit), they may be able to return to Canada again. The Exclusion 
Order requires individuals to leave Canada and bars re-entry for one to two years. Departure and Exclusion orders 
are usually issued for less serious immigration violations. If individuals do not follow the exclusion or departure 




If the Federal court finds that a person has misrepresented information in their citizenship 
application, then the Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism may submit a 
report of the case to the Governor in Council for review (CIC, 2011c). The final decision to 
proceed with revocation is made by the Governor in Council. The revocation itself is carried out 
through an Order-in-Council. The individual can request that the Federal Court review the 
decision to revoke citizenship made by the Governor in Council (CIC, 2011c).  The process to 
revoke citizenship, thus involves numerous checks and balances, and is ultimately decided in the 
court of law. 
There revocation of status can take many forms. If misrepresentation occurred in the 
citizenship application process, but not the permanent resident application, an individual’s status 
will be reverted to Permanent Resident. If, however, the individual did not meet the residence 
requirement to be a Permanent Resident, then they will lose their Citizenship and Permanent 
Resident status. Even if an individual did not misrepresent their citizenship application, but 
misrepresented their Permanent Resident application, they are at risk of losing both. CIC 
believes that the majority of revocation cases are instances where the individuals meet PR 
requirements but not citizenship requirements (CIC, 2011a). In cases where an individual loses 
their citizenship, but not PR status, they can apply for citizenship again five years after the 
revocation. In cases where parents obtained citizenship through fraudulent means for themselves 
and their children, both parents and children will also have their citizenship revoked (CIC, 
2011a). The revocation of status comes in many permutations.  
In addition to revocation and removal, criminal charges may be laid by the RCMP for 
individuals guilty of not meeting residency requirements. In some cases of PR or citizenship 
fraud, although not specified which by CIC, violations of the Citizenship Act and Immigration 
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and Refugee Protection Act may result in fraud charges under the Criminal Code of Canada. If 
charged under the Criminal Code, individuals may be incarcerated and/or receive criminal 
records.  Thus the revocations are a joint effort between CIC, the state’s branch that controls 
migration, the CBSA, the state’s border enforcement agency, and the RCMP, the state’s national 
police service. The CBSA and RCMP are responsible for enforcing the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act. The RCMP investigates organized crime (CIC, 2011a). 
It seems the revocation of citizenship, if it leads to reversion to PR status, and still allows 
individuals to apply for citizenship once again, is not a harsh penalty. It also appears that the 
investigations are focused on residency requirements, which do not seem to be dangerous 
transgressions either. Given the mild nature of the transgressions, it is interesting that CIC 
employs such harsh, intimidating, and penalizing discourses when talking about “citizenship 
fraud.” The analysis of the discourse surrounding citizenship fraud will be analyzed in the 
chapters below. 
 In summary, revocation of status can occur at any time, only applies to immigrants who 
are dual citizens, and are conducted in cooperation with the nation’s policing agencies. This type 
of approach to reducing fraud is more drastic than the Residence Questionnaire, which is used as 
a preventative measure and bars granting of citizenship in the first place.  
 
THE RESIDENCE QUESTIONNAIRE (RQ) 
 
The second approach to reduce residence fraud is to detect it before it happens, with the 
use of the Residence Questionnaire (RQ). The RQ is a tool the CIC uses to ensure that permanent 
residents meet the three-year physical residency requirement in order to be eligible for 
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citizenship. The RQ is associated with the first interpretation of “residence” in the Citizenship 
Act, as physical presence in the country.  
Although it is not known for how long the RQ has existed, it has been used by CIC as a 
tool in the citizenship application process since at least 2009. The RQ began to be more widely 
known after it was updated in May 2012, 11 months after Kenney announced the Fraud 
Crackdown. The change came as a result of the Audit of the Citizenship Program
3
 (2011) and 
also part of the “citizenship modernization” project in CIC (CIC, 2014a). The modernization 
project includes measures that increase efficiency, consistency, and integrity in citizenship 
application processing.
4
  The revisions to the RQ included adding new questions, requesting 
more documents, and changing the reasons for handing out the RQ to citizenship applicants. 
After its revision, the RQ began to be handed out in large numbers to citizenship applicants. 
The purpose of the RQ revision was to ensure that CIC: collected enough evidence of 
residence in citizenship applications; captured all-encompassing information about an applicant; 
reduced back and forth communications between CIC and the applicant, and thus decreased 
processing times; and used the RQ as an integral tool for reducing citizenship fraud.  The 
Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism described the link between RQ and 
actions undertaken to reduce citizenship fraud as follows: 
The RQ is issued in cases where additional information and documents are 
needed in order to assist in determining whether or not an applicant meets the 
                                                             
3A four-month Internal Audit of the citizenship program (CIC, 2012d), completed in April 2011, revealed that 
citizenship applications, among other things, did not collect strong enough evidence of residency in Canada (CIC, 
2012a). The Internal Audit seems to focus heavily on residence fraud (see Section 1.1.1 and 3.3.3 of the Audit).  
4
 The modernization project brings to light that CIC did not have consistency in its citizenship program. This is 
because different citizenship offices used different methods for collecting and building citizenship application files 
(CIC, 2012c). As a result of the Internal Audit, and the modernization project, a series of major changes to the 
citizenship application process were implemented in May 2012. These changes included: standardizing the 
citizenship application through creating a document checklist, standardizing how citizenship judges evaluate non-
routine cases pertaining to residency in Canada and prohibitions, and revising the Residence Questionnaire (CIC, 




residence requirement for citizenship…. It is a much simpler process to be able 
to prevent those who are involved in residence fraud from becoming citizens in 
the first place than to try to revoke citizenship after they have already acquired 
it. (Parliament of Canada, 2013)  
 
The main result of the revision has been an increase in the number of applicants who receive the 
Residence Questionnaire. From anecdotal evidence, it appears that the RQ, prior to being 
changed, was issued to five per cent of citizenship applicants (Residence Questionnaire 
Wordpress, n.d.[c]). Once revised in May 2012, the issuance rate increased to 22 per cent, with 
some CIC offices having rates as high as 30 and 50 per cent (Residence Questionnaire 
Wordpress, n.d.[c]).  
The revised RQ created many challenges for CIC and citizenship applicants.  For CIC, 
the processing time for RQs jumped from one and a half years to four years (ATIP 2012-19707, 
p. 30). The increase is attributed to more time needed to process an RQ case (as more questions 
had been added to the RQ, increasing the documentation for review), an increase in the number 
of applicants that received the RQ, combined with CIC office closures and staff decreases (ATIP 
2012-19707, p. 30). CIC admitted that it “cast the net too wide” in terms of who receives an RQ, 
and has reduced the triggers for issuing an RQ to applicants. It later revised the RQ a number of 
times (September 2012 and October 2013) to fine-tune the triggers and documentation requested. 
The triggers are not released by CIC in order to ensure integrity of the RQ, however, some initial 
triggers were accidentally released in an ATIP (Table 4). CIC also created a new form called the 
Request for Documentary Evidence of your Residence in Canada. It serves as an alternative to 
the RQ and requires much less documentation, thus addressing some of the initial challenges of 
the revised RQ. 
67 
 
The challenge for citizenship applicants when they receive the RQ is the extensive 
documentation it requests to prove residency in Canada.
5
 Under the first version of the revised 
RQ, recipients had to show their work, living, and personal history since arrival, which for some 
individuals dated back more than 10 years.
6
 Recipients must return the RQ and all supporting 
documents within 45 business days, or 9 weeks, of its receipt. If they do not return the RQ on 
time, their citizenship application is deemed abandoned. The timeline is very short for applicants 
who must acquire documentation from other countries. In addition, applicants who receive the 
Residence Questionnaire are no longer considered “routine” citizenship applications, and face 
indeterminate processing times. The indeterminate processing times give the impression that 
their application is no longer valuable to Canada, and their application is not a priority.  
It is interesting to note that the Residence Questionnaire was not a highly publicized 
component of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown. The Conservatives used rather vague language 
when referring to the RQ. Minister Jason Kenney announced in 2011 that 4,400 permanent 
residents were “flagged” for “further scrutiny” (CIC, 2011d). Given that the major change to the 
citizenship application was the RQ, it can be speculated the individuals he referred to were RQ 
recipients. Of those flagged, “nearly 1,400 [had] withdrawn or abandoned their citizenship 
application because of [the] new scrutiny” (CIC, 2011d). This number increased to 1,894 by the 
end of January 2014 (Cohen, 2014). It appears that the Residence Questionnaire, although not 
highly publicized, did affect a large number of citizenship applicants. Furthermore, the RQ 
recipients were counted among those under investigations for citizenship fraud. 
                                                             
5
 Some, but not all, documents requested include: children’s immunization records, employment history, proof of 
income, record of movement from borders, children’s attendance records from school. 
6
 In the first revised version of the RQ, recipients had to provide documentation since their arrival to Canada. For 
some applicants, this was over 10 years ago. Subsequent revisions of the RQ only asked for documentation 4 years 
prior to arrival to Canada (which aligns with requirements for meeting citizenship within 4 years of permanent 
residence in Canada). 
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Table 4: Residence Questionnaire Triggers 
Applicant Characteristics: 
A1 – Use of a suspect residential address. 
A2 – NCB in FOSS, Warning or Note(s) in GCMS indicating a concern. 
A3 – Previous citizenship applications which were not approved, withdrawn, abandoned, renounced or 
revoked. 
A4 – Discrepancy in absences between citizenship application and CIC information during the relevant 4 
years period. 
A5 – Self-identified as a consultant, self-employed or unemployed, with any travel during the relevant 4 year 
period. 
A6 – Absences to home country to sell land/property or to take care of ill family member during the relevant 4 
year period. 
A7 – Applicant has self declared having less than 1095 days of physical presence. 
 
Family Characteristics: 
B1 – Child born outside Canada during the relevant 4 year period. 
B2 – A child has made a non-concurrent minor application. 
 
Documents 
C1 – ID (provided in support of application) has been issued within 3 months of date of application. 
C2 – Inconsistency between address on ID and address on application form. 
C3 – Photograph and/or signature on the application do not resemble photograph and/or signature on identity 
document. 
C4 – NPR time (non permanent resident time) has been used in the calculation of basic residence and the 
original entry data used does not appear on the IMM 1000, the Confirmation of Permanent Residence or in 
CIC records 
 
GCMS — Global Case Management System (new CIC computer system) 
FOSS — Field Operations Support System (old CIC computer system) 
NCB — Non-computer based entry 
POE — Port of Entry 
NPR time — Non-Permanent Resident time 
 
Source: Residence Questionnaire Wordpress, n.d.(d) 
 
In summary, this section explained the context and goal of the Citizenship Fraud 
Crackdown and how it is implemented. The goal of the Fraud Crackdown is to purge Canadian 
citizenship of fraud, particularly relating to residency. The Fraud Crackdown is implemented 
through revocation of PR and/or citizenship status, and through the distribution of the Residence 
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Questionnaire to anyone suspected of misrepresenting information in their citizenship 
application. The Citizenship Fraud Crackdown occurred at a time when the Conservatives were 
attempting to redefine citizenship by making it more exclusionary and creating stricter 
definitions of “residence” in Canada. As the subsequent chapters reveal, the Crackdown 
succeeded in advancing both fronts. 
The next chapter will evaluate the image of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown created by 
the CIC in the public discourse. In the public discourse I analyze the government’s rationale for 
the Fraud Crackdown, the image of the “ideal citizen” that is constructed through the discourse, 
and evaluate the progress of citizenship revocations. Given the little information available about 
the Fraud Action Plan and Citizenship Fraud Crackdown, the public discourse provides 
important and rare information about the initiative. In addition to evaluating the public discourse, 
the chapter will uncover the neoliberal and racial underpinnings that are present in the 
Conservatives’ conception of citizenship. Thus the chapter also offers a critical analysis of the 





CHAPTER 5 – SOUND THE ALARMS  
 CIC takes the issue of fraud in the immigration and citizenship programs very 
seriously. Our intent is to apply the full strength of Canadian law, and where 
evidence permits, to strip permanent resident status or citizenship, seek removal, 
and/or refer the matter to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the RCMP, for a 
criminal investigation. 
- Minister Chris Alexander (Parliament of Canada, 2013) 
 
It is…not only the discursive practices manifested in legal statutes that create 
identities, but also the way that these practices are infused with societal norms 
and values. In examining the discursive production of national identity, one 
needs to examine not only laws per se, but the debates, interpretations, and 
professed needs and interests that surround legal statutes and the social practices 
to which these are linked. 
-     Roxanne Doty, 1996 as quoted in Nevins, 2002, p. 95 
 
The first quote from above is the oft-repeated explanation the Minister of Citizenship, 
Immigration and Multiculturalism, and CIC officials use when describing the Citizenship Fraud 
investigations. It can be regarded as a slogan of the initiative, repeated almost word for word on 
countless occasions. On the surface, the rhetoric paints a picture of the immigration system in 
general, and institution of citizenship specifically, under threat from immigrants obtaining 
citizenship fraudulently.  Fraud in the immigration system, it argues, is resulting in the granting 
of citizenship to undeserving (read: criminal) subjects.  
The role of immigration controls and citizenship is to uphold the existence of the (white) 
nation-state. Fraud in the immigration and citizenship program threatens the very process 
through which the white national identity is protected. If read deeper, the quote seems to suggest 
that the white nation is being threatened by the non-white other. In other words, the “other” is a 
threat because it is trying to outsmart the systems the nation has built to regulate it and keep it 
out.  At stake in the Minister’s statement is therefore the process which upholds the existence of 
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the nation-state; a process that the nation-state protects by reiterating the fine line between 
citizen and non-citizen, national belonging and abject otherness. 
The fraudulent immigrants who are the source of the threat are alluded to as criminals. In 
alluding to the individuals in this light, the rhetoric de-humanizes them and justifies ample 
security measures against them. The government wants to strip them bare of their rights to the 
nation-state, and remove them from its entity. Stripped of their humanity, the individuals under 
investigation are portrayed as obfuscated subjects, of great threat, and presumed guilty. They are 
cast into otherness and have no voice. The quote embodies the harsh, intimidating and retributive 
tone that the Minister and CIC use whenever they refer to citizenship/PR investigations.  The 
tone not only strikes intimidation and fear in applicants (as I demonstrate in the next chapter), 
but also criminalizes immigrants in Canada. 
Divisions between citizens and “others” have always been essential to the Canadian 
project. As I noted above, the Canadian nation has historically been produced through the 
elimination of indigenous and racialized people, the elevation of white subjects to “exalted” 
status, and the continual policing and subjugation of racialized people (both citizens and non-
citizens). At the centre of such delineations is the nation-state which has the power to decide who 
is a citizen and who is not (Bauder, 2013; Nevins, 2002). While the Citizenship Fraud 
Crackdown certainly operates on this already established (racial) terrain, it also exemplifies 
newer dividing practices that have been explored in the literature on immigration and 
neoliberalism. As many scholars have noted, contemporary immigration/citizenship regimes are 
generally shaped by the twofold logic of neoliberal ideology. On the one hand, neoliberalism 
valorizes the “economic subject” in immigration policies, a subject viewed as a source of 
creativity, entrepreneurship, and investment (Florida, 2002; Peck, 2004); on the other hand, the 
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logic demonizes unwanted populations, which it views as a threat to the security of the nation-
state (read: its established economic processes) (Nevins, 2007; Sparke, 2006; Valverde, 2010; 
Walia, 2010). The demonization of unwanted migrants has resulted in a “criminalizing and 
retributive tone [that] is now commonplace in immigration policy making” in Canada (Chan, 
2004, p. 34). It appears that the nation-state under neoliberal ideology employs a new duality to 
uphold national identity: the entrepreneurial subject vis-à-vis the criminal other. 
How this newer logic interacts with older racial codes remains a relatively unexplored 
question. Scholars that do engage in this type of analysis tend to observe that racism operates 
parallel to neoliberalism (Abu-Laban & Nath, 2007; Melamed, 2010). This type of analysis leads 
to conclusions that racialized individuals are disproportionately disadvantaged, although not 
intentionally, by neoliberal regimes. For example, some scholars argue that capital-based 
selection criteria categorize racialized individuals in less economically valuable migration 
streams, which face harder avenues for attaining citizenship, or are altogether barred from it 
(Ong, 2006; Sparke, 2006; Walsh, 2008). Others observe that a growing numbers of non-citizens 
are portrayed as criminals or illegal, in accord with neoliberal modes of governing, and that this 
“the criminal/illegal other” is the new racial category in immigration, supplanting previous racial 
discourses (Dauvergne, 2008; Pratt 2012; Wright, 2013). The literature seems to centre on the 
argument that neoliberalism is not racist intentionally, but rather that race continues to run 
parallel to it, although in new forms. Roberts and Mahtani (2010) argue that scholars need to 
focus on how race is embedded within neoliberalism. In my analysis I take the latter approach 
and attempt to uncover whether racial logics are embedded within neoliberalism. 
This chapter examines the conjoining of racial and economic logics in the Citizenship 
Fraud Crackdown. My analysis focuses on the public discourse surrounding the Crackdown in 
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newspaper articles; speeches and interviews from the Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and 
Multiculturalism; and CIC media releases. Given the highly secretive nature of the Fraud 
Crackdown, the public discourse is a rich source of information about the initiative. My analysis 
uncovers: (i) the stated purpose of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown, (ii) how the Crackdown 
constructs an image of ideal citizens as both neoliberal and nationalistic subjects, (iii) how the 
image of the ideal neoliberal-nationalistic citizen is reinforced vis-à-vis the “criminal” other, and 
(iv) how this “criminal” other operates as a revived “racial” other. The Citizenship Fraud 
Crackdown, I conclude, is an exercise in nation-building that reifies citizenship as a white 
institution, and consequently the white national identity. I conceive of nation-building as the 
“nationalist project of states which aim to hold on to their conceptual hegemony over the [white] 
nation” (Sutherland, 2005, p. 195). While most scholars argue that racist actions continue to 
operate under neoliberal regimes; I argue that, neoliberalism is a racist ideology in and of itself. 
It serves as contemporary tool for perpetuating racial divisions in wealth, power and mobility, 
while at the same time refuting the existence of racism. Neoliberalism does not just mask racism; 
it is a new form of racism.   
I wish to acknowledge that there are many possible angles from which the public 
discourse can be analyzed. Given that the Crackdown is partly based on Kenney’s personal 
ideology and largely anecdotal evidence (Griffith, 2013), it can be interpreted as an expression of 
Kenney’s personal neoconservative, populist, and white supremacist7 views. I will not attempt to 
focus Kenney’s personal influence in the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown, which is surely great. 
Rather, I will focus on uncovering the racial and neoliberal underpinnings in the public discourse 
                                                             
7
 Although Kenney has not openly declared he is white supremacist, this can be concluded from a number of his 
actions. For example, as Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism, Kenney refused to give funding 




that subsume views such as Kenney’s and transmit them as part of the status-quo in Canadian 
policy making. 
 
PURPOSE OF THE CITIZENSHIP FRAUD CRACKDOWN  
 
I begin with an examination of the stated purpose of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown in 
the public discourse. The Minister of Immigration and CIC portrays a citizenship and 
immigration system under threat during times of high immigration. The discourse identifies two 
types of threat that result from high numbers of immigration. The first threat from high levels of 
immigration is an increase of fraudulent immigrants. This threat carries the potential to 
undermine the institution of citizenship, which upholds the white identity. In this context, the 
nation-state seeks to reinforce and protect the institution of citizenship. A second threat that 
results from high numbers of immigrants is waning public support for a government that adopts a 
policy for increased immigration levels. The Conservatives indicate that the Crackdown is 
occurring at a time when immigration numbers are historically high. The decreased public 
support for such a policy is an expression of the xenophobia that results when the white national 
identity is threatened. The waning public support jeopardizes the power of the governing body of 
the nation-state, the Conservatives. In essence the Crackdown is an exercise in nation-building 
and of electoral power, which serves to uphold the integrity of citizenship, assure the public that 
the nation-state is still in control of the processes, and address the perceived though constructed 
threat to the white national identity.  
Historically immigrants have often been the ones portrayed as a threat to national safety 
(Chan, 2004; Bauder, 2008; Dhamoon & Abu-Laban, 2009; Ibrahim, 2005; Thobani, 2007), 
which serves as a primary vehicle for nation-building. The discourse of immigrants as threat has 
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been used since the inception of the Canadian state to create and uphold a sense national identity 
(Brodie, 2009; Mangia, 1999). For example, the Chinese Head Tax prevented Chinese 
immigrants from altering “the fundamental composition of the Canadian nation” (Prime Minister 
Lyon Mackenzie King cited in Green 1976, p. 21). In 1999, immigration policies were changed 
to address the perceived threat of a boat of Chinese refugees that arrived on the coast of British 
Columbia (Dhamoon & Abu-Laben, 2009; Chan, 2004; Mountz, 2004). The continual use of 
threat to uphold the existence of national identity is explained by the fact that every polity has to 
be continually re-founded in order to reaffirm the allegiance and loyalty of its citizen population 
(Honig 2001 cited in Nyers, 2006). The Citizenship Fraud Crackdown participates in 
perpetuating the presence of a threat and in doing so, reifies the national identity.    
As I mentioned, the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown was presented as a reaction to high 
levels of immigration to Canada. The nation-state associates increased immigration to Canada 
with increased fraudulent migrants.  CIC reports explain the context of the Citizenship Fraud 
Crackdown: 
With historically high numbers of new immigrants arriving in Canada, the 
Government of Canada has introduced a number of significant reforms over the 
past year to strengthen the integrity and economic responsiveness of the 
immigration system. (CIC, 2012g) 
 
From the quote, it is possible to see that the government associates increased immigration with 
fraud, which threatens the “integrity” of the system (read: the institution of citizenship).  The 
nation-states ambivalence toward high number of immigrants results from its economy being 
based on institutions of white privilege, but being dependant on people of colour for its 
continued prosperity. Given the increasing number of immigrants, the nation-state perceives the 
institution of citizenship as under threat, and in need of more stringent immigration and 
76 
 
citizenship criteria. In extension, the nation-state views white national identity as being 
threatened by high number of immigrants. 
The nation-state uses the public discourse as a forum to cement the association of 
increased immigration and threat to white national identity. In all press releases and interviews, 
Minister Jason Kenney proclaims that citizenship fraud is widespread Canada. Newspaper 
articles echo and amplify the claim by employing words such as “rampant” and “tip of the 
iceberg” to describe the presence of fraud. In their headlines they use “sweep” and “crackdown” 
to describe the unprecedented action the government is taking to eliminate fraud. The strong 
language gives the impression that fraud is pervasive in the citizenship program, and sounds the 
alarm to the Canadian public that drastic measures need to be taken by CIC.  
The existence of the nation-state, in fact, depends on the existence of a perpetual threat 
and the nation-state’s ability to diffuse this threat. The public concern that is created as a result of 
the perceived threat helps mobilize public support for immigration and boundary control which 
reifies the need and the existence of the nation-state (Nevins, 2002). Without illegality, the 
identity of the nation-state would be annihilated. The same reasoning can be applied to the 
Citizenship Fraud Crackdown: the presence of the “criminal” serves to reify the existence of the 
nation-state.  
The public discourse also serves as a forum to promote the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown 
as the government’s zero-tolerance policy on fraud. The rhetoric serves to show that the nation-
state is capable of eradicating this fraud, and thus upholding the institution of citizenship. CIC 
and Jason Kenney portray a nation-state working hard to protect its citizens. Kenney explains: 
"This [revocation of citizenship and permanent resident status] is by far - by many orders of 
magnitude - the largest enforcement action ever taken in the history of Canadian citizenship" 
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(Mackrael, 2011). Scholars observe that whenever immigration issues become publically 
contested, the nation-state responds by changing its laws or policies in order to regain the 
perception of control and to diffuse the issue (Buchignani & Indra 1999, as cited in Chan, 2004). 
The Citizenship Fraud Crackdown thus serves to convince the public that the nation-state is still 
in control of the national borders, and to maintain support for its policies. 
The Citizenship Fraud Crackdown, by demonstrating the nation-state has the ability to 
protect the white national identity, also serves to calm public xenophobia and increase support 
for immigration policies. Minister Jason Kenney explains that 
recent efforts to crack down on fraud and abuse in Canada’s immigration 
system, including residency fraud and fraudulent asylum claims, help restore 
Canadians’ faith in the immigration system [emphasis added]. (CIC, 2012j) 
 
The second purpose of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown, in addition to demonstrating the 
nation-state is in control, is to restore public faith in the immigration system. Thus, the 
Crackdown can be considered a political move to calm xenophobia within the nation-state due to 
high levels of immigrants being admitted into its entity. The xenophobia towards high levels of 
immigrants entering Canada is masked with the rhetoric that Canada’s “generosity” can only 
extend so far, and suffer so much abuse. Kenney explains: 
We want an immigration system that is open to genuine visitors, while at the 
same time prevents the entry of foreign criminals and denies them the ability to 
endlessly abuse our generosity. (CIC, 2013c) 
 
Kenny argues that Canada must be more selective so as to prevent naturalization of individuals, 
specifically criminals, into the nation-state who will abuse its generosity, and threaten the 
institution of citizenship. The Minister goes on to explain that “[r]ecent efforts to crack down on 
fraud and abuse in Canada’s immigration system...ultimately allow Canada to continue to have 
the most generous system in the world” (CIC, 2012j). The rhetoric is paradoxical, and seems to 
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suggest that if Canada is to continue to be as generous as it is, it must become less generous than 
it was before.  The idea of “abused generosity” is used to cover the public unease that results 
from high level of immigration, and justify the government’s need to be more selective. It paints 
a picture of the nation-state as benevolent, and masks any ambivalence towards immigrants. The 
image of a benevolent society, and its claims of innocence, have been used through the centuries 
by Canadian nationals to “mask aggressive behaviours that result in “the exaltation of their racial 
identity as the racial identity” (Thobani, 2007, p. 85). The use of claims of innocence and 
generosity in Citizenship Fraud Crackdown continue this long-lasting ritual.  
From the analysis above, it is possible to see that the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown is in 
reaction to two types of “threat” that result from high numbers of immigrants arriving to Canada. 
The first is the threat associates increased immigration with increased fraud, which weakens the 
institution of citizenship from upholding the white national identity. The second threat is that 
large numbers of immigrants reduce public faith in the governing body of the nation-state. The 
nation-state uses the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown as a means to show to show that it is still in 
control of upholding its institutions and protecting the white national identity.  By creating the 
perception of a threat to citizenship, and demonstrating its ability to protect its institutions, the 
nation-state reifies its existence, and unites the national identity against the perceived threat. 
Given this aim, the Crackdown is in essence an exercise in nation-building.  
 
THE IDEAL NEOLIBERAL SUBJECT 
 
 Given that the purpose of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown is to protect the white 
national identity, in this section I evaluation how the nation-state reifies what is it to be 
“Canadian.” The Crackdown highlights how citizenship is used as a discursive means for 
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establishing national identity (Dauvergne, 2008; Pratt 2012; Wright, 2013). The Citizenship 
Fraud Crackdown emphasizes its role in “protecting the value of Canadian citizenship.” In this 
section, I analyze the “values” that the Crackdown seems to be protecting. The use of citizenship 
to establish national identity is not a particularly new phenomenon in nation-building. Looking 
closer, however, it is possible to discern one element that is new in nation-building: how the 
nation conceives its citizens with neoliberal values.  I uncover a portrayal of the ideal Canadian 
as an individual laden with neoliberal and nationalistic traits. By highlighting the values of 
citizenship, the Crackdown reifies what it is to be Canadian, and thus facilitates in nation-
building. Part of the nation-building agenda, I argue, also requires drawing greater differences 
between the rights of dual citizens and birth-right citizens. 
The neoliberal ideas of following the rules, being good competitors and being deserving 
are all associated with the ideal citizen in the public discourse. When describing the value of 
Canadian citizenship Jason Kenney, and other government officials, explain that it is a status that 
is earned fairly (i.e., by following the rules): 
Canadian citizenship ... should be earned by strict compliance with the rules that 
govern its bestowal. Those who lie and cheat their way into becoming citizens 
should not be accepted into the Canadian fold. (Montreal Gazette, 2012) 
 
The Minister’s rhetoric seems to indicate that anyone who tries to circumvent the citizenship 
process is in fact undermining the competitive system Canada has established for citizenship. 
Thus, citizenship is valuable not only because it is attained fairly, but also because it is attained 
through competitive selection - an outcome of following the rules of the established citizenship 
regime. The ideal citizen is one who attains their status through following the established rules 
and competition.   
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The neoliberal logic of hard work and deserving is also strongly present in the 
Conservative’s broader paradigm of citizenship. Since citizenship is meant only for the best and 
brightest, the newspaper articles are laced with discourses about who is deserving of citizenship. 
In one newspaper article, a person argued: “Citizenship, that is something that is earned and I do 
not see why someone who does not deserve it should get it" (Raj, 2011a). It is important to note 
that the “deserving” rhetoric is neoliberal in nature (Smith-Carrier & Bhuyan 2010), given that 
the most competitive individuals should get what they earn.  The persistent rhetoric of 
“deserving” insinuates that those who don’t receive citizenship fail to prescribe to material or 
moral neoliberal ideals (Ong, 2003), and are inferior and potentially dangerous subjects (Chan, 
2004). The deserving rhetoric easily slips into labeling unsuccessful citizenship/immigration 
applicants as criminals and non-contributors to Canadian society (Bhuyan & Smith-Carrier 
2012).  The reality of being excluded and marginalized from citizenship is completely discounted 
by neoliberal logic. 
We can see how the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown employs neoliberal logic to explain 
why some people deserve citizenship (i.e., they follow rules, are hard working, and deserving) 
and others don’t (i.e., they cheat, are lazy, and are not deserving). The neoliberal ideas of 
following the rules, being good competitors and being deserving are all tied together in public 
discussions about the value of citizenship and the ideal citizen. The newspaper articles argue that 
individuals without these traits should not be able to attain citizenship, as it decreases the caliber 
of members Canada accepts into its nation-state.  
It is important to note that the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown employs the neoliberal 
rhetoric in a slightly different way than other discourses. Whereas most immigration discourses 
employ the rhetoric of deserving to justify individuals from being barred citizenship; the Fraud 
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Crackdown questions the citizenship of those who have already attained it. Nyers (2006) refers 
to the process whereby individuals are removed of their rights or legal status as the “unmaking of 
citizenship.” Usually, citizenship is unmade for dual citizens. The Citizenship Fraud Crackdown 
is indeed targeted at dual nationals. By increasing scrutiny for dual nationals, the Crackdown 
highlights how the neoliberal rhetoric of deserving can be used to created precarity in citizenship 
status itself. Ong (2006) argues that neoliberalism results in the decoupling of citizenship from 
the territory of the nation-state. The Citizenship Fraud Crackdown reveals the opposite case; the 
Crackdown serves to solidify citizenship to territory by ensuring individuals are meeting physical 
residence requirements of citizenship. In doing so, it demarcates greater differences between 
birth-right and dual citizenship.  
The unmaking of citizenship for dual citizens in the neoliberal era is paradoxical because 
dual citizens are key agents in international trade and development (Shachar, 2006). They have 
an international advantage in conducting business in foreign countries, where they are familiar 
with the language, customs, and institutions (Nyers, 2010), and should thus be advantaged by 
neoliberal regimes. Despite being ideal neoliberal subjects, the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown 
questions their rights to citizenship.  
This phenomenon can be understood by looking at race and economics. Nation-states 
such as Canada “are having difficulties in reconciling their desire for their citizens to be 
immersed within increasingly globalized economic, social, and cultural networks” (Nyers, 2010, 
p. 59). The Canadian nation-state is uneasy about the existence of dual nationals because it leads 
to questions of where their loyalties lie.  The existence of dual citizens brings up questions of 
how wealth generated by immigrants can be shared across host and home country (Shachar, 
2006), and conflicts with the nation-state’s desire “for a uniﬁed political subject within a uniﬁed 
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territorial space of the nation-state” (Nyers, 2010, p. 59). Given the ambiguities that surround 
dual citizenship, nation-states have responded by making “citizenship as indeterminate as non-
citizenship” (Nyers, 2006, p. 37) in order to be able to control loyalties and wealth accumulation 
of immigrants. What we see here is racial agendas (such as viewing with suspicion the loyalties 
of people of colour) working in tandem with neoliberal agendas to reiterate national identity. By 
treating dual citizens with more scrutiny, the nation-state ensures that they remain loyal to it, and 
create the unitary subject they need to uphold the nation-sate (Nyers, 2010). 
The thrust to create loyalty among dual nationals is seen in Minister Jason Kenney 
argument: “Canadian citizenship is more than a legal status, more than a passport…We expect 
citizens to have an ongoing commitment, connection, and loyalty to Canada” (CIC, 2010). The 
Minister argues that citizenship is valuable because it is given to individuals who are committed 
to Canada. The discourse surrounding the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown on numerous occasions 
stresses the utmost importance of loyalty and commitment to Canada, thus attempting to create a 
unitary subject of its citizens. 
In addition to promoting loyalty to Canada, the public discourse is infused with 
discussions of how citizenship is given to those who exemplify honour. Kenney explains: 
 
For those who simply touch down and try to get a Canadian passport as a ... 
passport of convenience, who don't pay our taxes but who do consume our social 
benefits, I think that's dishonourable. [emphasis added] (Raj, 2011b) 
 
The emphasis on the honourable character of citizenship holders is not necessarily a neoliberal 
trait. Rather, it is a national trait. It can be concluded that the “value” of Canadian citizenship 
refers to a mixture of neoliberal values (competition, best and brightest, most deserving) 
combined with authentic “Canadian” values (generosity, loyalty, honour). The Fraud Crackdown 
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is attempting to emphasize both neoliberal and nationalistic associated with citizenship, and 
reiterate the association between these values in the public’s mind.  
The Crackdown is presented as preserving the “value of Canadian citizenship.”  From the 
analysis it is possible to see that the “value” which is being referred to is the ability of citizenship 
to uphold the established (white) national identity, and thus serve as a means of nation-building. 
The Crackdown uses the image of the ideal citizen as form of nation-building at a time when 
immigration fraud is perceived to threaten the white national identity. It also promotes nation-
building by securing loyalty of dual nationals to Canada.   The operation of neoliberal ideology 
is present in other areas of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown, however, apart from the conception 
of the ideal citizen subjects.   
 
THE CRIMINAL/RACIAL OTHER 
 
The image of ideal neoliberal individuals who deserve citizenship is juxtaposed against 
the image of the non-ideal citizen. In the public discourse non-ideal citizens are portrayed as 
criminals or fraudsters, and pose a threat to the security of Canadians. The criminal other is 
needed as a part of nation-building because the construction of the national identity is always 
understood relative to its other (Chan, 2004; Dhamoon & Abu-Laban, 2009; Honig, 2001). This 
is seen by the fact that the “other” possesses all the opposite traits of the ideal citizen.  
Neoliberal ideology helps frame how the “other” that upholds the national identity is 
perceived. Scholars observe that while neoliberal ideology “exalts” the economic class, to 
borrow Thobani’s (2007) terminology, it simultaneously criminalizes unwanted classes. 
Neoliberalism views unwanted populations as a threat to the security of the nation-state (read: its 
established economic processes) (Nevins, 2007; Sparke, 2006; Valverde, 2010; Walia, 2010). 
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The abject other, which neoliberalism paints as the criminal other, is viewed as undesirable or 
undeserving of the rights of ideal subjects (Ong, 2006; Sparke, 2006; Walsh, 2008).  
In this section I analyze how the individuals under investigation in Citizenship Fraud 
Crackdown are portrayed in the public discourse. True to neoliberal modes of governing, the 
Citizenship Fraud Crackdown criminalizes the individuals. In addition to adopting the neoliberal 
governmentality of criminalization, I notice another interesting trend in the public discourse: the 
tendency to bring into question individuals’ morals and character.  I uncover the identity of the 
criminal “other” referred to in the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown, and reveal that it is, in fact, the 
racial “other”.  This finding reveals that neoliberal and racial conceptions are intertwining to 
create the image of the “criminal” other.  I focus on trying to disentangle whether race and 
neoliberalism operate separately from one another in the creation of the “criminal other” or 
whether neoliberalism is raced. I conclude from these observations that the existence of a 
criminal identity created by the Fraud Crackdown serves to solidify the white national identity 
embedded in citizenship, and the neoliberalism is indeed raced. 
 
The Criminal Other 
  The Citizenship Fraud Crackdown works on a number of levels to criminalize 
immigrants. I begin with an analysis of the rhetoric surrounding the initiative. The term “fraud” 
belongs to the realm of criminal law, which addresses harmful or violent actions against 
individuals or societies (Stumpf, 2006). Immigration law, on the other hand, belongs in the realm 
of civil law (Stumpf, 2006). There are two important divergences between criminal and civil law. 
First, criminal law addresses “violent actions” while civil law addresses “disputes.” As such, 
transgressions in criminal law are much more solemn in nature. Second, civil law is focused on 
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matters between private parties, while criminal law is concerned with violations against society, 
given the violent nature of the transgression. By employing terminology from the realm of 
criminal law, the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown, insinuates that the matter under investigation is 
not a dispute about how government laws are applied, but rather, that the matter consists of 
violent actions or evil motives on the part of the immigrant. Furthermore, these violations are not 
just committed against the state as a private party, but rather against the whole of society (the 
nation). By elevating the accusations from the level of the private realm to the national realm, the 
rhetoric facilitates the goal of nation-building. Furthermore, the term “fraud” de-facto labels 
individuals under investigation as criminals, even though their guilt has not been proven, while 
simultaneously the term “crackdown” connotes the presence of pervasive fraud in the citizenship 
program. The rhetoric of “Citizenship Fraud Crackdown” is thus laden with heavy accusations of 
guilt, violence, evil motive, and pervasive threat for the individuals under investigation. All of 
these discourses serve to criminalize. 
Criminalization occurs more than through the discourse surrounding the Fraud 
Crackdown, however: it seems to be embodied in the execution of the initiative and how CIC 
operates. In the quote found at the beginning of this chapter, the Minister states that the 
government will conduct a criminal investigation of residence misrepresentation. He explains 
that the citizenship fraud investigations are a joint effort between Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada (CIC), the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), and the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police (RCMP). The CIC is the state’s branch that controls immigration, the CBSA is the state’s 
border enforcement agency, and the RCMP is the state’s national police service. The Citizenship 
Fraud Crackdown, in its execution, is a joint effort between the policing and immigration 
agencies in Canada.  
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The consolidation of immigration and crime is not just found in the execution of the 
Citizenship Fraud Crackdown; rather it seems to be the rule for how CIC operates. CIC’s 
organizational mission, often attached at the bottom of all news releases, reads: 
Building a stronger Canada: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) 
strengthens Canada’s economic, social and cultural prosperity, helping ensure 
Canadian safety and security [emphasis added] while managing one of the 
largest and most generous immigration programs in the world. (CIC, 2012j) 
 
The organization’s mandate includes safety and security as a key part of immigration, indicating 
that these realms are linked across the entire organization, not just for the Fraud Crackdown. It is 
interesting to note how, again, this quote ties economic prosperity with the need for safety and 
security. It represents the neoliberal logic at work: in order to have economic prosperity, nation-
states must increase regulations that control the threat of the “criminal” other. CIC’s mission 
demonstrates that the consolidation of immigration and crime is the norm in the neoliberal era. 
Neoliberalism and racism operate in different ways to create the “criminal other.” The 
goal of neoliberalism is to protect the economic processes that uphold capitalism. It achieves this 
goal through criminalization which regulates populations in order to maintain the social order 
that upholds capitalism (Aharonson & Ramsy, 2010; Nevins, 2002; Parenti, 2000; Zedner, 2010; 
Walia, 2010). Neoliberalism views low-capital (read: unwanted) populations as a threat to the 
security of the nation-states’ established economic processes (Nevins, 2007; Sparke, 2006; 
Valverde, 2010; Walia, 2010). Neoliberalism uses criminalization as a way to justify the 
exclusion of unwanted populations (Aharonson & Ramsy, 2010; Aliverti, 2012; Dhamoon & 
Abu-Laban, 2009; Dolbrowsky, 2008; Gilbert, 2007; Nevins, 2002, 2007; Nyers, 2009; Pratt & 
Valverde, 2002; Stumpf, 2006). The “unwanted” populations that tend to be criminalized by 
neoliberalism are racial groups. Racism, on the other hand, criminalizes by people of colour by 
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suspecting that they are being prone to illicit activity and lacking moral character. Neoliberal and 
racial logics thus overlap in criminalizing people of colour. 
In the case of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown, the presence of citizenship fraud is 
perceived as resulting in the granting of citizenship to undeserving populations. The criminality 
of immigrants is painted as threat to society. The threat that the immigrant criminal embodies 
allows the nation-state to take drastic measures that circumvent democratic processes (Brodie, 
2009). Citizenship is increasingly posited along the lines of deserving citizens and criminal 
others who are denied citizenship (Dauvergne, 2008; Pratt 2012; Wright, 2008). Thus, neoliberal 
ideology frames abject others as criminals that are unworthy or undeserving, and a threat, which 
justifies their exclusion. We can see that this logic is at work in the Citizenship Fraud 
Crackdown.  
The criminalizing discourse advances nation-building by facilitating the creation of the 
“other” which upholds its identity. By criminalizing these individuals, the nation-state portrays 
them as threats and outsiders. In doing so, it “institutes and reinstitutes markers of national 
citizenship and belonging” (Dhamoon & Abu-Laban, 2009, p. 166) and thus upholds its identity. 
The profound accusations of committing horrendous crime and being a threat to society serve to 
stifle the voices of those implicated in the investigations (as the interviews in Chapter 6 reveal). 
By stifling their voices, the nation-state is able to portray them any which way it chooses. The 
criminalizing terminology also places the nation-state in the position of benevolence and in need 
of protection, which justifies its need to exclude others (Razack, 2002; Thobani, 2007).  Thus 
criminalization works on a number of levels to advance the goals of nation-building. 
In addition to creating the image of immigrants as criminals, the Citizenship Fraud 
Crackdown focuses on the moral character of the immigrants. The discourse argues that the 
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criminals do not have moral character because they make no sacrifice to obtain their citizenship. 
One person argues in a letter to the editor: 
We immigrants and our families worked hard, sacrificed much and exercised 
honesty and integrity in our respective journeys to Canada [emphasis added]. 
Since arriving, we have continued those same virtues in order to build a better 
life here. We cherish our citizenship because we appreciate its value - and its 
cost. Those who want to abuse Canada's generosity and legal systems are 
offensive to us, what we have done and to who we are. (Attia, 2012) 
 
The individual argues that the value of Canadian citizenship is that an immigrant must make 
sacrifices in order to attain it. The criminal other breaches this norm, and is thus branded as 
dishonest and lacking integrity. Not only is the criminal other dishonest, but s/he does not 
contribute to Canadian society, which is another sign of a lapse of character. Many of the articles 
explain that the “fraudsters” are avoiding paying Canadian taxes, while at the same time using 
Canada’s health care, education, and pension system. For example, articles stated: 
Many people [who commit residence fraud] benefit from Canada's generosity 
while living in places where they don't pay income tax, nor do they declare their 
worldwide income as they are required to under Canadian law, he said. "I know 
some people who declare their income to be $30,000 when they live in a $5 
million house and they have a lot of property in Asia. (Raj, 2011b) 
 
In many jurisdictions around the world, simply having a Canadian passport can 
double your salary. It can give you access to some of the highest quality health 
care in the world at no cost," [Minister Jason Kenney] said. "It can give your 
children access to subsidized postsecondary education at our excellent colleges 
and universities, and, of course, can represent a political insurance policy. 
(Galloway, 2012) 
 
The quotes above further underscore the amoral character of the accused; instead of contributing 
their wealth to Canada, the individuals are taking advantage of Canada’s resources. The portrayal 
of criminals as wasting the nation’s resources, undermining efficiency, and overall threat to 
security is a well-observed phenomenon in neoliberalism (Abu-Laban, 1998; Chan, 2004; 
Brown, 1993). However, the phenomenon of questioning the moral character of individuals in 
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relation to neoliberalism is relatively underexplored by scholars. I provide an explanation for the 
phenomenon in the sections that follow, which analyzes the contradictions in the neoliberal logic 
present in the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown. 
 
The Racial Other 
In addition to being portrayed as criminals or fraudsters, and amoral characters, non-ideal 
citizens embody specific racial backgrounds. When talking about who is implicated in the 
revocation, Minister Jason Kenney, CIC, and newspaper articles refer to specific cultural groups 
rather than individuals. According to the public discourse, the fraudsters are mostly Middle 
Eastern groups: 
The Iranians, the people from Dubai, the Lebanese, and others, they all have the 
same story.  'I came to Canada, I spent an hour and half here, I went back and I 
want to become a citizen. (Raj, 2011a) 
 
There are thousands upon thousands of Canadian passport holders in the Gulf 
States, the Middle East, India and Hong Kong alone who have never lived in 
Canada. (Taub, 2012) 
 
It is interesting to note that no white groups are said to be implicated in the fraud. This 
phenomenon highlights the cultural racism is present in the discourses by identifying certain 
cultural groups as more likely to be “criminal” than others. The fact that no white racial groups 
are identified as perpetrators of citizenship fraud naturalizes their rights to citizenship, and re-
confirms the whiteness embedded in the institution of citizenship.  
The public discourse revives the “citizens of convenience” debate from 2006 to support 
the rhetoric of unworthy dual citizens “taking advantage” of Canada. The rhetoric itself is laden 
with racial assumptions that are then transferred into the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown. For 
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example, one article used the Lebanese evacuation to explain why some immigrants obtain 
citizenship fraudulently: 
Canadian citizenship can at times be a safety net. Approximately 15,000 
passport holders in Lebanon used their citizenship to get out of a war zone in 
2006. The federal government spent almost $100-million bringing them home 
only to find out that some had rarely, if ever, set foot in Canada and that most 
returned to Lebanon, their real home, as soon as the situation calmed.  (Raj, 
2011b) 
 
The quote revives the argument that dual citizens only have Canadian passports for the sake of 
its privileges, rather than for personal commitment and dedication to Canada (see Harder & 
Zhyznomirska, 2012). The quote seems to assume that all of the Lebanese-Canadians who were 
evacuated in 2006 are fraudsters. The discourse also assumes that Lebanese-Canadians can never 
truly be “Canadian,” and that their home is always elsewhere. Thus, the suspicion towards dual 
citizens that is embodied the citizens of convenience debate perpetuates into the Citizenship 
Fraud Crackdown. 
Perhaps the most interesting finding from this investigation comes from documents 
released through the Access to Information and Privacy Act (ATIP). One ATIP in particular 
(CIC, 2012b) shows that the largest portion of individuals implicated in the citizenship 
investigations are primarily of Lebanese descent, representing a little more than a quarter of all 
investigations (Figure 3) (Appendix D). Additionally, 60% individuals under investigation are 
from the Middle East. Given that one of the triggers for the Fraud Crackdown was the 
controversy of the Lebanese “citizens of convenience,” is it a coincidence to see that Lebanese-
Canadians are disproportionally under investigation in the Crackdown? Are the high numbers of 
Middle East applicants due to CIC targeting investigations to this racial group, or is there indeed 
a high rate of misrepresentation from this part of the world? These questions are difficult to 
answer with the limited information available publically. However, what the statistics clearly 
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show is that category “criminal/illegal” is a racialized term, especially in the context of 
immigration. The ATIP also reveals that the Lebanese “citizens of convenience” controversy is 
subsumed in the Fraud Crackdown. My findings are consistent with scholars that observe that 
discourses of the criminal other have taken the place of the racial other (Dauvergne, 2008; Pratt 
2012; Sharma, 2006; Wright, 2013). Chan (2004) refers to the criminalization of immigrants as 
the “criminalization of race.” Thus, the criminal other that is used to uphold the neoliberal ideal 
citizen, is in fact the racial other. 
Figure 3: Citizens Implicated in Citizenship Fraud Investigations by Country of Birth 
(2012) 
 
Source: CIC, 2012b 
 
From the findings above, it appears that the criminal other, that is created by neoliberal 
logic, is layered onto the image of the pre-existing racial other. Goldberg (2002) suggests that 
neoliberalism attempts to ignore racial histories and their accompanying inequalities.  This type 
of analysis conceives of neoliberalism as a separate process from racism, with the two being 
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layered and working in conjunction with one another. While subsuming the racial other into its 
realm, neoliberalism subsumes the systems of repression embedded within in it, while failing to 
acknowledge their existence.  
I wish to turn my attention to Roberts and Mahtani’s (2007) challenge and examine 
possibility that “neoliberalism is fundamentally raced” (p. 248). I believe that key to 
understanding how neoliberalism truly operates is by evaluating its instances of incongruity. 
Scholars note that neoliberal ideologies and processes are fraught with contradictions. Harvey 
(2005) notes that when “neoliberal principles clash with the need to restore or sustain elite 
power, then the principles are either abandoned or become so twisted as to be unrecognizable” 
(p. 19). Mahtani and Roberts (2007) note that neoliberal processes are prone to “moments of 
eruption of racial discrimination” (p. 248). Given that neoliberalism’s primary objective is to 
keep capital concentrated in the hands of the wealthy (Harvey, 2005), who are coincidently 
white, is it quite possible that a goal of neoliberalism is to perpetuate and uphold racist divisions? 
In this section I highlight the unequal application of neoliberal principles in the Citizenship 
Fraud Crackdown. By doing so, I show that neoliberalism does not simply “ignore” or “conceal” 
racism; it is a racist ideology in and of itself. 
The first contradiction apparent in the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown is that the majority 
of individuals implicated in fraud investigations are from the skilled worker immigrant category, 
also known as economic migrants. The skilled worker category, which is the primary avenue for 
ideal neoliberal citizens to enter Canada, is thus the target of neoliberal criminalization. The fact 
that people of colour are criminalized, despite being ideal neoliberal subjects, is explained by 
racism embedded in neoliberalism, which cannot view them as ideal. As I mentioned earlier, 
immigration is about people of colour. Immigrants are not necessarily rewarded with the same 
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privileges and position of power as neoliberal citizens (Roberts & Mahtani, 2007). This is 
because the neoliberal citizen is imaged as a white citizen, not a citizen of colour (Roberts & 
Mahtani, 2007).  
It is important to note that white people also abuse their citizenship. One example is 
Conrad Black. Black, although born in Canada, renounced his citizenship in 2001 in favour of 
British citizenship. Years later, Black was convicted of fraud in the handling of his business 
matters and served a criminal sentence in the United States. Upon being granted a temporary 
resident visa to return to Canada, he indicated his intention to apply for Canadian citizenship 
once again. His statement did not lead to public outcry about the abuse of citizenship. It appears 
that when white people take advantage of the institution of citizenship, their actions can be 
justified. The need for the nation-state to strictly regulate the activities of people of colour 
reveals its apprehension in granting them long-lasting and binding rights to the nation-state.  
A second, and more important, contradiction in the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown is that 
the criminal other, which is meant to be the opposite of the ideal neoliberal citizen, in fact, 
possesses many neoliberal traits. The public discourse portrays the fraudsters as conniving and 
mobile citizens who make calculated decisions that serve their best interests. The criminals are 
also resourceful and creative; they find a way to live in a tax haven while their children have 
access to the best education and healthcare in the world. This is, in fact, what ideal neoliberal 
citizens do. Yet, they become non-ideal, or criminal, when they threaten to take advantage of 
Canada’s wealth. In other words, they stop being ideal not when they lose their neoliberal traits, 
but when they fail to act in the interests of the nation-state. I have already established that the 
nation-state represents the interests of white populations. What can be concluded from this 
contradiction is that the nation-state will not tolerate people of colour benefiting in large numbers 
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from its wealth. Failing to act in the interests of the nation-state is, in effect, failing to act in the 
interests of white power. 
Here, we see that the neoliberal ideology only extends for far, to a certain few. 
Neoliberalism accepts and promotes white populations to use their dual citizenship to take 
advantage of developing countries. However, immigrants from the Middle East who are doing 
this face the consequences of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown. Thus, the inverse does not 
apply: people of colour cannot use their dual citizenship to take advantage of the white nation-
state. It is through promoting one agenda while preventing a similar one that the racist logic of 
neoliberalism becomes completely exposed. 
The rhetoric from the public discourse employs questions of honour and morale as a way 
to criminalize people of colour who exemplify ideal neoliberal traits. This tactic is a well-
observed phenomenon. For example, wealthier business immigrants recruited from Asia by 
Canada are lauded as ideal migrants because of the economic dimensions of their lives (Mountz, 
2004). Whereas wealthier immigrants are rewarded for their economic ambitions, poorer 
migrants are punished as “greedy” for wanting to increase their wealth (Mountz, 2004). 
Melamed (2006) argues that “race remains a procedure that justifies the nongeneralizability of 
capitalist wealth” (p. 2). We see that the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown employs the same double-
standard. It uses morals and character to explain why people of colour, who are ideal neoliberal 
subjects, do not benefit from its principles.  
Another indication of the operation of racism is that it appears that non-white people are 
targeted because the Crackdown is framed partly in terms of loyalty. Racist logic always 
suspects people of colour being disloyal while at the same time it takes for granted the loyalty of 
white people (as is demonstrated in the “citizens of convenience”/”Lost Canadians” debate). It 
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could be that non-white dual citizens are using Canadian social services more than white dual 
citizens. Even if that’s true, however, there many things that white people do that are both 
“disloyal” and costly to the state. There is racism both in the choice of targets for the Crackdown 
as well as in the conception of the Crackdown itself (i.e., the decision to target disloyal dual 
citizens, rather than targeting people in general for their costly actions to the nation-state).  
By examining the contradictions within neoliberalism, we see that people of colour who 
attempt to exercise neoliberal ideals and take advantage of capitalist wealth, are criminalized. 
Neoliberalism actively works to prevent people of colour from attaining wealth that is 
concentrated in white privilege. Neoliberalism does not just ignore race; it is racist. In the case of 
the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown, it is possible to observe that neoliberalism uses 





I conclude that the Fraud Crackdown is an exercise in nation-building. At times of high 
immigration, the Conservatives wish to solidify in the public’s mind what it means to be a 
member of the nation-state. Citizenship is a discursive means of establishing national identity 
(Dauvergne, 2008; Pratt 2012; Wright, 2013).  The Citizenship Fraud Crackdown sounds the 
alarms of the threat of the racial other to the white national identity, and the need to do 
something about it. In reiterating the national identity, the Crackdown portrays Canadian citizens 
as individuals who possess both neoliberal and nationalistic traits. The construction of the 
national identity is always understood in relation to its other, however (Chan, 2004; Dhamoon & 
Abu-Laban, 2009; Honig, 2001). The Crackdown portrays non-ideal citizens as criminals, a 
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trademark of neoliberal governmentality. Criminalization of immigrants occurs through the 
rhetoric surrounding the Crackdown, as well as how it is operationalized. The analysis reveals 
that criminalization serves the purposes of nation-building by: placing the nation-state in a 
position of benevolence, creating a criminal “other” which the nation state understands itself in 
relation to, stifling the voices of those who are being criminalized. The criminalized other is the 
racial other, indicating that historic practices of drawing the national-identity continue to depend 
on racial constructions. In conclusion, criminalization facilitates nation-building by 
reconstituting the boundaries between citizen and non-citizen, national belonging and abject 
otherness. 
Another conclusion of this chapter is that by examining the contradictions within 
neoliberalism, it is possible to discern how neoliberalism is raced. This revelation occurs in two 
important moments of neoliberal governmentality. First, criminalization prevents people of 
colour from behaving as ideal neoliberal subjects because it strives to protect wealth 
concentrated in white populations.  Second, criminalization serves to increase precarity in 
citizenship for dual citizens who are not born into the white nation-state.  From these 
observations it appears that neoliberalism actively works to prevent people of colour from 
attaining wealth that is concentrated in white privilege. Neoliberalism does not just ignore race; 
it is racist. 
The implications from the findings are that scholars need to pay close attention to how 
race and neoliberalism are conjoined and intertwine. Racism is present in this construction of 
citizenship, and it also gives meaning to the neoliberal construction of the criminal “other.” This 
seems to suggest that race and neoliberalism operate parallel to one another. However, 
contradictions in neoliberal principles and practices seem to suggest that neoliberalism is 
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inherently raced. Scholars need to pay attention to these contradictions as they suggest ways of 
intervening, provide ways of pulling apart the dominant rationale, and racist operations that 
neoliberalism denies.  
 To understand the true power of criminalization, it is important to look at the events that 
followed the announcement Citizenship Fraud Crackdown.  A few months after the investigation 
of 11,000 individuals was announced, voice began to spread that the Fraud Crackdown had not 
lived up to its anticipated impact. One newspaper article reported that only 12 revocations had 
taken place in the 18-month period following the launch of the Crackdown (Levitz, 2013). 
Another article, written two and a half years after the launch, stated that CIC had made 
approximately 250 revocation attempts, 90 % of which have ended up in federal court (Cohen, 
2014). Given the minimal number of revocations and high incidence of court proceedings, it is 
reasonable to say the action to uncover and uproot fraud in the citizenship program by CIC was a 
failure.   
This failure could be from one of two reasons: either citizenship fraud is not as 
widespread as Minister Jason Kenney believed it to be, or CIC’s tools were not effective in 
finding fraud. Would the government really be incapable of finding large magnitudes of fraud? 
Both Jason Kenney, and current CIC Minister, Jason Alexander, have remained mum about the 
progress of finding fraud, and CIC continues to use hard-hitting language when questioned about 
the initiative.  The CIC stated that 11,000 individuals were under investigation. Given that the 
11,000 individuals is quite marginal to the 150,000 individuals that attain citizenship each year
8
 
(CIC, 2014c), I am inclined to say that residence fraud is in fact, not widespread in Canada.  The 
investigations affect 7% of citizenship cases in on year. It is important to remember that the 
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 This is the average number of grants of citizenship from 2008 to 2012. 
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Crackdown investigations were retroactive, and considered more than one year of citizenship 
applicants. This further diminishes the presence of fraud well below 7% in all citizenship cases. 
 Despite not finding the presence of fraud, the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown was not 
completely a failure. Two and a half years after the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown was 
announced, the Conservatives ushered in Bill C-24 (2014). The Crackdown seems to have 
influenced two very important components of the bill. The first influence was to redefine what 
qualifies as residence for citizenship. As discussed previously, prior to the passing of Bill C-24 
an individual qualified for citizenship if they demonstrated one of three types of residence in 
Canada: physical residence, centralized existence, or the intention of residence. The Crackdown 
served to enforce physical residence in Canada as the primary means for obtaining citizenship. 
Bill C-24 (2014) enshrined this interpretation into law and eliminated any other types of 
residence from being recognized as a precursor to citizenship. The shift to physical residence in 
effect increases the threshold for qualifying for citizenship. The implications of this change 
become clear in the next chapter, which highlights the lived experience of individuals applying 
for citizenship. 
 Perhaps the most important influence the Crackdown had on Bill C-24 (2014), however, 
was inspiring changes to the citizenship revocation process. Minister Chris Alexander explained 
that during the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown revocation of citizenship was “one of the most 
time-consuming, document-intensive bureaucratic processes I’ve ever seen” (Wingrove, 2014). 
The Conservatives seemed to blame the low number of revocations not on the lack of existence 
of fraud, but at the lack of ease of stripping status from individuals. Their solution was to create a 
slew of changes to revocation procedures using Bill C-24 (2014). The bill transferred the power 
to revoke citizenship from the federal court to the hands of Minister of Citizenship, Immigration 
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and Multiculturalism (CIC, 2014a).  This change gives the Minister power to make unilateral 
decisions on cases, and eliminate the opportunity of the accused to appear in court, except in 
complex cases (Wingrove, 2014). Transferring the decision making power from the judicial 
system to the political realm, signals that citizenship is now more politicized than it ever was 
before. The power to revoke citizenship can now depend on the Minister’s political agenda. By 
eliminating judicial review the opportunity for accused to defend their case becomes increasingly 
weak. The change effectively decreases the threshold for revoking citizenship, and introduces 
precarity in the status. 
 In addition to increasing the ease with which citizenship can be revoked, Bill C-24 (2014) 
also increased the grounds for revocation. Prior to Bill C-24 (2014), citizenship could only be 
revoked on the basis of “fraud, false representation or knowingly concealing material 
circumstances” (CIC, 2011c). The Citizenship Fraud Crackdown worked within these limiting 
provisions. Bill C-24 (2014) expands the reasons for revocation to include: serving in armed 
conflict against Canada, and for “terrorism, high treason, treason, or spying offences” (CIC, 
2014a). 
  It is important to note that the birth right citizens cannot have their citizenship revoked. 
Thus, the precarity that results from revocation only applies to dual citizens. In effect the 
citizenship reforms result in greater differentiation between birthright and naturalized 
citizenship. As seen in the public discourse, one reason why the nation-state wishes to increase 
precarity in dual citizenship is to increase loyalty of dual nationals. The Conservatives 
favouritism toward birthright citizenship takes the “invidious position that those lucky enough to 
be born into Canadian citizenship are “more” Canadian than those who strive to acquire it 
through naturalization” (Maclkin, 2006 cited in Nyers, 2010). In addition to requiring greater 
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loyalty from naturalized citizens, the increased provisions for revocation also allow the nation-
state to more easily expunge unwanted populations from its entity. The Citizenship Fraud 
Crackdown serves to reiterate the fine line between citizen and non-citizen. In doing so, it 
contributes to increasingly differentiating between the two. 
 It is troublesome to observe that such monumental changes encompassed in Bill C-24 
(2014) were based on the story of a few individuals suspected of fraud – a story that largely 
appears to be fictional.  The power of the story is explained through its reiteration in the public 
discourse. Despite the Crackdown investigations failing to uncover fraud, newspaper articles 
perpetuated the Conservatives rhetoric that fraud was widespread. To their defense, the media 
did not have any other information given to them by the Conservatives, and additional 
information had to be obtained through lengthy waits for ATIP requests (at the time of writing 
this report, I have been waiting 10 months for my ATIP request to be processed). It is interesting 
to note that although the newspaper articles spread the image of widespread fraud, only a few 
articles reported on lack of presence of fraud. Thus, the public discourse propagated over-
exaggerated allegations of fraud fed to it by CIC. Coupled with the deathly silence of the lack of 
evidence of fraud, the public discourse contributed to a damaging rhetoric for immigrants in 
Canada. The impact of the discourse on the Canadian pubic was high, because the same story 
was perpetuated across cities, newspapers and diverse readerships. It was a consistent message 
that echoed countless times to citizens across Canada. It is through its iteration in the public 
discourse (Fairclough, 2003), that the story that citizenship is under threat became factual, and 
rendered possible the troubling changes to revocation proceedings.   
 This false story may have primed the public for creating alarming changes to revocation 
procedures through Bill C-24 (2014). When the Conservatives first began to reform citizenship 
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in 2007, they were committed to preventing the misuse and abuse of citizenship by dual 
residents, a goal that was inspired by the “citizens of convenience” debate. The Standing Senate 
Committee review on dual citizenship concluded that no changes needed to be made to the 
provisions of dual citizenship, and that “a Canadian is a Canadian” (Standing Senate Committee 
2007 cited in Nyers, 2010). The Committee acknowledged that the task at hand was how to 
frame the debate surrounding dual citizenship. The Conservatives seemed to address this 
challenge through launching the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown, which framed citizenship as 
under threat from dual nationals who abused its privileges. I conclude, given the findings above, 
that the large magnitudes of “fraudulent” immigrants attempting to “lie and cheat” to attain 
Canadian citizenship, does not, in fact, exist.  The public discourse surrounding the 
investigations serves to create a false image of citizenship under threat and the false need to 
increase citizenship criteria in order to maintain the integrity of the status. The Citizenship Fraud 
Crackdown, through criminalizing dual citizens, helped the Conservative government obtain 
their long desired goal of reforming citizenship. 
  The new reforms to the Citizenship Act increase the threshold for qualifying for 
citizenship (through only recognizing physical residence) and decrease the threshold for losing 
citizenship (through increasing the ease of revocation). The Citizenship Fraud Crackdown thus 
represents the nation-state pushing for more scrutiny in citizenship applications. With this goal in 
mind, the nation-state does not see precarity of status as an issue, but rather views citizenship as 
too easy to obtain and in need of restriction.  This view is in stark contrast to the individuals 




CHAPTER 6 – LIVING IN THE BREACH: UNHEARD VOICES OF 
RQ RECIPIENTS 
 
 My sense when getting the RQ and looking into it…there seemed to be a lot of rhetoric 
around raising the value of Canadian citizenship and demanding … To me it kind of felt 
like the bad boyfriend that somebody has. I felt that they were treating me badly with the 





Precisely because national boundaries are constructed and always contestable, the 
reproduction of the nation and alien requires constant practice. It occurs continuously in a 
range of social institutions, such as schools, and media, and in daily routines associated 
with policing, suspicion, and crossing [borders] or refusal of entry.  
- Geoffrey Bennington, 1990 as quoted in Nevins, 2002, p. 177 
 
Whereas the previous chapter focused on the public discourse, in this chapter, I focus on 
voices absent from the discourse: individuals implicated in the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown. 
The public discourse focused on the components of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown that sought 
to revoke citizenship. A second component of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown, less discussed 
in the public discourse, is the Residence Questionnaire (RQ). The RQ is a tool the CIC uses to 
ensure that permanent residents meet the three-year physical residency requirement to qualify for 
citizenship. Its role is to prevent citizenship fraud before it happens. From the statistics that the 
CIC issued, approximately 3,100 individuals were facing citizenship revocation, and 5,000 
individuals with Permanent Resident status had been “flagged for additional scrutiny” (CIC, 
2012h). Given the statistics, it appears that the RQ affected a larger portion of individuals than 
the citizenship revocations. The RQ strictly scrutinizes physical presence in the country using the 
least common, and most stringent, interpretation of “residence” in the Citizenship Act.  The 
importance of the shift from defining residence as “centralized existence” to “physical” is 
highlighted in the interviews. Between December 2013 and February 2014, I interviewed seven 
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 Note that all names are fictional and have been changed to protect the anonymity of interview participants.  
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individuals, five of whom were people of colour, who received the Residence Questionnaire 
(RQ). Some recipients received it before the May 2012 RQ reforms that were part of the 
Citizenship Fraud Crackdown, and others after. The experiences with the RQ are all similar, and 
provide valuable insight into what the 11,000 individuals under investigation for citizenship 
fraud might be experiencing. Their stories provide perspectives on the Citizenship Fraud 
Crackdown devoid in the public discourse. 
The experiences of citizenship applicants, like Jessica mentioned above, portray a very 
different image of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown. Transnational feminist scholars argue that 
it is only possible to truly understand the functioning of neoliberalism, racism, and other 
hegemonic regimes by focusing on the perspective of those who are marginalized and exploited 
by such regimes (Alexander & Mohanty, 1997; Calliste & Sefa Dei, 2000; Shohat, 2002; 
Mohanty, 2003). The interviews reveal this to be the case. It is by sharing the stories of those in 
the margins that a more critical analysis of the initiative becomes possible. Individuals under 
investigation experience the nation-state as an abusive entity, or “bad boyfriend.” The 
individuals implicated in the Crackdown have heightened feelings of fear, vulnerability, stress, 
and shame. Their stories reveal that they are not criminals with evil-motives that threaten the 
nation-state, but rather that they yearn to contribute to Canada and be accepted by it. Despite 
being in a “bad relationship,” they do not want to quit. The emotional stories interviewees shared 
about their experience with the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown helps to move them out of the 
abject other category, thus restoring their humanity. Their stories also offer insights into the 
effects of the Crackdown that are censured from the public discourse.  
In order to understand the experience of the RQ recipients, I draw on two bodies of 
literature. The first body of literature examines precarity within immigration statuses, and 
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acknowledges the role of the nation-state in creating and upholding these conditions. I adopt a 
feminist interpretation of precarity, which conceives it as a “politically induced condition of 
maximized vulnerability and exposure…to arbitrary state violence and other forms of 
aggression” (Butler, 2009, p.ii).  One revelation from the interviews is that the Citizenship Fraud 
Crackdown creates precarity in citizenship and PR status, thus increasing vulnerability of 
immigrants. I draw on conditionality theory to pinpoint how precarity is produced in 
immigration. The theory acknowledges that precarity exists in “the contingency surrounding an 
individual’s ongoing presence in a legal status category and jurisdiction” (Goldring, & Landolt, 
2013, p. 15). In other words legal status can be precarious because there is always the possibility 
of losing it. Nyers (2006) observes that the nation-state can criminalize and illegalize naturalized 
citizens similarly to unauthorized immigrants, thus essential shifting them from the category of 
citizen to illegal. Conditionality theory also recognizes that precarity can arise from the 
“uncertainty of accessing rights or exercising substantive citizenship” (Goldring, & Landolt, 
2013, p. 15). In other words, precarity exists in legal status when individuals are not able to fully 
exercise the rights they are entitled to, due to racism or other systemic oppression. Scholars agree 
that conditionality is largely created by the nation-state, which has power to impose and modify 
conditions for legal status (Bauder, 2013; Dauvergne, 2008; Goldring & Landolt, 2013; Nevins, 
2002; Wright, 2013). The interviews, thus, shed light on how the nation-state employs 
neoliberalism and criminalization to increase precarity in some of its most secure immigration 
categories (citizenship and Permanent Residence), and how this precarity is experienced. 
A second body of literature focuses on the performance of citizenhood. In order to be 
recognized as formal members of the nation-state (i.e., granted citizenship), and uphold their 
legal status, immigrants must “perform” what is required of them by the nation-state (Butler, 
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2009). Concretely, they must meet certain legal obligations (such as upholding their physical 
residence requirements), and uphold social norms (such as being the ideal neoliberal citizens that 
are portrayed in Chapter 5). Those who do not meet the norms required of them by the nation-
state are excluded from formal recognition: the institution of citizenship. The interviewees are, in 
fact, ideal neoliberal citizens, and in many ways meet the norms that are required of them by the 
nation-state. Criminalization is a tool that the nation-state uses to compel individuals to perform 
what it requires of them. The interviewees also expose the violence that is directed at them by the 
nation-state through criminalization; yet they nonetheless seek accommodation in the entity 
which oppresses them. Drawing on Brown’s (1993) concept of “wounded attachments,” I show 
that individuals often desire that what is excluding or oppressing them. While the first body of 
literature is useful for understanding how precarity is present in citizenship, and how the nation-
state is the primary agent in creating precarity, this second body of literature helps understand the 
lived experience of individuals who attempt to perform what the state requires of them. 
In this chapter I analyze the lived experiences of those implicated in the Citizenship 
Fraud Crackdown, specifically the Residence Questionnaire. I structure my analysis in three 
parts; I begin with an analysis of how criminalization is experienced by those it is directed 
toward. I then move on to an analysis of how the individuals experience Permanent Residency as 
a precarious status, which severely limits their mobility. In the last section, I examine how the 
individuals, despite feeling victimized, abused, and excluded from the nation-state, yearn to be 
accepted by it and continue to support its institutions. They, in effect, participate in nation-
building. I conclude by arguing that the nation-state’s move to define residency as strictly 
“physical” increases precarity in Permanent Resident status, and hinders individuals from being 
the ideal neoliberal subjects that the nation-state desires.  
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THE RQ EXPERIENCE 
 
Accounts of the RQ experience shed light on how criminalization operates on the level of 
the individual. The interviews reveal the emotional impact of the Residence Questionnaire; all 
individuals experience heightened fear, vulnerability, and stress. Their emotions disrupt the 
construction of individuals implicated in the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown as abject subjects by 
showing their vulnerability and humanity. In disrupting this construction, their stories draw 
attention to the dehumanizing effects of criminalization. The interviews reveal how 
criminalization creates fear, which in turn serves to decrease their agency. Many recipients 
explained that they were reluctant to share their story with others, refrained from inquiring about 
their case, and complied with the intrusive demands of the RQ, out of fear from being branded as 
criminal. Additionally, the stories reveal how criminalization leads to over-surveillance and 
invasion of privacy. Brodie (2009) observes that the security and crime discourse grant 
governments and elites extraordinary power to circumvent democratic processes. Although 
scholars have observed the merging of crime and immigration (Aharonson & Ramsy, 2010; 
Aliverti, 2012; Dhamoon & Abu-Laban, 2009; Dolbrowsky, 2008; Gilbert, 2007; Nyers, 2009; 
Pratt & Valverde, 2002; Stumpf, 2006), few have examined how criminalization operates on the 
level of the individual. The experiences of the RQ recipients reveal how criminalization is a 
powerful tool for controlling populations.  
 
De-/Re-Humanization 
One of the most striking themes from the interviews is the emotional impact of the RQ. 
When describing their experience with the Residence Questionnaire, all individuals described 
107 
 
acute emotional reaction to receiving it.  The language of the RQ itself is very neutral, with the 
RQ stating:  
In order to assist the citizenship judge in determining whether you meet the 
residence requirements under paragraph 5(1)(c) of the Citizenship Act, please 
complete this questionnaire in detail. Please provide documentary evidence in 
support of your statements. It is your responsibility to satisfy the citizenship 
judge that you meet all the requirements of the Citizenship Act and 
Regulations. (Appendix C) 
 
Despite the neutral language, individuals used words such as “overwhelmed,” “ashamed,” 
“frustrated,” “panic[ked],” “violated,” and “slap[ped] in the face” to describe their reaction to 
receiving the RQ.  Their emotions strikingly reveal a very human subject at the focus of the 
Citizenship Fraud Crackdown. Their strong emotion, devoid in the public discourse, disrupts the 
construction of them as abject subjects. It is only by hearing of their vulnerability first-hand that 
we become fully conscious of the dehumanizing effects of criminalization. 
The emotional reaction from receiving the RQ seems to stem, in part, from the 
unexpected nature of its receipt. One recipient recounts her reaction to receiving the RQ: 
In [date] I got a letter from Citizenship and Immigration Canada. I was very 
excited because I thought maybe this is my invitation to take the knowledge 
test. And I opened it and it was the Residence Questionnaire. I was just very 
confused at first because I didn’t realize what it was. Reading through it a few 
times, the tone seemed to indicate that they didn’t actually believe I was 
qualified for citizenship. The level of documentation felt very overwhelming, 
and almost insulting to me. They requested almost every document from the 
last eight years of my life. But there was no explanation of why they thought I 
was so untrustworthy, why everyone else could be trusted without any proof, 
but not me. (Jessica) 
 
Once individuals submit their citizenship application, they have minimal communication from 
CIC, and eagerly await invitation for the next phase of the citizenship application process, which 
is to attend a knowledge test. When they finally receive a long-awaited letter inviting them to 
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take the citizenship test, they are devastated to find the bitter news it contains: they must provide 
more documentation to support their application.  
The amount of documentation required to complete the RQ is another reason individuals 
have a visceral reaction to the RQ. One person explains: 
Well, until we received it, we knew absolutely nothing about the Residence 
Questionnaire. We had never heard of it. We got a letter in the mail. We 
thought “Oh, good, he’s being asked for his citizenship test.” And then we 
opened it and we said “Good Lord! What is this?” And then we read it in some 
more detail, and, I – we panicked. We thought “What is this? This is essentially 
another permanent resident application.” I mean that’s what it felt like – they 
are asking us to reapply for permanent resident status. (Linda) 
 
First, it was a normal step for me. I thought I have complied with all 
regulations; I didn’t break any laws so I deserve a timely and proper processing 
of my application. No clouds on the horizon, I didn’t expect any trouble. Then 
it turned out to be a disaster with a horrible price tag, and a lot of stress, of 
waiting, of not knowing, of nothing happening for one year, two years. Very 
unpleasant, very unhealthy process. (Alexei) 
 
The recipients’ response is not surprising. Applications for permanent residence are more 
onerous than citizenship applications, given that permanent resident applications serve as the 
biggest hurdle for immigration to Canada (Dauvergne, 2007). Once the state accepts an 
immigrant as a permanent resident, the hurdle for citizenship is a low one (Dauvergne, 2007). 
Whereas individuals who are applying for permanent residents must pass strict screens on 
criminality, health, education, and employment, to list but a few, individuals who are applying 
for citizenship must be of age, have an understanding of an official language, meet the residency 
requirement, have no recent criminal offenses, and pass a knowledge test. Given the lower levels 
screening criteria and standards, citizenship applications are meant to be cheaper, quicker, and 
easier than PR applications. Individuals thus expect their citizenship application to be 
straightforward, but are surprised by the unexpected Residence Questionnaire which complicates 
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their case. This reaction is in part due to an abrupt disruption in the process for acquiring 
citizenship. 
Given the demanding documentation the RQ requires, the process of completing it is very 
stressful. The individuals reveal how onerous the RQ is, and the disturbance it causes in their 
lives: 
We spent over a month gathering the documents required for the Residence 
Questionnaire. Some documents required from [Continent A] took weeks to 
arrive. All this while my father was dying of cancer and while juggling young 
children and jobs. The whole process was very stressful and took an 
emotional toll on the whole family. (Linda) 
 
[The RQ] cost a lot of money, a lot of effort, a lot of time. I’ve spent maybe 
several hours on the phone with CIC, just to mention small pieces the 
problem. (Alexei) 
 
Our experience in general [with the RQ] was horrible, not just for him [the 
RQ recipient], but for our entire family, including our young children, 
because it took so much time and energy - physical energy, emotional 
energy…It was awful. It was awful and completely unexpected. (Linda) 
 
The emotional toll of receiving the RQ stems from the fact that it is unexpected, requests 
extensive documentation and effort to complete, and results in uncertainty about a person’s 
citizenship application. All recipients had strong reactions to receiving the RQ, whether feelings 
of devastation, frustration, or being overwhelmed.  
The stories of struggle and hardship disrupt the construction of those implicated in the 
Citizenship Fraud Crackdown as abject subjects. As Chapter 5 reveals, the power of 
criminalization is that erases the humanity of those to which it targets exclusionary measures. In 
this chapter, one can note that the consequence of dehumanization is that it allows the public to 
overlook the inhumane treatment of those at the hands of the nation-state. The stories of the RQ 
recipients are an important reminder that immigration policies, at the end of the day, affect 
human life (and in doing so decide which lives are worthy, and which lives are discounted).  By 
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erasing the subjectivity of the individuals it targets, criminalization makes it easier for the nation-
state to count, control, and expel unwanted populations. Their stories matter. 
The stories above highlight the emotional toll of initially receiving and completing the 
Residence Questionnaire. However, individuals did not stop feeling apprehension once they 
submitted their RQ; their apprehension persisted during the time they waited for their citizenship 
application to be processed. One reason for their continued apprehension is the lack of 
transparency surrounding the processing of the RQ. Applicants do not know why they received 
the RQ, the CIC remains silent about the progress on a case, and individuals cannot reach a CIC 
officer directly to make inquiries about their application. One individual mentioned that the CIC 
does not issue confirmation of receipt for the documents requested by the RQ. Thus, applicants 
can only assume that their response to the RQ has been received, unless they receive news 
otherwise. In addition to the lack of transparency in processing the RQ, individuals face 
indeterminate waiting times because their citizenship applications are no longer considered 
“standard.” Thus, a major source of apprehension for the respondents was the lack of 
transparency in how CIC processes the RQ and the indeterminate wait time, which stretched out 
for years. The time that interviewees had been waiting for a decision on their cases ranged from 
two to four years after applying for citizenship. 
With the wait time stretching into years, feelings of stress and vulnerability persisted well 
after individuals completed the RQ. One recipient explains: “I think they should let us know how 
it’s [RQ] is progressing. It is very mentally stressful – it gives stress to us [to not know what’s 
happening].” The only means of communication RQ applicants with CIC are to ask a Member of 
Parliament to inquire into their case on their behalf, or to submit an Access to Information and 
Privacy Act to see notes on their file. These avenues, however, contribute very little to the 
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transparency of the RQ process, and do not reduce apprehension.  Thus, the emotional toll of the 
RQ does not stop once the RQ is submitted; apprehension persists, and even amplifies, as 
individuals must wait an undefined amount of time. 
In addition to feeling apprehension, the result of being trapped in an opaque process 
results in powerful emotions, ranging from confusion to shame. Confusion results primarily from 
recipients not being able to understand why they received the RQ, when it will be processed, or 
what CIC is investigating about them. The recipients explain:  
That [receiving the RQ] was confusing to me, because I had the impression 
that everyone was just believed, and I didn’t understand why my signature, 
my word wasn’t enough. I didn’t understand what they were concerned about 
specifically in my case, because they didn’t give me any information. 
(Jessica) 
 
It was so hard to understand what they are looking for. (Alexei) 
 
In addition to creating confusion, the opaqueness also contributes to feelings of shame. As one 
person explains:   
I think it’s pretty normal to feel ashamed in that sort of circumstance 
[receiving the RQ]. For me there’s been the feeling that they know something 
– like the CIC – knows something about me, that’s unspeakable. Because they 
won’t tell me what it is. They won’t tell me what triggered the RQ. They 
won’t tell me what their concern is. So in some ways that makes it seem that 
their concern is so bad that they can’t even say it out loud. (Jessica) 
 
As these responses suggest, the feelings of shame associated with the RQ arise partly from the 
fact that applications are signaled as a non-routine, or “suspicious.” They feel shame in being 
separated from other applicants, and not being able to obtain citizen like the rest of their 
colleagues. They feel that they should have been treated normally. They feel that they are 
normal.  
Kirby (1997) explains that individuals who are marginalized by the nation-state 
experience it as a “force that is frequently directed against them, rather than exerted on their 
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behalf” (Kirby 1997, p. 5). Because the state conceals its decision-making process from 
applicants, they experience the RQ in a very powerful way, whether through feeling stressed, or 
victimized (Kirby, 1997, cited in Mountz, 2004). The response to the RQ, which is victimization 
and stress, is thus a reaction to a general phenomenon that is experienced by marginalized 
populations, when they feel the nation-state’s power being exercised on them.  
 The heightened sense of vulnerability and apprehension that individuals display 
contradicts their construction as “threats” in the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown. Their 
vulnerability shifts them from realm of abject others to “one of us.” Perhaps it is for this reason 
that the public discourse did not allow for their voices to be heard; through hearing their stories 
the public conscience might be awoken, and the nation-state’s undisputed tactics of investigation 
and control over these individuals might be questioned. By disconnecting individuals who are 
being maltreated as “one of us,” criminalization gains powerful traction in the disciplining and 
controlling its targeted populations.  
 
Fear 
The opaqueness of the RQ process does more than create apprehension – it fosters fear. 
This is another example of how criminalization is a powerful tool for controlling populations. All 
but one interviewee expressed some degree of fear, despite all individuals having high levels of 
education and language skills (which the neoliberal logic assumes to be very self-sufficient). One 
person explains how the opaqueness impacted her:  
And they never give you a reason for why; we don’t know why we received the RQ. In 
the same way we don’t know why he wasn’t granted his first visitor’s visa – they never 




In the absence of clear answers, individuals describe their apprehension and worry escalating to 
fear. One person, in search of information about his case, asked his Member of Parliament to 
inquire about the progress of his citizenship application. When he inquired about his case for a 
second time, the MP’s office told him: 
But please don’t ask frequently [about the status of your application], every 
three or four months, otherwise the CIC will suspect your case.” So I got 
scared. Is it not my right to even ask what is happening to my future life? I am 
still scared. So after that I never went there back. Maybe one year or more has 
passed, but I never went back to the MP office, and still I am scared to meet 
this person. Even to meet you - after that experience I was not even sharing 
anything with anyone. (Parth) 
 
This experience is quite unfortunate. Given the heightened sense of vulnerability the RQ 
recipient felt previous to approaching the MP’s office, the response by the office served to 
solidify his fears, and dissuade from inquiring further about his case. Feelings of fear meant that 
some RQ applicants did not want to share their stories at all. For one couple, the spouse who was 
the Canadian citizen preferred to share their story, while the RQ recipient did not actively 
participate in sharing his experience, or networking with other RQ recipients. They explained 
that their fear arose from the constantly changing immigration rules put forth by the Harper 
government, and the uncertainty of what awaited the husband’s status. For them, fear not only 
stemmed from the opaqueness of the RQ process, but ambiguity about the immigration systems, 
such as future changes to citizenship, and the uncertainty about status.  
Given the strong rhetoric surrounding the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown (that the 
individuals under investigation are criminals, guilty, and are committing violent actions), it is not 
surprising that individuals feel intimidated. The heightened rhetoric, coupled with an opaque 
process of investigation, meant individuals were living under heightened fear. This is another 
piece of evidence that criminalization is a powerful tool to control people; not only does it justify 
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the control of populations by dehumanizing them, it serves to strike fear in individuals it is 
targeting with its measures, and is used to decrease their agency.  
 
Over-Surveillance  
Another way that the criminalization is utilized by the nation-state as a powerful tool for 
controlling populations, the interviews show, is through excessive surveillance. The RQ 
recipients shed light on the impacts of the nation-state’s use of over-surveillance on their lives. 
Individuals are asked to disclose excessive amounts of personal information in order to prove 
their residency: 
Like I said, they asked for my children’s records. That really scared me. They 
don’t have anything to do with it – they’re Canadians. (Linda) 
 
The heavy surveillance embedded in the RQ makes individuals feel like they are being watched, 
which leads to overall sense of being targeted: 
I feel like our whole family is being treated with suspicion, because - I don’t 
know why. Because he’s a Permanent Resident. Because he comes from 
[Continent A]. So let me give you an example. His parents sent our children 
Christmas presents. Which were opened, ripped apart. Like the wrapping  
paper - ripped up, their names - ripped. All the boxes - opened, you know. 
And then it was shoved back in the box and sent to us. And I have no idea if 
that has anything to do with citizenship. And everything that gets to us – [this] 
happens [to]. So for our RQ, we had to get documents from [Country A]. 
Those were searched. That was by the US, those were searched by the US. 
So, yeah, it makes you feel, um, like you’re under suspicion. And I can’t tell 
you what on Earth we might have done wrong. (Linda) 
  
In addition to speculations about being targeted, many felt that the documents requested by CIC 
were an invasion of privacy. One reason for this was that RQ recipients are asked to prove 
residency since they first entered Canada, which for many was over-and-above the five year 
period under consideration for citizenship: 
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The law, as I read it, the Citizenship Act, asks for 1095 days [of residency in 
Canada in order to be eligible for citizenship]. Why should I be having to seek 
back for things that were over a decade ago? That’s a bit too onerous….I 
mean the fact that they ask for all your bank statements and all your credit 
card statements, it’s a humungous invasion of privacy. (Pablo) 
 
One individual decided to black out or omit personal information because he did not know what 
would be done with that information, and thought that it was unnecessary for proving residence. 
For example, he provided income statements from every other month, in an attempt to decrease 
the workload for the CIC officer, and out of hesitation to provide confidential information. The 
individual explains: 
I said to the [citizenship] judge, I don’t know who has access to these papers 
and whether they’re under oath on disclosing this information, or they can 
talk to anyone they like to. And she said “Of course they are [under oath].” 
But this was not mentioned in the RQ letter at all, so it was really confusing. 
Everyone was on his own to make sense of this document, according to their 
mental abilities. So, what I thought was saving them some work, by not 
letting them leaf through tons of documents, I just gave them several months 
in a year to show them I’m still there [in Canada] and I’m still paying 
expenses. I thought it would be enough, but apparently it wasn’t. (Alexei) 
 
The heavy surveillance that is embodied in the Residence Questionnaire leads to individuals 
feeling targeted, their privacy invaded.  Some of the recipients even referred to themselves as 
“RQ victims” because of the ill-treatment and suspicion they felt from the CIC. 
Fear, in addition to reducing agency, served to coerce individuals in complying with the 
demands that violate their privacy. One individual explained that she felt she had no choice but 
to provide the documents, despite her frustration in being asked to share personal information:  
Nobody else had all of their personal and private documents – that you’re told 
not to share – scrutinized. And then you send it by mail, and somebody else 
from a totally different country rips open the documents and looks at them. 
Goes ahead and scans them – who knows that they did with them. That makes 
you feel violated. But you can’t refuse, right?  What would happen if we 
refused, then we would be fraudsters.  You know what I mean? It would be 
assumed – “Oh, you refused to give us what we asked for, you must be 




This last quote embodies the difficult situation in which RQ recipients find themselves. They 
must comply with the demands of CIC, otherwise their citizenship application will be deemed 
abandoned, and they will fall in the category of “fraudsters.”  Here, we see how the threat of 
criminalization serves as a powerful tool for intimidating targeted individuals to comply with the 
demands of the nation-state. 
The criminality discourse serves to greatly limit ability of individuals to respond to 
unreasonable demands by CIC. Criminalization achieves this end by making those it targets as 
already presumed guilty. In the case of the RQ, individuals who do not submit the requested 
documents are described as “abandoning” their application, and thus counted among the 
fraudulent cases (CIC, 2012h). Criminalization also places the burden on the accused to prove 
their innocence (Stumpf, 2006). In the case of the RQ, this burden requires providing extensive 
documents that are considered an invasion of privacy. At the same time that individuals felt 
victimized by the RQ, the threat of being branded as criminals meant that they could not reject 
the excessive demands. 
The emotional stories interviewees shared about their experience with the Residence 
Questionnaire help us understand how criminalization functions. Their emotions and fear they 
experience are in reaction to how criminalization functions: to control and discipline populations 
through de-humanizing them, striking fear in them, and introducing heavy surveillance in their 
lives.   
Their reactions provide insight into how criminalization operates on the skin of the 
marginalized, in their shame and trembling, an area that is relatively underexplored in the 
literature. The interviews, however, offer more than insight into how criminalization functions. 
Individuals shared their experience of living with Permanent Resident status, which they 
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perceive as precarious and limiting their mobility. They hope to obtain citizenship in order to 
mitigate the precarity of their status. In the next section, I turn my attention to the experience of 
living with Permanent Resident status. 
 
LIVING WITH PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS 
 
In addition to the emotional impact of the Residence Questionnaire, another prominent 
theme in the interviews is that Permanent Resident status is experienced as precarious, which 
stems from the fact that they experience limited mobility with the status. The individual identify 
two factors of Permanent Resident (PR) status that limit their mobility. The first revolves around 
the conditions of their legal status; individuals must limit their travel outside of Canada in order 
to uphold their Permanent Resident status, and in order to meet the residency requirements for 
citizenship. The second factor of PR status that contributes to their limited mobility is that, 
unlike citizenship, PR status does not ensure the right to travel without scrutiny to other 
countries, and does not guarantee the right to return to Canada. The interviews with RQ 
recipients reveal how precarity, defined as the uncertainty of maintaining legal status and/or 
being able to fully exercise the rights of legal status, can exist across various immigration 
categories, including Permanent Resident status. I draw on conditionality theory to explain this 
phenomenon, which focuses on the nation-state’s power to impose and modify the requirements 
for legal status categories. 
Before delving deeper into the precarity associated with PR status, it is important to first 
understand the nuances between PR status and citizenship. Compared to the different spectrums 
of immigration statuses in Canada, which range from undocumented to citizen, permanent 
resident is a relatively secure status. Permanent residence is the precursor to citizenship, and 
118 
 
gives individuals similar rights as citizenship. They can live, work or study in Canada, pay taxes, 
receive social benefits such as health care, and are protected by the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (CIC, 2013b). However, unlike citizens, Permanent Residents have a status that is 
contingent on their continual habitation in Canada; they cannot vote or run in elections; are not 
given preference for Federal jobs; and cannot hold a Canadian passport (CIC, 2013b).
10
 In 
essence, Permanent Residents can live and work in Canada, but are citizens of other countries. 
They are thus on the periphery of the nation-state, which acknowledges and approves their 
presence, but does not grant them full membership in its entity. On the surface, the differences 
between permanent residence and citizenship seem minimal. However, the interviews reveal that 
this status is experienced precarious, due to limited mobility and feelings of living in the 
periphery.  
Permanent Residents conveyed their limited mobility at a number of points. First, they 
face reduced mobility in order to maintain their Permanent Resident status. One person explains: 
Well I’m certainly not completely mobile. I can travel outside of Canada, but 
I cannot have long-term travel plans, I cannot have long-term education plans, 
for example, or an employment plan in the United States, for example…If I 
go out [of Canada] and I stay out more than three years in a five year period 
and not be able to come back to Canada. And then it would be like I spent six, 
seven, eight years, and all this effort and you just got kicked out and you’re 
not a Canadian. So eliminating the probability or possibility of that 
devastating experience of not being let back in Canada, that itself is bringing 
more stability. (Milovan) 
 
 In addition to having to uphold their status, Permanent Residents also encounter limited 
mobility in order to be able to meet the residency requirements for citizenship. The individuals I 
                                                             
10
 Other limitations for Permanent Residents include: Not being able to work in high-clearance security jobs (ex – 
RCMP, CSIS), running or voting on school boards, jury duty, ability to travel without visas to countries that accept 
Canadian passports, right to Canadian consular services, right of children to study or work abroad, right to obtain 
citizenship for a child adopted through intercountry adoption (Residence Questionnaire, n.d.) 
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interviewed were all very reluctant to leave Canada in order to be eligible for citizenship. I 
highlight three different ways individuals limited their mobility: 
After three years [I applied for Canadian citizenship]. Maybe nine to ten days 
I stepped outside of Canada during these three years, otherwise I never went 
outside of Canada, nothing. (Parth) 
 
You have to stay in Canada for three years [to apply for citizenship], your PR 
card is good for five years. There was no question that we would have to 
reapply for another PR card. We didn’t think that was going to happen. We 
were going to apply for citizenship as soon as he was ready. We were very 
careful – we really stayed here, we didn’t take too many vacations, we didn’t 
travel for work. Made the application [for citizenship], now, okay, we’re 
stuck [in the RQ process]. (Linda) 
 
Even after getting RQ-ed, we were hesitating to go to [India] to visit our 
family. But then we weren’t able to wait, so they [my parents and siblings] 
went, but I haven’t still stepped outside of Canada. Since we came here I 
haven’t gone anywhere [seven years]. I personally think that because we’re 
already waiting on the processing of the RQ, what if once that’s passed and 
they see again – oh, you’ve stepped outside of Canada – and then they’ll give 
more papers, and it will just be a long stretch.  (Priya) 
 
The Permanent Residents exemplify how, even though they have a legal status that is relatively 
secure, they still experience precarity in this status. The precarity results from the need to uphold 
the residency requirements of the status. This type of precarity is well observed by conditionality 
theory. Permanent Residence differs greatly from citizenship in that citizens do not have to meet 
residency obligations in order to uphold their status. Permanent Residents on the other hand, 
must continually ensure that they are meeting the requirements of their status, or risk having to 
reapply to immigrate to Canada. They thus hover on the border between acceptance and 
expulsion in the nation-state. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, many Permanent Residents encounter mobility 
challenges because they have a harder time leaving and entering the without a “strong” passport, 
such as the Canadian one. Depending on what country their passport is from, individuals have to 
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go through visa applications and extra security checks to go to other countries. One person 
contrasted the difference between traveling with a Canadian passport: 
[Citizenship] gives many privileges to us. It is very easy to fly to the maybe 
158 countries without any harassment, without spending time [on visas], 
whenever you want. (Parth) 
 
Compared to the travelling with a passport from his home country: 
 
If you want to go somewhere you need the visas and the time, the money. If 
you fly through the airport, you have to go one hour before, you stay in a 
different line, lots of security check up, lots of questions, and only then can 
you enter. (Parth) 
 
Whereas travelling as a Canadian citizen is a relatively easy process, citizens of other countries 
must pass through visa approval and security checks before they can travel to the same places as 
Canadian citizens.  
Another problem emerges when Permanent Residents attempt to return to Canada. Unlike 
Canadian passport holder, Permanent Residents are not guaranteed the right of return. One 
person describes the experience of returning to Canada as follows: 
I think that when one crosses the border as a non-citizen it’s a very different 
experience than when you cross as a citizen. And there’s a level of stress and, 
this sounds a little intense, but sort of subjugation. I’m very serious when 
going over borders. I’m very respectful and very – there’s a way that I act 
when I go over the border that has to do with the fact that I know that they 
don’t have to let me in. That I’m essentially accepting the power of the state 
over my personal life. And there would be a lot of relief in just feeling like 
“This is my right. This is my right to get in.” That would feel pretty great, to 
feel that I had right as opposed to I was asking for a favour – a favour to be 
able to return to where I live in my apartment with my husband and daughter. 
Not to say that I realistically expect to be turned down when I cross the 
border. But that is a fear and that is a possibility. 
 
As a Permanent Resident I don’t have an absolute right to re-enter the 
country. So when I am re-entering the country there’s always the question – 
the border guard is always assessing whether they believe I have the right to 




The stories highlight the numerous limitations to mobility Permanent Residents encounter: they 
must limit their mobility in order to uphold their legal status (both PR and citizenship), and they 
have a more difficult time leaving and entering Canada as a result of not having strong passports. 
The restrictions around leaving and entering Canada highlight how colonial differences 
continue to be entrenched in the passport system.  Mongia (1999) observes that the Canadian 
passport system was established by racist motivations to control the mobility of unwanted 
populations. In doing so, it inscribes different rights to mobility or different racial groups.  
Spivak (2008) observes that racist hierarchies remain embedded in the contemporary passport, 
and that the phenomenon of “free movement” is observed by those with white privilege. The RQ 
recipients confirm their observations through their lived reality.  Whereas the Canadian passport, 
which represents a white national identity, offers relatively free travel globally, other passports 
do not. Thus Permanent Residents are limited by the passport that they carry, which inscribes 
their racial origins, when both leaving and re-entering Canada.  
I interviewed individuals who were citizens of the Global North; even though they did 
not encounter difficulty leaving Canada, they still experienced fear of not being able to re-enter 
Canada. No matter a person’s country of birth, all Permanent Residents identified three points of 
limited mobility: the residency requirement for upholding Permanent Resident Status, the 
residency requirement for qualifying for citizenship, and the fear to travel in the absence of a 
strong passport and/or the right of return. 
Permanent Residents face numerous consequences to their constrained mobility. I would 
like to now focus on what impacts this had on them. Individuals discussed being excluded from 
feeling Canadian, the fragmentation of nuclear families with different citizenships, their 
separation from friends and family in home countries, and their missed opportunities - all 
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consequences of their limited mobility. Being able to travel freely is part of the Canadian 
identity. Permanent Residents are excluded from this norm. One person explains: 
But they [my children] are asking “Why, dad, do we need the visa [to go to 
the United States]? We are Canadian…We don’t need a visa, we can go 
directly, let’s just take the car.” They are living in this mentality, but they are 
not knowing what is the fact. (Parth) 
 
Even though Permanent Residents may feel “Canadian,” their limited mobility acutely reminds 
them that they are not; this contributes to them feeling like they are living in the periphery of the 
nation-state. Immigration discourses and laws have the power to dictate who belongs in that 
nation-state, and which groups are out of place (Mountz, 2004; Dauvergne, 2008). The 
differences in mobility individuals encounter reveal the operation of the nation-state’s power on 
their personhood (Pratt, 1999 cited in Mountz 2004). Their limited mobility serves as a constant 
reminder that they have not yet been accepted into the powerful entity that is the nation-state. 
In addition to delineating citizens from non-citizens, mobility constraints lead to 
fragmentation of nuclear families in cases where family members have different citizenships. 
This fragmentation results in family members not being able to travel equally and with the same 
assurances: 
I think it [citizenship] will improve my life in terms of being able to travel 
with a passport and being able to travel on an equal basis with my wife and 
my child. It’s not [just about] going to a different line; it’s more having to get 
visas when traveling elsewhere, etc. We’re all always just going to be a 
family; we’re going to be a unit. And we’re going to be able to travel 
together, as a unit, there’s a huge value to that. (Pablo) 
 
My husband’s PR card had expired and his renewal application was caught up 
in long waits. Now his citizenship application may be delayed for years. In 
the meantime his parents are aging and he cannot visit them, while our 
children (both Canadian) are being denied family travel outside of Canada 




 In addition to fracturing nuclear families, limited mobility results in separation from 
family and relatives living in other parts of the world. Many of the individuals interviewed 
travelled outside of Canada to visit extended family only when needed:  
My wife had gone to [India] for maybe one month [in a three-year period]. 
Her mother was very sick and actually when she reached there, after one 
week she [her mother] expired. So after attending the funeral she came back. 
So that is the only one time, she has to go, she stepped outside of Canada. 
(Parth) 
 
Others contemplated what they would do when family members abroad became sick: 
What happens if – my parents live six hours away by car. So what happens if 
they get sick? They’re older. If I leave the country, will I be able to get back 
in? It’s a scary situation feeling like if my parents got sick I would have to 
choose between going down there and seeing them, and the fear of not being 
able to get back in and live with my daughter and my husband. So it’s, I think 
the security of knowing one has full mobility rights – is important to me. 
(Jessica) 
 
It is interesting to juxtapose the image of the Canadian citizen, a travel-loving, globe-
trotting adventurer, who is open to explore the world and all the continents, to the stories above, 
of Permanent Residents who face reduced mobility, separation from family, and only leave 
Canada in extreme cases of family sickness or death. The individuals are well-aware of this 
image, and how they are not part of it. The limited mobility contributes to feelings of living on 
the periphery of the nation-state, whereby the nation-state accepts their presence, but does not 
offer full membership rights.  
  However, for the individuals interviewed, their constrained mobility did more than 
prevent them from being globe-trotting citizens. The main concern individuals expressed was 
more substantial in nature; many RQ recipients lamented missed opportunities, such as 
employment and participation in the democratic process, as they waited for a decision to be made 
on their citizenship application. One individual had to forfeit an international training 
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opportunity in order to maintain his Permanent Resident status. Others identified missed 
opportunities such as: travelling internationally for Canadian companies, completing an 
education abroad, completing internships/practicums, and applying for Federal jobs. One RQ 
recipient explains her frustration: 
I’m a nursing student. After we graduate we have a choice to work in 
community- and not just community, there’s also the choice you can go 
internationally and help some countries in Africa or any third-world country 
where they don’t have very good medical care. So we as nurses or doctors – the 
health care professional team – we go there and we help them. We stay there, 
we live with them. But I cannot go, because I need visas. It would be a long 
procedure, unless I’m a Canadian citizen, then it becomes very easy. (Priya) 
 
Another person also explains: 
I’ve applied for citizenship more than three years ago and my application is 
taking forever. Now that might affect my ability to – it just affects my ability 
to plan for my life. In the sense that, “Okay, well, what am I doing?” I want to 
do my graduate studies elsewhere, I want to go to US to do my master’s and 
PhD – but, I can’t because I don’t know if I do that then what’s going to 
happen to my status as a Permanent Resident. So… and I can’t plan, you 
know. (Milovan) 
 
Individuals felt that they were missing opportunities to grow, develop, and contribute to Canada 
from their limited status and mobility. Indeed, any of the experiences listed above (working 
abroad or in government jobs) are ideal experiences for any Canadian to have. Minister Jason 
Kenney explains the need to have high-capital subjects for the prosperity of Canada: “Today we 
are a modern economy that needs people who have the human smarts, the human capital in an 
increasingly competitive global economy” (CBC Radio, 2012). One of the values of citizenship 
is that it is attained through competitive selection. The irony of Permanent Resident status is that 
it prevents individuals from continuing to build on their capital, and thus maintain their 
competitive edge.  
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The sense of precarity and vulnerability these individuals experience is a stark contrast to 
the narrative put forth by the Minister Jason Kenney or Chris Alexander. The neoliberal state 
does not acknowledge or view precarity and vulnerability. Rather, as Chapter 5 demonstrated, it 
perceives citizenship as too easy to attain, as requiring more restrictions, and higher thresholds to 
achieve. An irony is that all individuals interviewed exhibited the neoliberal ideal of being high-
capital, with university education in areas such as nursing, law, accounting, engineering, and 
planning, to list but a few. However, the RQ puts them in a position of vulnerability, fear, and/or 
stress. The delay in processing their citizenship request also results in missed opportunities to 
contribute to Canada. Thus, the push to attract the best and brightest by increasing thresholds for 
citizenship and PR status, in effect, serves to create precarity among individuals who clearly fit 
the neoliberal ideals in many ways.  
The seeming contradiction that neoliberal subjects are excluded by the operation of the 
nation-state can be explained by taking race into consideration. If we accept the argument that 
neoliberalism is a racist logic, then it follows that neoliberalism rejects people of colour as ideal 
neoliberal subjects; the conception of being “ideal” is reserved to white subjects. The fact that 
the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown inhibits people of colour from ideal neoliberal subjecthood is 
thus not perceived as a problem. Another way to explain the contradiction is to acknowledge that 
the changes are a result of “fraud” (i.e., of threat) in the immigration system. The purpose of the 
Citizenship Fraud Crackdown is not so much to ensure that the best and brightest are coming to 
Canada, but rather, to eradicate fraud. By eradicating fraud, the nation-state ensures that if people 
of colour are obtaining citizenship, they ought to go through the most rigorous selection process 
possible, which weeds out a substantial number of people of colour, and thus protects the 
whiteness inherent in citizenship.   
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The thrust of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown is to ensure that PR and citizenship 
applicants meet the physical residence requirements of theirs status.  With this in consideration, I 
wish to return for a moment to other interpretations of residence under the Citizenship Act. 
Previous to the Crackdown, physical residence was the least common interpretation of 
“residence” in citizenship law; rather “centralized existence” in Canada was the most commonly 
used interpretation. Centralized existence is a much richer consideration of a person’s 
relationship to the nation-state. It not only takes into account physical presence, but also 
considers: the qualities of connection to Canada, whether a person’s family resides in Canada, 
and whether re-entries to Canada constitute a “returning home.” It also gives room for 
opportunities such as temporary employment or studying abroad that extend beyond the allowed 
time limits. Whereas physical residence only considers time spent in Canada, centralized 
existence looks at the quality of time spent in Canada and the quality of the connections made.  
RQ is a tool to verify physical presence exclusively, and represents a shift from recognizing 
centralized existence in Canada under the law to only recognizing physical residence.  
In February 2014, the seven RQ recipients were waiting an average of three years since 
applying for citizenship, and without knowing a final decision on their case; this is an average of 
six years spent as a Permanent Resident.  However, it is important to note that most of the 
individuals resided in Canada for a longer period of time on student visas or work visas. Two 
interviewees had arrived in Canada when they were in high school and stayed until adulthood. 
Another individual had been in Canada for nine years in total. Thus, most of the individuals had 
a long history in Canada. Despite living and residing in Canada for an extended period of time, 
and in many ways participating in society as citizens, the application for citizenship only 
recognized three years in Canada as a Permanent Resident. It is in this context that we can 
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observe that the individuals had “centralized existence” in Canada, even though the short three-
year window under consideration in the citizenship application was only concerned with physical 
residence. By narrowing the definition of residence to exclusively physical, the individuals are 
barred from the ability to live, work, and train abroad, and bring these skills to Canada. Despite 
spending an average of six years as Permanent Residents, these individuals have not yet attained 
their citizen status. 
As the experience of the RQ recipients reveals, maintaining physical presence is much 
harder than maintaining centralized existence. The shift to defining residence as purely physical 
increases the threshold for maintaining PR status and obtaining citizenship. The nation-state 
justifies the increase in thresholds by using the criminalization discourse, which portrays 
citizenship and PR as under threat from encroaching fraudulent immigrants. 
From the stories of RQ recipients such as Jessica emerges a picture of ideal neoliberal 
citizens trapped in a bureaucratic operation of the nation-state, hindered from opportunities, and 
plagued by feelings of stress, fear, and/or vulnerability. The lived experience of RQ recipients 
reveals that the boundary between legal statuses is not fixed, that once a person gains legal 
status, their status is not “safe.”  In the context of the RQ, the nation-state shifts the qualifications 
for citizenship from centralized existence to physical residence.  In changing the conditions for 
citizenship, the nation-state increases precarity of PR status. Physical residence fails to take into 
account quality of connections to Canada, and instead threatens to push individuals to the limits 
of separation from family, friends, and loved ones; severs their feelings of belonging; and 
prevents them from making meaningful contribution to Canada.  
The way these draconian changes are justified is through the Crackdown’s discourses on 
the need to reduce criminality and fraud. Thus, we see how criminalization operates not only to 
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monitor and control populations, and compel their obedience, but also to justify and promote 
increases in precarity of status. How do individuals perceive the nation-state that criminalizes 
them? In the next section, I focus on the immigrant’s relationship to the nation-state in the 
context of criminalization.  
 
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NATION-STATE 
 
 The previous two sections examined how criminalization is an effective method of 
discipline populations, and how it increases the thresholds for unwanted populations to maintain 
legal status. In this section, I focus on immigrants’ relationship to the nation-state in the context 
of criminalization. The interviews reveal that immigration is a process in which individuals 
encounter violence on behalf of the nation-state at multiple points in time. Despite this, 
immigrants do not radically resist the operation of the nation-state; instead they attempt to find 
accommodation in the exclusionary entity. Individuals view citizenship as a way to mitigate the 
precarity they experience as Permanent Residents. Their situation is thus a demonstration of what 
Brown (1993) calls “wounded attachments.” I conclude by arguing that contrary to being a threat 
to national identity, and taking away Canadian values, immigrants are important agents of 
nation-building.  
Immigration involves violence. This violence occurs at various points of interaction with 
the nation-state. When individuals encounter violence, they witness the unraveling of the 
national myth of Canada as a generous, open, and welcoming country. There are three points at 
which violence replaces the national myth, the first usually being the operation of the 
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bureaucratic immigration system. One person describes her experience with the immigration 
system as follows: 
When I first met him [my husband], it was kind eye-opening. Oh, you mean, 
everyone can’t travel like this [without a visa]? But now, [sighs] now I almost 
feel like this country of mine – where I was born, Canada – I keep thinking it 
can’t surprise me anymore in how differently it treats people. I mean at the 
political level, not person to person. But then it keeps surprising me. And the 
RQ is a case in point. (Linda) 
 
Through the experience of applying for visitor visas, permanent residence, and citizenship for 
her husband, this individual experienced the high level of scrutiny placed on foreigners wanting 
to enter Canada, a scrutiny she never experienced as a citizen. The immigration system reveals a 
highly exclusionary and stringent nation-state in operation. In the face of this, immigrants must 
perform what is required of them, or risk being denied entry. The heightened security and 
exclusionary criteria is a form of state violence that non-citizens experience.  
Another point of contact in which the national myth of generosity and openness begins to 
unravel – and individuals begin to experience violence – is in interactions with people. Many 
Canadians are still racist and averse to individuals who do not fit the white Canadian identity. 
One person explains encountering such behaviour: 
But I still like that honesty. I still like it when dealing with Texans or, you 
know, Americans who are racist - at least they say it to my face so I know 
who I’m dealing with. But if you have racism in your subconscious and you 
don’t express it - now that will change how you would treat me. But it’s going 
to be much harder for me to deal with it, because you don’t just outright say 
to me “You look scary to me”, or “You look like a terrorist to me”, or “You 
look like this to me – or that.” Um, so, yeah, that is some certain aspect of 
Canadian culture that I don’t really appreciate. But anyways, I think there is 





Through interacting with people, the imagined image of the “nation” of Canada begins to 
unravel, and show inconsistencies and contradictions, such as racism. Individuals who do not fit 
norm (or “perform” the norm) of being white, encounter racism. 
A third point where the national myth unravels is through the rhetoric of the Immigration 
Minister in the public discourse. Permanent Residents describe their reaction to the Minister’s 
rhetoric regarding the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown. I was surprised at how many interviewees 
pointed out the Minister as a direct source of animosity. One person explains how the Minister’s 
rhetoric impacted him: 
There were some negative experience in the beginning of the immigration 
process. After I applied and waited for let’s say, one year, it [my perception of 
Canada] changed. I started to read about the political attitude of Immigration 
Minister Kenney and the paranoid campaign of looking for fraudsters 
everywhere, filling up the air with this poisonous suspicion. It was very 
negative part of the experience, and still is. (Alexei) 
 
In attempting to please the Canadian public about the increased security on citizenship, Minister 
Jason Kenney alienates immigrants waiting for citizenship. Individuals do not identify with how 
they are portrayed to be in the public discourse. Moreover, they do not appreciate violent 
undertones of such rhetoric. It is worth mentioning the criminalization rhetoric turns the violent 
actions of the nation-state on its head by arguing that immigrants (read: criminals) are 
perpetrators of violence against the nation-state. While it is difficult for a single person to 
commit violent actions against an entire nation, it is much more possible for the nation-state to 
commit violence against individuals. 
Despite various points of unraveling of the national myth, immigrants still wish to be part 
of the myth of what it is to be Canadian. Many of the individuals I interviewed were part of, or 
had heard of, the Association of Future Canadians. The purpose of the group is to mobilize RQ 
recipients and their allies to “ensure a fair and timely path to citizenship” and “fight against 
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unreasonable citizenship delays” (Residence Questionnaire Wordpress, n.d.[b]). In addition to 
advocating for changes to how citizenship is processed, the network serves as a support group 
and source of information sharing. The network resists the current way in which citizenship 
applications are processed, but nonetheless seeks accommodation in the institution of citizenship. 
The interviewees do not reject the state and its promises. Rather, they wish to obtain their 
citizenship in order to be recognized as members of the nation-state. Individuals explain how 
they perform many norms associated with the Canadian national identity, even though they do 
not receive formal recognition (i.e., citizenship) for it: 
They are kids, they do not have that much maturity, but still all the day, the 
morning, the evening too, they are singing “Oh Canada,” and all these things. 
Sometimes we are joking with them, “I am Indian.” [And they say] – “No, no, 
no, we’re Canadian.”So they are believing that they are Canadian, but they 
don’t know actually that they’re not officially. So sometimes we think we are 
playing with their emotions. From the morning we are starting our day with 
“Oh Canada” and they are not knowing they are not officially Canadian. 
(Parth) 
 
I feel in many aspects, if not completely, that I’m Canadian. But I can’t get 
that recognition officially. I don’t really have that much connection to my 
home country anymore, other than the language I speak still … I’ve been here 
since I was 16 and I’m 22 right now ... If I’m not Canadian, what am I? That’s 
the question. (Milovan) 
 
The individuals expressed that they felt they were “Canadian,” and they seek formal recognition 
from the nation-state to solidify their identity. In a sense, immigrants are important perpetuators 
of the national identity. They often expressed feelings of conflicted identity, in that they felt 
Canadian, but were not granted citizenship. Even though they are performing the norms required 
of them, they yearn for formal recognition from the nation-state. 
Despite their frustrations with the citizenship application process, individuals did not 
radically question the nation-state. Many of them did not express concern about the RQ itself 
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which directs many criminalization tactics toward them, such as de-humanization, fear, and over-
surveillance. Rather individuals were concerned with its lack of proper administration: 
The RQ is not the problem. The processing time is the problem. You need 
more information? We are ready to provide all the information. (Parth) 
 
As I said, my problem is not about scrutinizing people. My problem is about, 
you know, dedicating proper resources to it. My problem is, you know, 
playing with people’s emotions while not really being honest about the 
performance of your scrutinizing strategy. My problem is, you know, about 
not being honest about things and responsible. If they did it in a responsible 
way and they scrutinize, I have no problem – they can scrutinize me - as long 
as it’s not going to take me forever to get my citizenship. As long as it’s not 
going to affect me so much in a negative way without getting a thing out of it. 
(Milovan) 
 
Thus, despite being faced with violence from the state, many individuals do not question the 
state’s power over their lives, but rather accept it. One person explains: “They’re assessing 
whether I’m worthy. That’s embarrassing, you know. I would like my worthiness to be so 
obvious, that it’s undeniable.” In this quote, the individual explains that she wants the state to 
acknowledge that she’s worthy; she does not question the state’s right or ability to question her 
worthiness. The sense of wishing to be recognized as worthy of citizenship was present in all 
interviewees.  
The RQ recipients are not able to understand their position within the operation of the 
neoliberal state, and thus critically analyze what is happening to them and why. They are only 
able to feel anxiety and the desire to be accepted. Brown (1993) writes that in cases of exclusion 
or marginalization, individuals often desire that what is excluding or oppressing them. In this 
case, individuals desire to be part of the nation-state, even though it is denying them 
membership; their impulse is to seek membership into what they are being excluded from, and 
thus reiterate the power of the nation-state (Brown, 1993). Contrary to the public discourse that 
immigrants “threaten” the security of the nation-state, it is possible to see that they uphold its 
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operation and identity, even when it targets exclusionary measures at them. A reason why 
individuals seek accommodation is because they view citizenship as a way to eliminate the 
precarity they experience as Permanent Residents. 
Their relationship to the nation-state is revealed to be complex and contradictory, with 
the national myth unraveling in the bureaucratic operation of the Canadian state, and through the 
public discourse, specifically the rhetoric of the Immigration Minister. Despite experiencing the 
fractioning of the national myth, individuals still wish to be part of the myth and to be 
acknowledged as “Canadian.” Immigrants are in fact important agents of nation-building, given 





From the stories of RQ recipients emerges a picture of ideal neoliberal citizens trapped in 
a bureaucratic operation of the nation-state, hindered from opportunities, and plagued by feelings 
of stress, fear, and vulnerability. Their stories provide insight into how criminalization is a 
powerful means of controlling people of colour, and operates through de-humanization, fear 
tactics, and over-surveillance. Criminalization is signaled by these forms of control in people’s 
lives. The stories reveal the precarity of Permanent Resident status, which constrains their 
mobility. The limited mobility, not only separates them from friends and family, but prevents 
them from being ideal neoliberal citizens. Criminalization, ironically, justifies increasing the 
residence requirements for citizenship, and consequently increases precarity in PR status, which 
further prevents individuals from being ideal neoliberal subjects. Individuals’ relationship to the 
nation-state in the context of criminalization is a complex one. While individuals experience 
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violence from the nation-state, they still desire to be accepted in its institutions. I conclude that 
the contingencies surrounding PR status result in neoliberal subjects who cannot attain their full 
potential. The move to make residence purely physical increases precarity in PR status and 
prevents individuals from being ideal neoliberal subjects. Criminalization, in its move to heavily 
regulate and control populations, prevents Permanent Residents from being ideal neoliberal 
subjects. 
 In order to better understand individuals’ lived experience in the Citizenship Fraud 
Crackdown, I draw on literature that explores how the nation-state operates in the realm of 
immigration and precarity, and how individuals respond to the actions of the nation-state. 
Scholars agree that the nation-state is the primary agent in upholding immigration controls and 
regulating precarity of status (Bauder, 2013; Dauvergne, 2008; Goldring & Landolt, 2013; 
Nevins, 2002; Wright, 2013). Conditionality theory, in particular, explains that precarity exists 
even in legal statuses, as individuals are barred from exercising the rights their status endows, or 
through changing requirements of legal categories. By increasing the use of the RQ, the nation-
state is shifting the requirements of citizenship from centralized existence to physical residence. 
The nation-state is able to justify these changes on the grounds of perceived threat (Brodie, 
2009). Criminality enables the nation-state to justify operating in the exception needed to change 
the boundaries between legal statuses. Criminalization serves to justify the need to increase these 
boundaries.  
The second body of literature attempts to understand how individuals perform in the 
context of immigration and precarity. Transnational feminist scholars argue that it is only 
possible to understand how power functions by looking at how it is expressed on the bodies of 
the marginalized (Aharonson & Ramsy, 2010; Parenti, 2000; Zedner, 2010). This framework 
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centers on understanding lived experiences of those implicated in the Citizenship Fraud 
Crackdown. The individuals experience the RQ in powerful ways because the nation-state 
conceals its decision-making process (Kirby, 1997 as cited in Mountz, 2004). Even though 
individuals are hurt by the exclusionary measures of the nation-state, such as the Citizenship 
Fraud Crackdown, they nonetheless continue to seek membership in the entity that suppresses 
them. The phenomenon is described by Wendy Brown’s (1993) concept of wounded 
attachments. 
In focusing on the voices from the margins, the interviews contradict the criminalizing 
rhetoric in three important ways. First, they humanize the individuals who are cast into abject 
otherness by criminal rhetoric. Second, they show that legal status is not “too easy” to attain, 
rather precarity exists across legal statuses. Third, whereas the criminalizing rhetoric serves to 
portray immigrants as a threat to the nation-state, the interviews reveal the contrary; immigrants 
yearn to be accepted by Canada, and support the institutions of the nation-state. By contradicting 
the rhetoric of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown, the interviews show how the criminalization 
functions. 
The emotional stories interviewees shared about their experiences with the RQ help to 
shift them from abject others and restore their humanity. The narratives reveal that the RQ 
recipients are not criminals with evil-motives, but rather, they are normal humans, with needs, 
feelings, and dreams, like the rest of us. It is by sharing the stories of those in the margins that 
the criminalizing rhetoric of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown begins to lose its hold on the 
imagination of the members of the nation-state. The stories from the margins reveal stories of 
aspiration, hope, and desire to contribute to the nation-state. 
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Individuals explained the precarity of living with Permanent Resident status and their 
hope for citizenship as a means to mitigate their precarity. However, as Chapter 5 showed, the 
Citizenship Fraud Crackdown serves to introduce precarity in citizenship, by differentiating 
between birthright citizenship and dual citizenship. Although immigrants might think that 
obtaining citizenship is eliminating precarity from their status, they are mistaken. The 
conditionality of their status persists into even the most secure status – citizenship.  
There is a strong connection between the precarity immigrants of the Citizenship Fraud 
Crackdown experience, and their agency (performativity). Butler (2009) writes: 
The question of how performativity links with precarity might be summed up in these 
more important questions: How does the unspeakable population speak and make its 
claims? What kind of disruption is this within the field of power? And how can such 
populations lay claim to what they require? (xii) 
 
In the case of individuals implicated in the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown, one can note that they 
are in fact provided no voice in the public realm. They are not able to disrupt the criminalizing 
rhetoric used to portray them. Despite this, the individuals convene on online groups, such as the 
Association of Future Canadians, which facilitates information sharing and media campaigns. 
They attempt to support each other as much as possible, and share their voice wherever 
permitted, whether through intermittent radio, newspaper interviews, or research projects such as 





CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
 The Citizenship Fraud Crackdown was an initiative announced by Minister Jason Kenney 
in July 2011. Its main purpose was to eradicate fraud in the citizenship program. The Crackdown 
claimed to find unprecedented cases of individuals obtaining citizenship through residency fraud, 
and promised to revoke status on a scale never seen before in Canadian history. In addition to 
revoking status, a less publicized, secondary, approach to the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown was 
the revision and increased use of the Residence Questionnaire. The Residence Questionnaire 
evaluates physical presence in Canada of citizenship applicants. Whereas revocation attempted to 
eliminate the presence of fraud, the Residence Questionnaire served as a means for deterring 
fraud. A central component of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown, thus, was focused on enforcing 
physical residency in Canada, one of three different interpretations under the Citizenship Act. In 
reality, fraud was found in very few cases, which proved the rhetoric surrounding the initiative to 
be hollow and misleading.  
My goal in studying the Crackdown was to answer the question: 
How are race and neoliberalism conjoined in the conception of Canadian citizenship? 
The Citizenship Fraud Crackdown is riddled with racial and economic logics that provide insight 
into the relationship between neoliberalism and race. Kenney often justified the Crackdown as a 
means of improving Canada’s economy by making its immigration system more efficient and 
secure. The security-efficiency binary reveals strong neoliberal underpinnings present in 
citizenship.  Race also plays an integral part in the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown. Shortly after 
coming into power, the first controversy the Conservative government faced was the evacuation 
of Canadians from Lebanon in July 2006 (Harder & Zhyznomirska, 2012). The scandal, 
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nicknamed the “citizens of convenience controversy,” marked the beginning of their obsession 
with reforming citizenship. As the chapters above discuss, and as documents obtained from the 
Access to Information and Privacy Act (ATIP) reveal, the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown was 
launched in part due to the Lebanese citizens of convenience controversy, and the Crackdown 
disproportionately affected Lebanese and Middle Eastern citizens. The relationship to the 
Lebanese-Canadians controversy reveals strong racial underpinning present in Citizenship Fraud 
Crackdown.  
The first part of my investigation consisted of an analysis of the public discourse 
surrounding the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown (Chapter 5).  The finding from analysis - that 
neoliberalism is associated with the rise of criminalization of immigrants - is consistent to 
findings from other scholars (Chan, 2004; Dauvergne, 2007; Stumpf, 2006). The investigation is 
insightful for understanding how criminality functions in relation to citizenship. The crime 
agenda has increasingly fractured citizenship; there are now growing differences between birth-
right citizenship and dual citizenship. Dual citizens may have their citizenship revoked easier 
than ever and for a growing number of criminal-related reasons, while birthright citizens face 
immunity from revocation. The comforting provision of “once a citizen, always a citizen” no 
longer holds for citizens born outside of Canada, meaning the nation-state will always have 
conditional terms of acceptance for dual citizens. Additionally, dual citizens must spend a 
regulated amount of time in Canada to qualify for their citizenship, whereas birthright citizens do 
not. The shift to recognizing only physical residence as a precursor to citizenship serves to tether 
immigrants physically to the nation-state for prolonged periods of time and increases the 
qualifications for citizenship. This fracturing of citizenship serves to uphold racialized division 
in citizenship, as the changes applied to the status are often meant to reduce the rights and 
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entitlements of the “criminal” (read: racial) other. Presumed criminality is used as a means to 
justify decreasing the rights and protections of citizenship. 
  The Citizenship Fraud Crackdown demonstrates how discourses of crime are particularly 
powerful in garnering public support for anti-immigrant laws and policies. The investigation 
reveals how a few cases are used to set precedent for far-reaching changes to immigration 
policies. The Citizenship Fraud Crackdown served to convince the public that an overhaul to the 
Citizenship Act was needed. Many components of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown were 
incorporated in new changes to the Act, thus enshrining the criminalization of immigrants in law. 
One of the main influences the Crackdown had was to shift the legal definition of the residence 
qualification for citizenship from “centralized existence” to physical existence. The Crackdown 
also resulted in increased Ministerial powers for revoking citizenship. The challenge the 
Conservatives faced after the citizens of convenience controversy, was how to frame their desire 
to reform dual citizenship. The Conservatives framed it in the light of criminality and widespread 
fraud. The power of this rhetoric is revealed by the fact that they were able to make such 
monumental changes to citizenship. 
  The discourse analysis reveals that the Crackdown relied on constructions of nation and 
citizen that are similar to historical conceptions, in that they rely on racialized images of the 
“other” and the self. What has changed with the rise of neoliberalism is how the racial other is 
perceived. Whereas before the racial other was perceived through cultural differences, it appears 
that race now is increasingly delineated through illegality, crime, and the economy. The “illegal” 
immigrant, or the “fraudster” who is trying to obtain citizenship that is not rightfully his is the 
new racial conception of “other” which frames how we perceive our nation and our citizens. 
Neoliberal logic infuses criminality in portrayals of racial “others.” It thus takes up racist goals to 
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delineate us and them, deserving and non-deserving members of the nation-state. I conclude that 
the criminalization of immigrants (a neoliberal tool) supports existing racial conceptions of 
citizenship. In taking the stance that neoliberalism is a racist ideology, and does not just function 
parallel to racism, I differ from how scholar’s view on race and neoliberalism. 
  The Citizenship Fraud Crackdown is not without its consequences, as the interviews 
discussed in Chapter 6 reveal. Immigrants who are waiting for their citizenship are prevented 
from being ideal neoliberal subjects. They experience limited mobility, and face heightened 
sense of vulnerability and worry. They feel alienated by the discourses and policies that portray 
them as criminals and wrong doers. The paradox lies in the fact that the nation-state uses these 
tactics to solidify the national identity for its existing members, but in doing so, it alienates future 
members of the nation-state. In effect, it undermines the effectiveness of its nation-building 
tactics. Despite feeling victimized, the individuals still wished to acquire citizenship as a 
validation of their belonging in the national identity and as a means to eliminate the precarity 
they experienced as Permanent Residents.  
  Like Russo (2008), I am inclined to say that the changes to citizenship under the 
Conservative are not a new trend. Russo (2008) notes that the linking of security and 
immigration began under Jean Chretien’s Liberal government. Where the Conservatives have, 
perhaps, made a break from other governments is that they have created fast-paced immigration 
reforms with minimal public consultation, and have consolidated immigration and crime more 
than any other party. They have managed to consolidate crime and immigration through the 
rhetoric of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown, and through the changes in the Citizenship Act, 
which allow for increased grounds of revocation based on criminality. 
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One factor that I have had trouble understanding is how the Conservatives could set in 
motion such monumental changes to citizenship based on anecdotal information of citizenship 
fraud. It is while mulling over this conundrum that I realized the power of story-telling. The 
“citizens of convenience” story began the Conservatives obsession to reform citizenship. It is not 
possible to emphasize enough that much of the “controversy” surrounding Lebanese dual 
citizens, namely that they spent large amounts of time living outside Canada, was not evidence-
based. Rather, the controversy was fueled by stories that were racist in nature (i.e., that Lebanese 
individuals can never fully be “Canadian,” and an inherent suspicion towards immigrants who 
are people of colour).  The Conservatives relied on anecdotal evidence of fraud (a story) to set in 
motion the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown. The Crackdown represents the nation-state fashioning 
its own story about immigration – a story that sounded the alarms of widespread fraud and threat 
to citizenship. The Crackdown was successful in garnering public support for a massive overhaul 
to citizenship, or at least creating a public complacent to the changes. Why was the anecdotal 
evidence so powerful in setting in motion these chains of events? I believe that the answer lies in 
the fact that the perception that is citizenship under threat is enough to for the nation-state to start 
heavily investing in nation-building. Sadly, the most important story of all – the voices of those 
who bear the violence of nation-building – remains unheard. We see with the Citizenship Fraud 
Crackdown how racist fears (xenophobia of immigrants) of are made into racial narratives 
(criminals are threatening to take advantage of Canada), which can assist dominant groups to 
make sense of the world in particular ways, and also justify and defend current racial 
arrangements (such as the crackdown on fraud, and consequent stripping of rights of dual 
citizens). Whether these racial narratives are fact or fiction loses importance, as the reiteration of 
these stories is made material, as the nation-state continues to uphold the connection between 
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race and nation. The more we are attuned to these stories, the more we can react appropriately 
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APPENDIX A: OVERVIEW OF BILL C-24 THE 
“STRENGTHENING CANADIAN CITIZENSHIP ACT” 
 
Previous Citizenship Act (1977-2013) Citizenship Act revised under Bill C-24 
 Residence for three out of four years (1,095 days); 
 No requirement that resident be physically 
present; 
 Time as a non-permanent resident (non-PR) may 
be counted toward residence for citizenship; 
 No intent to reside provision 
 Requires physical presence for four years (1,460 
days) out of the six years; 
 183 days minimum of physical presence per year in 
four out of six years; 
 Eliminate use of time spent in Canada as a non-
permanent resident (non-PR); 
 Introduce “intent to reside” provision 
 Adult applicants aged 18–54 must meet language 
requirements and pass knowledge test; upper age 
limit of 54 currently established by policy, not in 
legislation; 
 Applicants can meet knowledge requirement with 
assistance of an interpreter 
 Requires applicants aged 14–64 to meet language 
requirements and pass knowledge test; 
 Applicants must meet knowledge requirement in 
English or French 
 Most “Lost Canadians” had their citizenship 
restored in 2009, but some “Lost Canadians” were 
not covered by that  change and are not eligible 
for citizenship 
 Extends citizenship to “Lost Canadians” born before 
1947 as well as their 1st generation children born 
abroad 
 Bars getting citizenship from people with 
domestic criminal charges and convictions 
 Expands bar on getting citizenship to people with 
foreign criminal charges and convictions 
 Consultants not required to be registered or 
regulated in order to represent individuals in 
citizenship manner; 
 Few tools to deter fraud and ensure program 
integrity; 
 Fines and penalties for fraud are a maximum of 
$1,000 and/or one year in prison 
 Defines who is an authorized representative and 
provides authority to develop regulations to 
designate a regulatory body whose members would 
be authorized to act as consultants in citizenship 
matters; 
 Authority to refuse applicant for fraud; fines and 
penalties for fraud are a maximum $100,000 and/or 
five years in prison 
 Governor in Council (GIC) final decision maker 







 Gives Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) 
Minister authority to decide on routine revocation 
cases 
 Complex revocation cases such as war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, security, other  human or 
international rights violations, and organized 








Previous Citizenship Act (1977-2013) (continued) Citizenship Act revised under Bill C-24 (continued) 
 GIC final decision maker on discretionary grants 
of citizenship 
 Gives CIC Minister the authority to decide on 
discretionary grants of citizenship 
 Limited authority to define what constitutes a 
complete application 
 Establishes authority to define what constitutes a 
complete application and what evidence applicants 
must provide    
 Citizenship grant is a three-step decision-making 
process 
 Changes citizenship grant to a single-step process 
that reduces duplication and improves processing 
times. 
 No requirement to file Canadian income taxes to 
be eligible for a grant of citizenship 
 Requires adult applicants to file Canadian income 
taxes, as  required under the Income Tax Act, to be 
eligible for citizenship 
 No authority to revoke citizenship for acts against 
Canada’s national interest 
 Establishes the authority to revoke Canadian 
citizenship from dual citizens who were members of 
an armed force or an organized armed group 
engaged in armed conflict with Canada, and deny it 
to PRs for the same reasons 
 Authority to revoke Canadian citizenship and deny 
it to PRs who are convicted of terrorism, high 
treason, treason, or spying offences, depending on 
the sentence received 
 No fast-track mechanism for citizenship for 
members of the military to honour their service to 
the Canadian Armed Forces and address 
deployment challenges 
 Creates a fast-track mechanism for citizenship for 
PRs serving with—and individuals on exchange 
with— the Canadian Armed Forces to honour their 
service to Canada 
 




APPENDIX B: ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND PRIVACY ACT 
REQUESTS 
 





Summary of Request Disposition Number of Pages 
Disclosed 
A-2013-11016 Transition binder prepared for the Minister of State for 
multiculturalism as per July 2013, cabinet shuffle. 
Disclosed in part 50 
A-2012-19707 
I request ALL electronic and physical files, copies of ALL 
directions, emails, memorandums and guidelines with respect to 
when and how Citizenship requests residency questionnaires 
from applicants for grants of citizenship and all information 
regarding the processing or lack thereof and delay in processing 
citizenship grant applications where residency questionnaires 
have been received from January 2011 to January 11 2013. 
Disclosed in part 187 
A-2012-11322 A complete copy of statistics or other data held by your 
department on citizenship fraud by province (I want the history 
of the number of fraud identified, type of fraud, by province, by 
date and year) from 2006 to present (September 14, 2012). 
Disclosed in part 461 
A-2011-56246 The following information referenced in Minister Jason 
Kenney''s statement made in Montreal on December 9, 2011: 
Information, including identifiers, regarding the more than 
2,100 individuals that Minister Kenney indicated obtained their 
citizenship fraudulently and whose citizenship is in the process 
of being revoked; Information, including identifiers, regarding 
the nearly 4,400 people with permanent resident status who 
Minister Kenney indicated are known to be implicated in 
residence fraud; and Information, including identifiers, 
regarding the nearly 1,400 people who have withdrawn or 
abandoned their citizenship applications because of this new 
scrutiny. 
Disclosed in part 17 
A-2012-05827 Copies of all briefing notes, memoranda, reports, research and 
other communications material prepared for the Minister and 
ministerial staff, as well as all CIC Departmental 
documentation, including briefing notes, memoranda, question 
period notes, policy documents with keyword "Residence 
Questionnaire" from January 1, 2012 to June 19, 2012. 
Disclosed in part 14 
 
 A-2012-21082 Copy of statistics or other data held by your department 
permanent residency fraud by province (history of the number 
of fraud identified, type of fraud, by province, by date and year) 
from 2006 to present (January 24, 2013). I wish to obtain them 
classified by category, in a way that makes it easy to compile 
statistics. 
Does not exist 0 
159 
 
The following is the ATIP that I requested, that is yet to be processed: 
Request 
Number 
Summary of Request 
A-2013-23291 Internal reports, policies, procedures that outline CIC’s attempts to reduce citizenship fraud and 
residence fraud starting January 2011 to present. Including, but not limited, to:  CIC Fraud Action 
Plan (all versions), rationale for the Fraud Action Plan(s), progress report(s) on the Fraud Action 
Plan(s), CIC research that resulted in departmental action to eradicate citizenship fraud/residence 
fraud, rationale for updating the Residence Questionnaire (as mentioned in OB 407), progress 
reports on citizenship fraud and permanent residence fraud investigations that started in 2011. 
Reports that support the Fraud Action Plan, or that give background information on citizenship 
fraud, revocations and RQs.  Documents which show how the evacuation of Lebanese-Canadians in 
2011 (“citizens of convenience”) led to actions to reduce citizenship fraud. 
Statistics on: 1) The fraud investigations  (ex – number of revocations, number of cases under 
investigation, country of origin of cases, successful/unsuccessful revocations), 2) The number of 
Residence Questionnaires given out to citizenship applicants and citizenships revoked between 
January 1990 - January 2014 - if possible, include the country of origin of the RQ recipients 
 





APPENDIX C: RESIDENCE QUESTIONNAIRE 
The following pages contain the five-page Residence Questionnaire that was updated on April 2012, and 
began to be distributed on May 7, 2012, as part of the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown. The copy of this RQ 
was obtained from the Association of Future Canadians’ website (Residence Questionnaire Wordpress, 
n.d.[a]), which also contains the RQ version previous to the Citizenship Fraud Crackdown, and a 


















APPENDIX D: INDIVIDUALS IMPLICATED IN CITIZENSHIP 
FRAUD, BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH  
 








Source: ATIP A-2012-11322 (CIC, 2012b) 
